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I. INTRODUCTION
Debate continues to rage over limited shareholder liability and
the social costs it imposes.' While proposals flourish for imposing
liability on shareholders to reduce these costs, little attention has been
devoted to a more promising solution: vicarious tort liability for high-
ranking corporate officers. Limited shareholder liability produces
benefits, but it also inflicts costs, including encouraging excessively
1. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 43 CORP. PRAC.
COMMENTATOR 517, 568-74 (2001) (noting that limited liability has been much debated recently
in academic circles); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1566 (1991) (noting the burst of scholarship in the area); Nina A.
Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 1203, 1205-06 (2002) (discussing the debate).
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risky corporate activity. These costs are most pronounced in the tort
context because potential tort victims rarely can protect themselves by
monitoring corporate activities or bargaining with corporate actors.
Commentators disagree on limited shareholder liability's net impact
on social utility and what, if anything, should be done to change
limited liability. Some defend the current regime as efficient or at
least preferable to alternatives, even in the tort context. 2 Others
propose curtailing limited liability, arguing that vicarious liability for
corporate torts ought to extend to some or all shareholders in closely
held corporations, 3 or that courts ought to "pierce the corporate veil"
more often. 4  Still others have gone much further, arguing that
liability for corporate torts should extend to all shareholders. 5 Few,
however, have seriously considered extending vicarious liability to the
firm's other primary stakeholders, corporate management. 6 Most who
2. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 41-59 (1991); Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 563-66; Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 104 (1985).
3. See, e.g., Paul Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation
Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 148-49 (1980) (arguing liability should extend to shareholders in
closely held companies); Note, Should Shareholders Be Personally Liable for the Torts of Their
Corporations?, 76 YALE L.J. 1190, 1190 (1967) (same); see also Philip I. Blumberg, Limited
Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573, 630 (1986) (advocating the abolition of
limited liability for wholly owned subsidiaries); Leebron, supra note 1, at 1618-19 (same); Robert
B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate
Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4-6 (1994) (suggesting shareholder-
managers should be vicariously liable for corporate torts).
4. See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, Limited Liability and the Efficient Allocation of Resources,
89 Nw. U. L. REV. 140, 162-65 (1994) (arguing that veil piercing is justified when the corporate
form is used to perpetuate a fraud or engage in known risks); Debra Cohen-Whelan, Individual
Responsibility in the Wake of Limited Liability, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 335, 363 (1998) (calling for
application of veil piercing in the LLC context); Franklin A. Gevurtz, Piercing Piercing: An
Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion Surrounding the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 76
OR. L. REV. 853, 907 (1997) (arguing that courts should pierce in the tort context when the firm
lacks insurance to cover reasonably foreseeable risks). Other commentators advocate codifying
aspects of piercing doctrine. See, e.g., Rebecca J. Huss, Revamping Veil Piercing for All Limited
Liability Entities: Forcing the Common Law Doctrine into the Statutory Age, 70 U. CIN. L. REV.
95, 123-24 (2001); John H. Matheson & Raymond B. Eby, The Doctrine of Piercing the Veil in an
Era of Multiple Limited Liability Entities: An Opportunity To Codify the Test for Waiving
Owners' Limited Liability Protection, 75 WASH. L. REV. 147, 182 (2000).
5. See, e.g., Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Lemonade Stand: Feminist and Other Reflections on
the Limited Liability of Corporate Shareholders, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1440 (1992) (suggesting
shareholder limited liability ought to be abandoned); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman,
Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1879 (1991)
(advocating pro rata shareholder liability for corporate torts); Christopher D. Stone, The Place of
Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. 1, 74 (1980) (arguing for
proportionate shareholder liability).
6. Only a few scholars have offered a thorough critique of managerial liability. Cf. Jennifer
H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and
Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 691 (arguing that with respect to fraud on the market,
vicarious entity liability "does not serve the goals of optimal deterrence or optimal risk
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
have addressed the idea have dismissed it with little analysis. 7 In this
post-Enron environment of concerns over corporate accountability and
participant behavior, it is time to take seriously the option of holding
top corporate officers responsible for the torts of their enterprises.
In a recent Columbia Law Review article, Professor Nina
Mendelson offers the most thorough analysis to date of limited
shareholder liability's moral hazard, i.e., its encouragement of
excessively risky activities.8 Building on existing scholarship, she
contends that the efficiency-based arguments in favor of limited
shareholder liability fail to take into account qualitative differences
among shareholders, that these arguments at most support limited
liability only for small or passive investors, and that the limited
liability of controlling shareholders for corporate torts harms social
utility.9  She proposes that all shareholders with the capacity to
control corporate activity be held liable for corporate torts and tort-
like statutory violations. 10 Professor Mendelson's critique of limited
liability is compelling. She demonstrates that the current regime is
socially costly and explains why imposing liability on controlling
participants is the most efficient way to reduce excessively risky
corporate behavior. Nevertheless, her prescription ultimately falls
short because, like most previous reform proposals, it seeks to
"unlimit" shareholder liability.
Despite scholarly criticisms, limited shareholder liability is an
enduring feature of our economic landscape. Since the early twentieth
century, state business corporation statutes have limited the liability
of shareholders for corporate obligations to the amount of their
investment (except in very rare circumstances).11 These statutes draw
spreading" and should be supplanted by a regime of agent liability and criminal enforcement, but
distinguishing liability for market fraud from other corporate liabilities in tort). See generally
Thompson, supra note 3, at 1-41 (1994) (discussing both managerial and shareholder liability).
Professor Kraakman offers a detailed exploration of managerial liability in an early article,
suggesting its potential usefulness in some contexts. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate
Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984). But, in a later
article proposing pro rata shareholder liability, he rejects managerial liability in certain
situations. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1928-29.
7. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 61-62 (rejecting managerial liability
on overdeterrence grounds); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1929 (same); see also
Gregory Walker, The Personal Liability of Corporate Officers in Private Actions Under the
Sherman Act: Murphy Tugboat in Distress, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 909, 934 n.137 (1987) (noting
that holding a corporate officer jointly liable for firm wrongdoing may lead to overdeterrence).
8. See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1203.
9. See generally id. at 1203-71.
10. See id. at 1271-79.
11. Two minor exceptions are the New York and Wisconsin statutes, which impose liability
on some shareholders for wage claims. See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 103 (McKinney 2003); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 180.0622 (West 2002).
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no distinction between controlling and passive shareholders, between
closely held and publicly traded firms, or between voluntary and
involuntary creditors. 12 Moreover, the trend in the last two decades
has been towards expanding limited liability protections rather than
curtailing them. 13 Thus, as an initial matter, statutory reform in
favor of unlimiting shareholder liability is a political nonstarter. 14
In addition, although courts have utilized various "veil
piercing" theories to extend liability to shareholders, such theories
cannot serve as a vehicle for meaningful reform. Veil piercing
jurisprudence is unpredictable, inconsistent, and largely
unprincipled. 15 This disarray is a symptom of a more fundamental
flaw: courts use veil piercing to extend liability to select shareholders
when, in fact, state legislatures have conferred on all shareholders the
benefit of limited liability. Whether viewed as a conceptual problem
or as a separation-of-powers problem, this dichotomy has led many
courts to resist piercing even when extending liability might be
efficient or equitable in a given case. For instance, courts almost
never pierce based on shareholder control alone. 16 Piercing therefore
cannot serve as the means of implementing comprehensive reform.
Moreover, a shareholder-based liability regime would be
ineffective and may have adverse downstream consequences for
corporate governance. For example, under a capacity-to-control
liability rule, investors would find ways to maintain control while
evading liability or would reduce their equity stake in any one
corporation to below the level at which they would face liability. A
sophisticated, controlling investor can seek to remain judgment proof
by restructuring the enterprise or by redefining its role within the
firm. 17 On the other hand, if long-term, institutional or fiduciary
investors choose to avoid control-based liability by divesting or
reducing their equity interests, publicly traded firms will lose a
growing, important check against managerial abuse. Thus, although
discussion of limited liability has produced many proposals to alter
shareholder liability, these proposals are unpersuasive.
12. See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
13. Indeed, all states now provide some form of limited liability to equity stakeholders in
"hybrid entities," including limited liability companies ("LLCs") and limited liability
partnerships ("LLPs"). See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
14. See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 540.
15. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 89; Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 554-55.
16. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
17. This is consistent with Professor LoPucki's basic premise that an enterprise can always
be structured in such a way that the owning entity or controlling firm can reap the benefits of
the business with little inconvenience while remaining judgment proof. See generally Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Essential Structure ofJudgment Proofing, 51 STAN. L. REV. 147, 147-60 (1998).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
In this Article, I argue that there is a better way to link control
with accountability in the corporate context and to reduce limited
liability's social costs. The corporation's highest-ranking officers,
rather than its controlling shareholders, should be vicariously liable
for torts of the enterprise. This control-based approach, like Professor
Mendelson's, creates a powerful incentive for primary corporate
participants to compel the firm to internalize tort risk. It also leaves
the beneficial aspects of limited shareholder liability undisturbed and
provides an administratively simple enforcement mechanism. My
proposal, in fact, offers greater efficiency than shareholder liability
regimes. High-ranking corporate officers are the most efficient risk
bearers within the corporate enterprise: they are in the best position
to monitor and avoid risks, and to determine and bargain for efficient
levels of risk spreading among customers, shareholders, and insurers.
Furthermore, traditional claims that managerial risk aversion and
overdeterrence render officer liability inefficient are no longer
convincing. This is due, in part, to the recent emergence of a powerful,
highly compensated, and highly mobile top managerial class. This
class is less subject to human capital "job lock" than a generation ago,
and, given their compensation structure, more risk preferring than
their predecessors. Any remaining tendency towards overdeterrence
will be constrained by their incentive-based compensation, the
equities markets, controlling shareholder oversight, and other factors.
Moreover, officer liability would be effective because, in every firm,
there will be at least one natural person-a named highest-ranking
officer or someone acting in an officer-like capacity-who cannot evade
vicarious liability if the entity lacks the capital or insurance to satisfy
tort claims.
In addition, holding high-ranking corporate officers vicariously
liable for corporate torts is a more realistic proposal than unlimiting
shareholder liability. It is consistent with norms and trends
elsewhere in the law. For example, Congress, state legislatures, and
courts have extended various forms of direct and vicarious liability to
corporate controlling persons, a phenomenon reflected in post-Enron
legislative and regulatory reforms. And high-ranking officer liability
does not depend on statutory reform or on veil piercing. Courts can
implement this regime through a natural extension of respondeat
superior liability consistent with the predominant, contractarian or
"nexus-of-contracts" conception of the firm. Respondeat superior
extends vicarious liability to a principal for the tortious activities of
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agents subject to the principal's direct control,18 thereby shifting the
risk of loss to the person most able to prevent the tortious conduct and
spread the risk. The contractarian view of the firm recognizes that
the corporation is a hub of contractual relationships between its
participants-including shareholders, officers, and creditors-rather
than a single, independent actor. 19 The law ought to account for the
differing inputs and roles of these participants. Thus, when torts are
committed within the enterprise, the law of respondeat superior
should extend principal liability not only to the firm but also to its
highest-ranking officers, since these participants exercise direct
control over firm activities and are the firm's most efficient risk
bearers. In this way, my proposal offers a realistic means of
synthesizing modern tort and corporate law theory, and resolving the
lingering conflict between limited liability and the aims of our tort
regime.
In Part II, I begin by summarizing the history and parameters
of limited liability for firm participants. I then critique corporate veil
piercing, limited shareholder liability's most prominent exception, and
demonstrate that veil piercing doctrine is inherently flawed. This
Part ends with a discussion of recent extensions of controlling person
liability, which collectively constitute another growing hole in limited
liability's protective shield. Part III explores the potential benefits
and costs of limited shareholder liability, focusing largely on efficiency
concerns. It then reviews the existing debate between various
proponents of reform and defenders of the current regime. This Part
concludes with a discussion of why Professor Mendelson's critique of
limited liability is the most persuasive to date, but also discusses why
her proposed reform, like others, is both infeasible and inadequate. In
Part IV, I propose highest-ranking officer liability as an alternative to
both the current regime and to other suggested reforms. I begin by
explaining why, contrary to the claims of other scholars, an officer-
based approach is the most efficient mechanism for retaining the
benefits of limited liability while reducing its social costs. I then
discuss why highest-ranking officer liability would be more effective
than alternatives at preventing judgment evasion. Finally, I establish
that my proposal is realistic, demonstrating that it reflects prevailing
social norms, can be implemented through an extension of tort
principles, and is consistent with both tort and corporate theory.
18. A principal who asserts such direct control over agent activities is a "master" or
"employer." An agent subject to such control is a servant or employee. See infra note 50 and
accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 671, 681-82 (1995) (discussing the "nexus or web of explicit and implicit contracts").
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF LIMITED LIABILITY, VEIL PIERCING, AND
CONTROLLING PERSON LIABILITY
A. Limited Liability
At the most general level, limited liability refers to the legal
default rules that limit the personal liability of a firm's stakeholders
and participants for the firm's obligations. Thus, if the firm fails, the
stakeholders' or participants' losses are limited to their investments-
labor, capital, opportunity costs, etc.-in the firm. Although most
commentary focuses on limited liability for shareholders and the
owners of other modern entities, theories of limited liability existed
long before the modern corporation and extend today to other firm
participants, including managers, agents, and creditors.
Methods for achieving limited liability for commercial activity
have ancient roots.20 For example, under Roman law, the master or
head of household could use the "peculium," a device that allowed the
master or head of household to entrust assets to a slave or son who
would then conduct trade with third parties, to invest in and profit
from a commercial enterprise while limiting his risk of loss to the
amount invested.21 Other ancient doctrines allowed participants to
allocate liability in a variety of ways: the Byzantine "chreokoinonia"
provided a means for passive investors to profit from sea ventures
while limiting their exposure to the amount invested;22 conversely,
20. See, e.g., Leigh A. Bacon, "Freedom of" or "Freedom from"? The Enforceability of
Contracts and the Integrity of the LLC, 50 DUKE L.J. 1087, 1109 (2001) ("[T]he idea of managers
being liable without limit while inactive suppliers of capital risked only their capital is ancient."
(quoting H.A.J. FORD & R.P. AUSTIN, FORD AND AUSTIN'S PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATIONS LAW
1.230 (7th ed. 1995))); Robert W. Hillman, Liability in Historical Perspective, 54 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 615, 615 (1997) ("[Flor as long as commerce has existed, merchants, financiers, and others
associated in business activity have sought to eliminate, minimize, and shift their losses and
liabilities.").
21. See, e.g., David Johnston, Limiting Liability: Roman Law and the Civil Law Tradition,
70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1515, 1515-16 (1995) (discussing limiting liability under Roman law,
including the actio de peculio); David V. Snyder, The Case of Natural Obligations, 56 LA. L. REV.
423, 429 (1995) ("The existence of the peculium in this circumstance made slaves particularly
useful for engaging in commerce because limited liability trading ... was thus possible centuries
before the creation of the corporation."). The Digest of Justinian also explicitly provided for
limited shareholder liability. See DIG. 3.4.7.1 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 10) (Alan Watson ed., 1988)
("A debt to a corporate body is not a debt to individuals and a debt of a corporate body is not a
debt of individuals.").
22. See, e.g., ROBERT S. LOPEZ, BYZANTIUM AND THE WORLD AROUND IT: ECONOMIC AND
INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS 69-85 (1978); Hillman, supra note 20, at 619; Abraham L. Udovitch,
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early Islamic law offered a technique by which a merchant could
operate with limited liability while his (more passive) investing
partner bore the liability risks. 23 During medieval times, some
European traders utilized the "commenda"-containing many of the
attributes of the modern limited partnership, most importantly
passive investor limited liability-to facilitate larger sea-based
ventures. 24 Thereafter, regimes in Continental Europe began to enact
limited partnership statutes, and England and the United States
followed. 25
The corporate form emerged in England and the American
colonies in the late seventeenth century.26  Although limited
shareholder liability is now the primary benefit of the corporate
form, 27 the earliest corporations in England and the United States
served other purposes. 28 In the early 1800s, for example, states
At the Origins of the Western Commenda: Islam, Israel, Byzantium?, 37 SPECULUM 198, 201-02
(1962).
23. See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 20, at 621; see also Daniel Klein, Comment, The Islamic
and Jewish Laws of Usury: A Bridge to Commercial Growth and Peace in the Middle East, 23
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 535, 539 ("A mudaraba is a limited liability partnership in which one
or more people provide 'a fixed amount of disposable money capital.' ").
24. See, e.g., HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION 353 (1983) (noting that, under the commenda, liability of partners was limited
to the amount of their initial investment); Bacon, supra note 20, at 1109 (stating that, under the
commenda, "suppliers of capital . .. risked only the amount of their capital"); Paul J. Mahoney,
Preparing the Corporate Lawyer: Contract or Concession? An Essay on the History of Corporate
Law, 34 GA. L. REV. 873, 880-81 (2000) (indicating that the commenda was similar to a limited
partnership). Investors in land-based ventures during the same period had no such privileges.
See, e.g., Adam B. Weissburg, Note, Reviewing the Law on Joint Ventures with an Eye Towards
the Future, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 487, 506-07 (1990).
25. See, e.g., RONALD E. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION,
1784-1855, at 97-98 (1982) (noting that in 1822, the New York legislature enacted a limited
partnership statute that was based on the French commercial code); Blumberg, supra note 3, at
576-85 (discussing England's slow evolution in eliminating direct shareholder liability and the
ultimate emergence of limited liability); Hillman, supra note 20, at 626-27. Today, limited
partnerships consist of at least one general partner and one limited partner. Limited partners
enjoyed limited liability as long as they did not exercise "control" over the affairs of the
partnership's business. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 303 (2001). The general partner
remains subject to personal liability. Id. § 404.
26. 1 JOSEPH S. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 30-48,
50 (1965) (discussing colonial corporations chartered in England and mentioning that in 1641
"the first of the score or more incorporated boroughs and cities was chartered in Maine");
SEAVOY, supra note 25, at 3-4 (stating that Massachusetts enacted "a general regulatory statute
for towns as early as 1635"); Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability
Company, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1459, 1485 (1998) ("Corporations have existed in America since the
earliest colonial days.").
27. See, e.g., I. MAURICE WORMSER, DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED
CORPORATION PROBLEMS 14 (1927); Thompson, supra note 3, at 6.
28. Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1209 n.15 (noting corporate features predating limited
liability).
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granted the privilege of incorporation for other reasons, such as
facilitating building projects or other activities that enhanced the
public welfare. 29 These charters did not provide for limited liability,
and some expressly provided for full shareholder liability.30 As states
began to extend the privilege of incorporation more broadly, they did
not necessarily provide limited liability as well. 31 Indeed, many state
statutes provided that shareholders were liable for amounts in excess
of their investment. 32
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, most states had
enacted corporation statutes that provided limited shareholder
liability. 33 There is some disagreement over why limited liability
29. See, e.g., HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 26 n.7 (3d ed.
1983) (noting that under special acts of state legislatures, incorporated businesses usually
consisted of "public utility-type enterprises"); SEAVOY, supra note 25, at 5 (stating that the
earliest method for creating a corporation was by individual charter and that such a mode
"assumed that corporations were legally privileged organizations that had to be closely
scrutinized by the legislature because their purposes had to be made consistent with public
welfare"); see also Steven C. Bahls, Application of Corporate Common Law Doctrine to Limited
Liability, 55 MONT. L. REV. 43, 55 (1994) (noting that in the early to mid-1800s, states placed
substantial limitations on corporations and corporate activity).
30. Some charters did not provide for limited liability. See, e.g., Merrick Dodd, The
Evolution of Limited Liability in American Industry: Massachusetts, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1351, 1356
(1948) ("Several of the early Massachusetts manufacturing corporation charters were completely
silent with respect to what rights, if any, corporate creditors would have against individual
shareholders."); Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory,
88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 208 (1985) ("[T]ruly limited shareholder liability was far from the norm in
America even as late as 1900."). But see Blumberg, supra note 3, at 588-89 (noting that there
were some early examples of limited liability in New York). Other charters expressly provided
for full shareholder liability. See, e.g., id. at 588 (discussing such charters in New England states
and New York); William J. Carney, Limited Liability Companies: Origins and Antecedents, 66 U.
COLO. L. REV. 855, 873 (1995) (stating that many incorporated companies lacked limited
shareholder liability during this period); Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing of the
Corporation: Limited Liability, Democracy, and Economics, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 148, 155 (1992)
("In the beginning of the nineteenth century, state legislators tended to impose unlimited
liability on corporate shareholders .... ").
31. See Blumberg, supra note 3, at 577 ("[Limited liability] arose in the wake of the
acceptance of the entity concept but not as a necessary consequence."); Leebron, supra note 1, at
1567 (stating that limited liability "gradually became a fixture of the law between the
seventeenth and nineteenth centuries").
32. See, e.g., J. William Callison, Federalism, Regulatory Competition, and the Limited
Liability Movement: The Coyote Howled and the Herd Stampeded, 26 J. CORP. L. 951, 972 n.153
(2001) ("In fact, throughout the nineteenth century, shareholders did not enjoy complete limited
liability protection since state statutes made them liable to creditors of insolvent corporations for
up to twice the value of their stock .. "); Carney, supra note 30, at 873 n.95 ("In New York,
shareholders in manufacturing corporations bore double liability until all stated capital was paid
until 1828.").
33. Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural Lens,
106 HARV. L. REV. 387, 415 (1992) ("By 1850, most states had enacted statutes providing for
limited liability."); Blumberg, supra note 3, at 593-94 (discussing the legislative development of
limited liability in several industrial states). However, as recently as 1931, California law
imposed personal liability on shareholders on a pro rata basis. See Amalia D. Kessler, Limited
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became universally accepted. Some observers believe that politically
powerful industrialists used their influence to extend limited
liability;34 others argue that limited liability was the product of an
ideological commitment to economic democracy and the corresponding
belief in broad-based entrepreneurialism. 35 Still others contend that
legislators simply became convinced that limited liability would
enhance capital formation and commercial activity. 36 What does
appear largely undisputed, however, is that early proponents of
limited shareholder liability were primarily concerned with limiting
investor exposure to the firm's contract creditors.3 7 Indeed, early
legislatures could not have foreseen potential conflicts between limited
shareholder liability and much later developments in tort law.
Today, the vast majority of state corporation statutes expressly
provide for limited shareholder liability38 and the remaining statutes
clearly imply it. The Model Business Corporation Act, for example,
provides that "[u]nless otherwise provided in the articles of
incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable
for the acts or debts of the corporation except that he may become
liable by reason of his own acts or conduct."39 Similarly, the Delaware
General Corporation Law provides that, as the default rule,
Liability in Context: Lessons from the French Origins of the American Limited Partnership, 32 J.
LEGAL STUD. 511, 532 n.20 (2003) (noting also that New York allowed double liability until
1923).
34. See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 3, at 592-93 (discussing how industrialists pressed for
limited liability for manufacturing companies); see also Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1210-11
("[L]arge-scale industrialists probably pressured the political process for limited liability.").
35. See, e.g., Callison, supra note 32, at 979-80 (discussing democratic theory of limited
liability and offering several arguments that can be made against it); Halpern et al., supra note
3, at 118 (noting that English supporters of limited liability hypothesized that its availability
would facilitate investment of savings by the middle and working classes); Presser, supra note
30, at 155-56 (noting that without limited liability, "only the very wealthiest men.., could
possess the privilege of investing in corporations"; thus, "limited liability was perceived as a
means of encouraging the small-scale entrepreneur, and of keeping entry into business markets
competitive and democratic").
36. See, e.g., SEAVOY, supra note 25, at 74 (indicating that limited liability was viewed as a
means of attracting capital); Blumberg, supra note 3, at 595 (noting that limited liability was a
political response to economic and political pressures); Presser, supra note 30, at 155 (stating
that most state legislatures had determined by 1840 that capital formation could best be
achieved through limited liability).
37. Leebron, supra note 1, at 1566-67 ("Yet, the doctrine of limited liability has its origins in
quite a different time and circumstance, when the protection of contractual creditors, not tort
victims, was the overwhelming countervailing concern."); see also Dodd, supra note 30, at 1353
(noting that "[legislative desire to combine encouragement of industry with substantial
protection of creditors" was attendant with the movement towards limited liability).
38. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1211 n.25.
39. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.22(b) (3d ed. Supp. 1997).
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shareholders are not personally liable for corporate debts "except as
they may be liable by reason of their own conduct or acts."40
This statutory protection is both unqualified and universal.
Absent circumstances giving rise to direct liability-e.g., tortious or
criminal conduct or an independent statutory cause of action-a
shareholder enjoys limited liability regardless of the firm's status as
closely held or publicly traded, the size of the shareholder's stake in
the firm, the level of the shareholder's involvement in the
management of the firm's affairs, or the contractual, tortious, or
statutory nature of the firm's liability. 41 In other words, state
corporation statutes plainly provide shareholders far-reaching
protection against vicarious liability for firm obligations.
Statutorily sanctioned limited liability for equity stakeholders
continues to expand. All states have recently enacted statutes
extending the privilege of limited liability to equity stakeholders in
firms other than corporations and limited partnerships. For example,
all states now allow firms to organize as limited liability companies
("LLCs") and limited liability partnerships ("LLPs").42 Although there
are some variations, LLC statutes generally treat the owners of the
firm ("members") like corporate shareholders for purposes of limited
liability.43 LLPs sometimes provide more qualified protection. LLP
statutes usually shield partners from liability for firm contractual
obligations, but some of these statutes require the purchase of a
minimum level of malpractice insurance and provide that a partner
remains liable for torts committed by an employee or agent within the
partner's sphere of control.44
Because these "hybrid" entities offer limited liability for equity
stakeholders, allowing participation by professionals unable to
incorporate and providing organizational flexibility and elective tax
treatment, these hybrids have experienced explosive growth over the
last decade. Indeed, while corporations remain dominant in terms of
40. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(6) (2002).
41. Again, the New York and Wisconsin statutes impose liability on some shareholders for
wage claims. See supra note 11.
42. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability Unlimited, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 407, 407
(1999). Most state legislatures have also recognized limited liability limited partnerships
("LLLPs"), which provide, within certain limits, greater protection for the limited partnership's
general partners.
43. See Huss, supra note 4, at 101.02.
44. See id. (citing jurisdictions that provide mandatory insurance requirements for LLPs
and discussing how some jurisdictions extend liability to an LLP partner for tortious conduct
committed by someone under the partner's direct supervision).
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total economic output, 45 hybrid entities are now, in many contexts, the
forms of choice for closely held firms.46
Yet equity stakeholders are not the only firm participants that
enjoy limited liability. Again, absent tortious conduct or statutory
violations on their part,47 firm officers, employees, agents, and
creditors generally need not account for firm obligations or losses.
Thus, like equity stakeholders, these participants risk only their
investment (e.g., capital, labor, loans, opportunity costs) in the firm.48
Importantly, however, the limits on liability for these
participants usually are not statutory, but rather derive from agency
and tort principles. 49 Once courts recognized the separate legal
existence of the corporation, they extended this fiction-albeit
somewhat mechanically-to the agency context. Thus, the entity
itself, not the person(s) managing its affairs and/or benefiting from its
existence, is the principal and master.50 Corporate officers and other
agents are simply agents of the entity.51 Directors, although not
formally agents because their role is to manage the affairs of the
45. Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1208 (citing statistics showing the overwhelming
dominance of corporations in terms of economic output).
46. See Huss, supra note 4, at 97-98 (describing the growth in LLCs as "tremendous").
47. Individuals committing torts or statutory violations are always individually liable. See,
e.g., Thompson, supra note 3, at 7 (discussing agency principles).
48. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 40 (noting that no one-shareholders,
workers, or voluntary creditors-risks more than he invests).
49. Thompson, supra note 3, at 6-7. A few statutes limit director and officer liability, but
the meaning of these statutes is at best unclear. Most likely, they codify the common-law rule
that agents are not liable in contract for acts committed within the scope of their authority. For
example, the Model Business Corporation Act states that an officer is not liable for actions taken
as an officer, but, because this section contains a cross-reference to the officer's "discretionary
authority," it appears to address contract claims. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.42(a), (d) (3d
ed. Supp. 1997); see also Thompson, supra note 3, at 6 n.22 (stating that this section appears to
have no impact on tort liability).
50. See, e.g., Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 282 (2003) (holding, in a unanimous opinion,
that a corporate officer of a real estate company is not vicariously liable for the violations of the
Fair Housing Act committed within the scope of the enterprise, because traditional tort
principles provide that the corporate entity, not its officers or shareholders, is the "employer" for
purposes of vicarious liability); Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209, 211 (4th Cir. 1991)
("We have long recognized that a corporation is an entity, separate and distinct from its officers
and stockholders .... ); Dutton & Vaughan, Inc. v. Spurney, 600 So. 2d 693, 697 (La. Ct. App.
1992) ("Corporations are distinct legal entities, separate from the individuals who comprise
them."); see also Leonard v. McMorris, 63 P.3d 323, 330 (Colo. 2003) ("Corporate officers occupy
the position of agents in relation to third persons dealing with the corporation. Therefore,
personal liability of officers is governed by principles of agency law."). Today, the master-servant
relationship is often referred to as the employer-employee relationship. See generally
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001). Neither set of terms is
particularly appropriate: for example, "employer-employee" can be misleading because, provided
it exercises enough control, a corporation can be the "employer" of another corporation,
subjecting it to respondeat superior liability. See, e.g., infra note 106 (discussing cases).
51. See, e.g., Leonard, 63 P.3d at 330.
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entity, likewise are not principals or co-principals. 52 Similarly, absent
the unusual circumstance in which a creditor exercises or bargains for
the right to exercise principal or master-like control over the entity, a
creditor is not the principal or master with regard to entity
activities. 53
The entity's status as the principal/master limits liability for
nonshareholder participants in both contract and tort settings. When
a participant acting on behalf of the corporation enters into an
authorized transaction with a third party, the transaction binds only
the corporation. Thus, the transacting participant-officer, employee,
or authorized agent-is not liable to the third party. 54  In addition,
although a participant is always personally liable for torts she
commits within the scope of the corporate enterprise, the doctrine of
respondeat superior extends vicarious tort liability only to the entity.55
Similarly, only the entity is liable for forms of enterprise liability in
52. Directors are sui generis. Acting in their capacity as members of the board of directors
or a board committee, they are neither agents nor officers. See, e.g., First Valley Bank of Los
Fresnos v. Martin, 55 S.W.3d 172, 183 (Tex.App. 2001) ("A director of a corporation is not, as
such, an agent of the corporation." (citing to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14C (1958)));
see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 1.40(8) (2002) (defining "employee" to include officer but not
director).
53. On rare occasions, courts have held creditors exercising substantial control over
corporate affairs liable as principals or masters of the entity. See, e.g., A. Gay Jenson Farms Co.
v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 293 (Minn. 1981) (holding that there was a master/servant
relationship between the two parties, but noting that this was a "unique fabric" and varied from
the normal debtor/creditor situation).
54. See, e.g., Leonard, 63 P.3d at 330 ("Generally, a corporate officer acting in his or her
representative capacity and within his or her actual authority is not personally liable for such
representative acts .. "); Winkler v. V.G. Reed & Sons, Inc., 638 N.E.2d 1228, 1231 (Ind. 1994)
("It is a matter of black-letter law that where the agent acted within the scope of the agent's
authority in signing a contract on behalf of the principal, the remedy of one seeking to enforce
the contract is against the principal and not the agent."); Dutton & Vaughan, 600 So. 2d at 697
(stating that, absent his purporting to bind himself individually, an officer or director does not
incur personal liability for the debts of the corporation). If an agent enters into a truly
unauthorized transaction, the third party cannot hold the principal liable. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 140 (1958).
55. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a master is liable for the torts of his servants
acting within the scope of employment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219. A master "is
a principal who employs an agent to perform service in his affairs and who controls or has the
right to control the physical conduct of the other in the performance of the service." See id. § 2.
When the employee works for a corporation, the corporation is the principal/master. See, e.g.,
Bagsby v. Gehres, 195 F. Supp. 2d 957, 964 (E.D. Mich. 2002) ("Acts within the scope of the
agent's employment are imputed to the principal corporation."); see also Browning-Ferris Indus.,
Inc. v. Ter Maat, 195 F.3d 953, 956 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that there is no doctrine of "superiors'
liability" and that, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, only the employer is strictly liable);
Wellborn v. Mountain Accessories Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1327-28 (D. Wyo. 1998) (stating
that an officer is only liable to a third party if he or she "directs or participates actively in the
commission of a tortious act").
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tort, such as liability arising from product defect claims. 56 Thus,
agency and tort principles, as currently applied in the corporate
context, limit contract liability to the entity and tort liability to
individual tortfeasors (if any) and the entity. 57
Taken together, these statutory and common-law doctrines
form a fairly preclusive web of protection for corporate participants.
In this country, the protection for equity stakeholders has expanded
over time, from fairly restrictive forms such as limited partnerships, to
general protection for corporate shareholders, to very recent
recognition of hybrid limited liability entities. The common-law
protections for other participants have, for the most part, held fast
over the last century.
However, there are three important holes in this web. First,
limited liability is merely the default rule. 58 Thus, parties transacting
business with the firm can and often do bargain for greater protection
by requiring corporate participants personally to guarantee
satisfaction of corporate obligations. 59 Second, equity stakeholders
may lose their limited liability protection via one or more "veil-
piercing" or "disregard of the corporate form" theories. Third,
Congress, state legislatures, and some courts recently have extended
various forms of controlling person liability to firm participants who
otherwise would enjoy limited liability. Because the latter two
''exceptions" to limited liability are involuntary and the subject of
much scholarly attention, they are worthy of further exploration.
B. Veil Piercing
When a firm is insolvent, the firm creditors often seek legal
theories to hold firm participants liable. The most prominent of these
approaches is veil piercing. Since the nineteenth century, courts have
been willing in some circumstances to "pierce" the "veil" of limited
liability or otherwise "disregard the corporate entity" to impose
liability on shareholders. 60 Although courts rely on similar underlying
56. See, e.g., Lobato v. Pay Less Drug Stores, Inc., 261 F.2d 406, 409 (10th Cir. 1958)
(stating that officers and agents are not liable along with the corporation in a products liability
action).
57. See Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Thornton, 92 S.W.3d 259, 270 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002)
("[N]ormally, the acts of a corporation's agent are imputable to its principal.").
58. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
59. Booth, supra note 4, at 143 (stating that contract creditors will often negotiate for
personal guarantees in the closely held context).
60. See, e.g., I. Maurice Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, 12 COLUM. L. REV.
496, 517 (1912) (discussing veil piercing in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
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theories, there is great inconsistency between jurisdictions with
respect to outcomes. 61
The dysfunctional nature of the doctrine has produced a steady
stream of critical commentary, culminating in Professor Bainbridge's
recent proposal to abolish veil piercing.62 Yet, importantly, many
scholars and courts still view veil piecing as a vehicle for addressing
limited liability's perceived inefficiencies or inequities. As I detail
here, however, veil piercing cannot serve such ends.
Despite enormous variation in application, there are four basic
common-law theories for piercing the corporate veil or disregarding
the corporate entity: 1) fraud, 2) "alter ego" or "mere instrumentality,"
3) enterprise entity, and 4) agency. Courts often are unclear as to
which theory they are applying; some use these terms
interchangeably, and others seem to combine different theories into a
single analytical framework. Interestingly, the New York Court of
Appeals mentioned each of these theories in its seminal Walkovszky v.
Carlton decision.6 3  Like many piercing decisions, however,
Walkovszky's analysis is cursory and confusing, providing little
guidance for future cases.
Briefly, the first and least controversial piercing theory is
premised on shareholder fraud. Courts will pierce the veil when a
shareholder uses the corporate entity to further a fraud, mislead
creditors transacting business with the entity, fraudulently transfer
funds out of the corporation, or otherwise engage in fraudulent or
deceitful activity within the corporate enterprise. 64
The second theory, often labeled either the "alter ego" or "mere
instrumentality" doctrine, premises shareholder liability on the "unity
of interest" or lack of separation between the shareholder and the
61. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 554-55 (stating that the standards for veil piercing are
vague and produce uncertainty and unpredictability).
62. Id. at 521, 554-74. Professor Bainbridge advocates abolishing veil piercing. In its place,
he proposes a direct liability regime for shareholders who engage in wrongful conduct such as
fraud and an enterprise liability regime for certain parent-subsidiary groups. See id. at 521-22,
554-74.
63. 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966). Walkovszky was a struck by a cab operated by the Seon Cab
Corp. Id. at 7. Carlton owned Seon and nine other taxicab corporations, each owning only two
cabs and carrying only the minimum liability insurance required by applicable law. Id.
64. See ALFRED A. CONRAD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 431 (1976) (discussing
misleading creditors as a basis for piercing the corporate veil and citing Weisser v. Mursam Shoe
Corp., 127 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1942), as an example of this theory). Of course, as Walkovszky
makes clear, incorporation itself or dividing a single enterprise into multiple entities as a means
of judgment proofing does not constitute fraud. See 223 N.E.2d at 10. Some courts have held
that structural changes to avoid an already existing liability may constitute fraud. See, e.g.,
Parker v. Bell Asbestos Mines, Ltd., 607 F. Supp. 1397, 1403-04 (M.D. Pa. 1985).
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corporate entity. 6 Courts have reasoned that when a shareholder
fails to maintain or shows disrespect for the distinctiveness of the
entity, the shareholder loses the benefit of asserting the legal
separateness of the entity for purposes of limiting liability. Courts
articulate varying tests and factors for determining whether to pierce
under this type of theory. 66 Yet, at minimum, there must be
shareholder control of the entity67 and other circumstances-including
undercapitalization, lapses in corporate formalities, or utter
shareholder domination-suggesting a lack of distinction between the
shareholder and the corporation. 68  Some courts also impose an
additional requirement that the shareholder misuse the corporate
form, such as to perpetrate a fraud or illegal activity, or otherwise
65. See Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824, 836 (Ct. App. 2000)
(noting that California piercing law requires a showing of "unity of interest" between the
shareholder and the corporation). Courts do not always use the terms "alter ego" and "mere
instrumentality" interchangeably. They sometimes articulate different tests based on the chosen
label. For example, Mid-Century Insurance Co. v. Gardner, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 918, 922 (Ct. App.
1992), contains a common description of alter ego doctrine as embodying two elements: "(1) that
there be such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation
and the individual no longer exist and (2) that, if the acts are treated as those of the corporation
alone, an inequitable result will follow" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Courts
that expressly follow an instrumentality theory often apply a three-prong test:
(1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not
only of finances, but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction
attacked so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no
separate mind, will or existence of its own; and (2) Such control must have been used
by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a statutory
or other positive legal duty, or a dishonest and unjust act in contravention of
plaintiffs legal rights; and (3) The aforesaid control and breach of duty must
proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained of.
Glenn v. Wagner, 329 S.E.2d 326, 330 (N.C. 1985). I view these theories as essentially the same
because, despite their differing articulations, they are premised on the lack of any de facto
distinction between the shareholder and the corporation. Courts also have described this type of
theory as holding a shareholder liable for acts of its corporate "dummy." See, e.g., Walkovsky,
223 N.E.2d at 8.
66. See supra note 65 (setting forth the commonly articulated tests for piercing pursuant to
this theory).
67. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 547 ("[I]t seems clear that control is an essential
prerequisite for holding a shareholder liable."). Professor Bainbridge contends that courts
applying the instrumentality rule often require shareholder control that is so complete as to
"amount to total domination of finances, policy, and business practices such that the controlled
corporation has no separate mind, will, or existence" and the use of such control to commit fraud,
a violation of the plaintiffs rights, or some other wrong. Id. at 547-48 (citing cases).
68. See, e.g., Carte Blanche (Sing.) Pte. v. Diners Club Int'l, Inc., 2 F.3d 24, 26 (2d Cir.
1993) (stating that the corporate veil can be pierced " 'when the corporation has been so
dominated by an individual or another corporation .... and it [sic] separate identity so
disregarded, that it primarily transacted the dominator's business rather than its own and can
be called the other's alter ego' " (quoting Gartner v. Snyder, 607 F.2d 582, 586 (2d Cir. 1979)));
Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 547-48.
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engage in conduct that promotes injustice (beyond the mere inability
of the plaintiff to receive complete relief).69
The "enterprise entity" or "enterprise liability" doctrine
provides a third theory for reaching shareholder assets.70 This theory
allows courts to extend liability within corporate groups, including
parent-subsidiary relationships and other groups of aligned or
affiliated entities.71 Enterprise entity doctrine provides that when two
or more firms are in fact conducting business as a single enterprise, a
plaintiff ought to be able to collect a judgment out of the assets of all
firms making up the enterprise. 72 Unlike the other piercing theories, it
facilitates a horizontal form of liability-access to assets of aligned or
affiliated entities that are not shareholders-as well as a vertical form
of liability (to reach the assets of the parent-shareholder). 73 Although
courts articulate a variety of grounds for imposing liability on a parent
corporation under this theory, at minimum there must be such a unity
of interest-including substantial parent control and overlapping
69. See, e.g., Perpetual Real Estate Servs., Inc. v. Michaelson Props., Inc., 974 F.2d 545, 548
(4th Cir. 1992); Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519, 524 (7th Cir. 1991); Minifie
v. Rowley, 202 P. 673, 676 (Cal. 1921); see also Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 548-49 (noting that
courts that require fraud or injustice require more than the absence of sufficient funds to satisfy
the claim); cf. Hystro Prods., Inc. v. MNP Corp., 18 F.3d 1384, 1390 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that
to show injustice requires "something less than an affirmative showing of fraud"). But other
courts do not require fraud. See, e.g., In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 887
F. Supp. 1447, 1452-53 (N.D. Ala. 1995) ("Although the standards are not identical in each state,
all jurisdictions require a showing of substantial domination .... Delaware courts ... do not
necessarily require a showing of fraud, if a subsidiary is found to be the mere instrumentality or
alter ego of its sole stockholder.").
70. Some commentators do not consider the enterprise entity theory to be a "veil piercing"
theory. Professor Bainbridge, for example, argues that enterprise entity theory is not a veil
piercing doctrine because it is premised on holding an entire enterprise liable despite the
presence of separately incorporated entities. See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 566. In fact, he
ultimately concludes that veil piercing in the parent-subsidiary context is, in substance, an
aspect of enterprise liability. See id. at 568.
71. See, e.g., Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 7-8 (N.Y. 1966); Rutherford B. Campbell,
Limited Liability for Corporate Shareholders: Myth or Matter-of-Fact, 63 KY. L.J. 23, 42 (1975)
(attributing the economic entity theory to Professor Berle and citing Burton v. Roos, 20 F. Supp.
75 (W.D. Tex. 1937), and Zaist v. Olson, 227 A.2d 552 (Conn. 1967), as examples).
72. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 566-67.
73. See, e.g., Gartner v. Snyder, 607 F.2d 582, 585 (2d Cir. 1979) (horizontal liability
between three overlapping entities used to develop housing); Walkovszky, 223 N.E.2d at 7
(horizontal liability between the ten taxicab companies); see also Carte Blanche, 2 F.3d at 26
(vertical liability between parent and subsidiaries). Texas courts have analogized this form of
liability to partnership liability. See N. Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. Emmons, 50 S.W.3d 103, 119
(Tex. App. 2001) ("The single business enterprise theory relies on equity analogies to partnership
principles of liability."). The Emmons court also required a "common business purpose" among
the constituent entities. Id. (citing Aluminum Chem. (Bol.), Inc. v. Bechtel Corp., 28 S.W.3d 64,
68 (Tex. App. 2000)).
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operations-between the entities that they are in fact operating as a
single enterprise.7 4
The final doctrine is the "agency" theory. As its name suggests,
this theory purports to apply agency principles to hold a shareholder
personally liable as a "principal" when the shareholder treats or uses
the corporate entity as its "agent."75 Courts have not articulated with
precision a test for determining when a shareholder's actions create an
agency relationship. In fact, most courts, including the Walkovszky
court, mention agency but apply an alter ego analysis. 76 While
shareholder control or domination of the entity is an essential element
in this analysis, courts almost always require more than principal-like
control or domination to pierce via the agency doctrine. 77
Although these four theories have gained widespread
acceptance, application of these doctrines is uncertain, inconsistent,
and shrouded in the "mists of metaphor."78 Courts applying these
doctrines-in particular, the alter ego, enterprise entity, and agency
theories-tend to make broad announcements of policies or offer
unwieldy lists of factors, without providing much useful analysis or
74. See, e.g., Pan Pac. Sash & Door Co. v. Greendale Park, Inc., 333 P.2d 802, 806 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1958). Courts are split on whether the enterprise entity theory requires some form
of bad faith or fraud. Compare In re Sunstates Corp. S'holder Litig., 788 A.2d 530, 534 (Del. Ch.
2001) ("For the purposes of the corporation law, the act of one corporation is not regarded as the
act of another merely because the first corporation is a subsidiary of the other, or because the
two may be treated as part of a single economic enterprise for some other purpose. Rather, to
pierce the corporate veil based on an agency or 'alter ego' theory, 'the corporation must be a sham
and exist for no other purpose than as a vehicle for fraud.'" (quoting Wallace v. Wood, 752 A.2d
1175, 1184 (Del. Ch. 1999))), with Emmons, 50 S.W.3d at 119 ("To recover under a finding of a
single business enterprise, no proof of fraud is required .... ").
75. See, e.g., Walkovszky, 223 N.E.2d at 8 ("[W]henever anyone uses control of the
corporation to further his own rather than the corporation's business, he will be liable for the
corporation's acts 'upon the principle of respondeat superior applicable even when the agent is a
natural person.'" (quoting Rapid Transit Subway Constr. Co. v. City of New York, 259 N.Y. 472,
488 (1932))).
76. Id. at 10. Although courts generally do not distinguish the two theories, they are
conceptually distinct. See, e.g., Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824,
837 (Ct. App. 2000) (noting that many courts have failed to distinguish between an agency
analysis and an alter ego analysis). Indeed, if courts took the agency theory seriously, neither
the lack of formalities nor shareholder misconduct would be required. Rather, courts would
simply determine whether the shareholder exercised sufficient control-or had the right to
exercise such control-to be considered a principal, or, in the tort context, a master. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 1-2 (1958). If so, then the shareholder would be strictly
liable for authorized corporate transactions or torts committed within the corporate enterprise.
See id. § 219(1).
77. See In re Sunstates, 788 A.2d at 534 ("[T]o pierce the corporate veil based on an agency
or 'alter ego' theory, 'the corporation must be a sham and exist for no other purpose than as a
vehicle for fraud.'" (quoting Wallace, 752 A.2d at 1184)).
78. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 546 (quoting Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 155 N.E. 58, 61
(N.Y. 1926)); see also Thompson, supra note 3, at 9 (stating piercing is best described as "open-
ended").
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guidance. 79 At the same time, they conflate the various theories; for
example, courts utilize many of the same factors in determining
whether to hold a shareholder liable under the three non-fraud
theories.8 0 According to Professor Bainbridge, existing veil-piercing
doctrine is so vague and unpredictable that it allows individual judges
to "impose their own brand of rough justice without being overly
concerned with precedent or appellate review."81
There are, however, a few sensible trends in the application of
piercing doctrine. First, it is largely beyond dispute that fraudulent
conduct serves as a basis for finding shareholder liability in the
contract setting.8 2 Of course, in many circumstances, shareholder
fraud may support direct rather than vicarious shareholder liability.8 3
The broad acceptance of the fraud theory therefore may simply be a
recognition that reliance-inducing shareholder misrepresentations and
fraudulent transfers of assets create direct tort liability.8 4 Second,
79. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 54-55 (stating that the standard
formulations are "singularly unhelpful"); Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 553 ("Judicial opinions in
this area tend to open with vague generalities and close with conclusory statements with little or
no concrete analysis in between."). Professor Bainbridge argues, for example, that courts are
sloppy in applying the instrumentality doctrine. Id. at 548. He also summarizes the unwieldy
"laundry list" of factors many courts adopt. Id. at 549-51 (quoting and citing cases).
80. In Walkovszky, for example, the court essentially treated the agency and alter ego
theories as a single theory. See 223 N.E.2d at 8-10; Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 568 ("The
observant reader will note substantial overlap between the factors considered in enterprise
liability cases . . . and the veil piercing cases.").
81. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 555. To make matters worse, in some contexts it is not
clear which jurisdiction's piercing law-state versus state or state versus federal-should apply.
See, e.g., United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63-64 n.9 (1998) (noting that there is
disagreement whether federal or state common law applies to CERCLA indirect liability, and
declining to resolve the issue).
82. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 58 (arguing that fraud and
misrepresentation justify piercing); Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 543 ("If the shareholder in some
way deceived the creditor into believing that the corporation had adequate assets to cover its
obligations and the creditor, relying on that misstatement, failed to demand a personal
guarantee, the shareholder ought to end up being held liable."); Thompson, supra note 3, at 9.
83. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 521-22; see also Thompson, supra note 3, at 10
("When the shareholder behind the veil actively participated in the act leading to liability, there
is no need to use piercing ... ").
84. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 521-22. Professor Bainbridge argues that in many
piercing cases, the plaintiff could have brought a direct action because the shareholder-defendant
either misled the creditor or was otherwise a joint tortfeaser. Id. at 556. He contends the fraud
theory should be retained as a form of direct liability, at least when shareholder fraud leads
creditors to forgo protections or fraudulently transfers funds out of the corporation. See id. at
556-57. Indeed, the less similar the allegedly wrongful shareholder conduct is to common-law
fraud, the less likely that piercing will succeed. Although some courts do not require actual
fraud, the language they use suggests that something close to common-law fraud is required.
See, e.g., Hystro Prods. v. MPN Corp., 18 F.3d 1384, 1390 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that the
"promote injustice" test requires something less than an affirmative showing of fraud, but it
requires something more than the mere prospect of an unsatisfied judgment); Sea-Land Servs.,
2004] BEYOND "UNLIMITING" SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY 349
piercing occurs only in the closely held context.8 5 This distinction
between closely and publicly held firms is consistent with some of the
efficiency-based justifications for limited liability discussed in the next
section.8 6 Third, more courts now require a misrepresentation or other
deceptive conduct for piercing in the contract (voluntary creditor)
context.8 7 This narrowing of the doctrine makes sense, given that
contract creditors bargaining at arm's length are often able, absent
fraud, to protect themselves from the risks of limited shareholder
liability through a variety of means.88
Yet other aspects of piercing doctrine make no sense and
promote neither efficiency nor other normative aims.8 9 For example,
in the closely held context, piercing occurs sporadically, and, again,
absent fraud or statutory violations, it is difficult to predict when a
court will pierce. 90 Because piercing is both rare and unpredictable, it
is unlikely to have any meaningful effect on internalizing risk or on
increasing firm monitoring, and is unlikely to promote equitable
Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519, 523 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Some element of unfairness, something
akin to fraud or deception or the existence of a compelling public interest must be present in
order to disregard the corporate fiction." (internal quotation marks omitted)): Associated
Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 806, 813 (Ct. App. 1963) ("[W]hile the doctrine
does not depend on the presence of actual fraud, it is designed to prevent what would be fraud or
injustice if accomplished. Accordingly, bad faith in one form or another is an underlying
consideration and will be found ... in those cases wherein the trial court was justified in
disregarding the corporate entity.").
85. See generally Robert Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1991) (finding no piercing to reach shareholders in publicly traded
corporations and, hence, piercing was limited to close corporations and corporate groups).
86. As discussed below, scholars contend that the externalization of risk onto creditors is
more likely in the close corporate context because firm management and ownership tend to
overlap, and shareholder-managers are more likely to engage in risky behavior than managers in
publicly traded firms. See discussion infra Part III.B. This is also consistent with Professor
Bainbridge's view that shareholders who are natural persons should be liable only for their
direct acts. See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 556-57 (noting that the focus on personal conduct of
shareholders "effectively incorporates the important distinction between public and close
corporations").
87. See, e.g., Perpetual Real Estate Servs., Inc. v. Michaelson Props., Inc., 974 F.2d 545, 550
(4th Cir. 1992) ("[I]n [contract] cases, courts have required proof of some form of
misrepresentation to the creditor."); see also supra note 69.
88. See discussion infra Part III.A; see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 55
n.8 ("There is no reason to disregard a 'shell' corporation in favor of a creditor that can negotiate
for such protection as it desires. Courts routinely enforce limited liability in such cases .... ");
Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 557-59 (arguing contract creditors should be able to hold
shareholders liable only when the shareholders have defrauded the creditor or later siphoned
away funds); Thompson, supra note 3, at 12-13 (noting that few question limited liability in the
bargain setting for a variety of reasons).
89. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 555.
90. See, e.g., id.; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 89.
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outcomes across similarly situated firms and creditors.91 In addition,
the most comprehensive empirical study suggests that piercing occurs
no more frequently in the (non-fraud) tort context than in the contract
context. 92 This is particularly troubling, given that contract creditors
are usually better able to protect themselves from the firm's
externalization of costs-limited liability's moral hazard-than are
tort creditors. 93
Moreover, regardless of the underlying theory, many courts
cling to, as a prerequisite for piercing, the failure to maintain
corporate formalities or "corporate separateness." 94  This focus is a
product of the antiquated notion that firms somehow exist and act
independently from their primary participants, including their
shareholders. 95  Thus, the analysis is flawed from the start:
shareholders necessarily seek to achieve their own preferences rather
than hypothesized corporate ends, whether or not formalities are
maintained. 96 What is even more troubling, however, is that the
inquiry into formalities and separateness is, as a matter of efficiency
91. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 564 (noting that the small number of piercings
and seemingly arbitrary outcomes suggest that piercing may not have any effect on the
internalization of risk).
92. In his extraordinary empirical study, Professor Thompson found more contract piercings
than tort piercings, and a greater creditor success rate in contract cases than tort cases.
Thompson, supra note 85, at 1058 (finding 779 contract veil piercing cases and only 226 tort
piercing cases, and finding a contract creditor success rate of 42 percent and a tort creditor
success rate of 31 percent). Professor Thompson admits potential bias in the data based on
settlements and other factors, and he notes that courts refused to pierce in a high percentage of
the contract cases that did not involve some kind of misrepresentation. See id. at 1046, 1063.
Nevertheless, the low rate of success in non-fraud tort cases is troubling, as is the difference in
the total number of tort and contract piercings.
93. See infra notes 227-237 and accompanying text.
94. See Campbell, supra note 71, at 43 ("The failure to maintain the requisite corporate
formalities substantially increases the probability that the corporate existence will be
disregarded."). In his study of piercing cases, Professor Thompson found that courts pierce in
two-thirds of the cases in which they find that the defendant has failed to comply with corporate
formalities, and decline to pierce in almost all (over 90 percent) of the cases in which they find
that the defendant complied with formalities. See Thompson, supra note 85, at 1063-65. Such
formalities may include holding annual board of director meetings, maintaining separate bank
accounts, recording all transactions in the corporate books, formalistically separating firm
functions from those of related firms, and compliance with other traditional corporate practices.
Sometimes, it also refers to undercapitalization.
95. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 524 (stating that the alter ego doctrine is flawed
because it is premised on the "mindlessly formalistic notion that the corporation is a real entity
distinct from its owners"); id. at 547 (stating that it begs the question to describe a closely held
corporation as the "dummy" for its individual shareholder since the corporation has no ends
separate from that of the shareholder (citing Gevurtz, supra note 4, at 864 ("No corporation in
the world has a mind of its own; they are fictitious entities. People control corporations."))).
96. See supra note 95.
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or equity, usually irrelevant.97 Indeed, rigid adherence to a formalities
inquiry promises arbitrary results since, all else being equal,
shareholders and corporate affiliates who (wisely) make the nominal
investment in maintaining corporate formalities will be immune from
piercing, while those who (unwisely) do not may be subject to it.98
Although observers tend to agree that piercing doctrine is a
mess, most proposed reforms predating Professor Bainbridge's critique
sought to address the problem by "correcting" or adjusting one or more
aspects of piercing doctrine, rather than confronting the problem
holistically.99 Other scholars contend that piercing can be utilized
broadly to address limited liability's social costs. 100 What these
commentators do not consider is that piercing doctrine is
fundamentally flawed and therefore cannot serve as the means for
enhancing efficiency or for other normative ends. 10 1
Piercing doctrine is inherently problematic for two reasons.
Professor Bainbridge discusses the first: as mentioned above, piercing
is premised on an antiquated view of the corporation, rather than on
the more realistic contractarian conception. The former view assumes
a separation between the interests and preferences of the entity itself
and those of its "owners," the shareholders. 10 2 The contractarian
approach abandons the artificial distinction between the firm and its
97. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 551-53 (noting that although the failure to
maintain formalities is often cited in opinions ordering veil piercing, such formalities are of
dubious relevance and obscure the real issues). For example, with regard to voluntary creditors,
whether or not the corporate participants have maintained formal distinctions between
themselves and the corporation seems beside the point, unless the failure to do so misleads these
creditors. As to tort creditors, formalities are rarely relevant: consideration of the lack of
formalities or corporate distinctiveness in the tort context seems wholly unprincipled unless it
serves as evidence of something else, such as the level of shareholder control or, in the products
liability context, customer reliance or confusion.
98. Cf. Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1262-64 (discussing how a shareholder must "work
hard" to dominate the corporation and disregard corporate formalities such that the shareholder
will run afoul of current veil piercing rules).
99. See supra notes 3-4 (providing a sample of reform proposals).
100. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1207.
101. See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 555 ("[I]t may be doubted whether veil piercing
contributes much to any plausible conception of either efficiency or equity."). Piercing also
inflicts substantial transaction costs. Professor Bainbridge discusses the significant resources
devoted to reducing the risk of veil piercing and the litigation costs in such an unwieldy doctrinal
landscape. Id. at 564, 575.
102. Indeed, courts and commentators describe veil piercing as the means by which debts of
the corporation are recast as debts of individual shareholders. See, e.g., STEPHEN B. PRESSER,
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1.01, at 1-6 (1998); Wormser, supra note 60, at 517 (stating
that, once the veil is pierced, courts will "regard the corporate company as an association of live,
up-and-doing men and women shareholders").
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participants, and between shareholders and other participants. 10 3
Rather, the firm is viewed as a nexus of consensual relationships
between various participants-including shareholders, firm managers,
and voluntary creditors-with their own sets of inputs, rights, and
obligations. 10 4 The antiquated view of the corporate fiction leads courts
to focus on irrelevancies such as corporate formalities. It also
emphasizes shareholder liability to the exclusion of other firm
participants. 105  Because shareholder liability dominates the
discussion, 106 piercing doctrine fails to offer a broader conception of
accountability within the enterprise.
A second, even more fundamental problem with veil piercing,
and disregard of the corporate entity is that courts use these theories
to extend vicarious liability to select shareholders despite the fact that
state legislatures have conferred upon all shareholders the benefit of
unqualified limited liability, regardless of firm size, the level of
shareholder participation and control, or the nature of the creditors'
claims. In other words, piercing seeks to do precisely what limited
liability statutes seemingly prohibit: it extends vicarious liability for
firm obligations to select shareholders in select circumstances. 107
103. Other authors offer a detailed account of the contractarian view of the firm. See, e.g.,
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 1-39; Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 524-27. This view
of the firm can be traced to Ronald Coase's work on the nature of the firm. See R.H. Coase, The
Nature of the Firm, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 33-55 (1988).
104. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 12; Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 525.
Although some contractarians' claims-both positive and normative-about the nature of
corporate law are subject to debate, their aforementioned descriptive claims about the nature of
the firm and firm participants seem largely beyond dispute.
105. See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 525.
106. There are a few exceptions. Again, enterprise entity theory provides a model for
spreading liability to affiliated firms within corporate groups that are not shareholders. See
supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. And courts occasionally hold lenders and other third
parties liable for firm obligations under various "agency" theories. See, e.g., Billops v. Magness
Const. Co., 391 A.2d 196, 197-98 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978) ("If, in practical effect, the franchise
agreement goes beyond the stage of setting standards, and allocates to the franchisor the right to
exercise control over the daily operations of the franchise, an agency relationship exists."); A.
Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 291 (Minn. 1981) ("A creditor who
assumes control of his debtor's business may become liable as principal for the acts of the debtor
in connection with the business."); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Martin, 222 S.W.2d 995, 998 (Tex.
1949) (holding that a Commission Agency Agreement between two independent contractors
actually created a master-servant relationship). Yet horizontal enterprise entity and third-party
claims are rarely successful and do not contemplate vicarious liability for other corporate
constituencies, including directors, officers, and employees.
107. Although Professor Bainbridge recognizes this problem in his critique of the alter ego
and agency theories, I contend it also precludes a coherent application of the enterprise entity
theory in parent-subsidiary groups. He recognizes the drawbacks of enterprise entity analysis,
yet, on balance, he advocates retaining this doctrine. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 568-74. I
agree that limited shareholder liability is less defensible in the parent-subsidiary context, and
that, without a means for holding parents accountable for subsidiary torts, firms will have even
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Obviously, this apparent conflict between veil piercing theories
and statutory limited liability has separation-of-powers implications,
as the Walkovszky court recognized.108 One can offer arguments why
piercing does not violate, separation-of-powers principles.10 9
Nevertheless, the co-existence of these legislative and judicial
prerogatives is, at best, troublesome. Keenly aware of this tension,
courts almost always state that piercing must be limited to
"exceptional" circumstances. 110  Yet the conflict between the
unqualified and universal limited liability "rule" and the veil piercing
"exception" creates enormous conceptual difficulties, and courts must
perform analytical cartwheels to justify holding select shareholders
liable for firm obligations. Except for shareholder fraud and statutory
violations, the factors that emerge in the courts' analyses are
singularly unhelpful: they are either irrelevant to any efficiency-based
or normative conception of appropriate liability allocation, or, if
dispositive, prove too much, because they would swallow limited
shareholder liability.
For example, in order to justify defying corporate statutes,
courts look to maintenance of corporate formalities as an indicator of
greater incentives to separate their businesses into distinct entities to externalize risk. See id. at
569, 571-72; see also discussion infra Part III. My point, however, is that enterprise liability in
the parent-subsidiary context is as conceptually problematic as the alter ego and agency theories,
since corporate shareholders, like individual shareholders, enjoy unqualified limited liability.
Also, I am persuaded by Professor LoPucki's more general conclusion that the search for the
boundaries of the enterprise often will be futile. See LoPucki, supra note 17, at 157.
108. See Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E. 6, 10 (N.Y. 1966); see also Radaszewski v. Telecom
Corp., 981 F.2d 305, 311 (8th Cir. 1992) (refusing to pierce in part because legislatures are the
ones who have the right to decide such questions).
109. For example, the drafters of the limited liability provisions in modern corporation
statutes may have been well aware of judicially crafted "equitable" exceptions at the time of
enactment, and, thus, their failure to eliminate these exceptions implies intent to retain them.
Indeed, a comment to section 6.22 of the Model Business Corporation Act suggests the legitimacy
of common-law piercing doctrine. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.22(b) (3d ed. Supp. 1997). Yet, as
Professor Bainbridge notes, while the Model Act's drafters may have "wimped out" in the
historical commentary, the Act itself makes no such provision for veil piercing. STEPHEN M.
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 173 & n.10 (2002). On the other hand, a few
enacted LLC and LLP statutes contain sections addressing veil piercing. See, e.g., Huss, supra
note 4, at 116-19. Most such provisions are general, stating that existing corporate veil piercing
principles ought to apply to LLCs or LLPs. See id.; see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 332B.303 (West
2002) ("[Clase law that states the conditions and circumstances under which the veil of a
corporation may be pierced under Minnesota law also applies to limited liability companies.").
The Uniform Limited Liability Company Act explicitly provides, however, that the failure to
observe the usual formalities is not a ground for imposing liability on LLC members or
managers. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 303(b) (1996).
110. See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 521 n.8 (noting that the piercing could easily swallow
the rule if courts are not careful to limit the doctrine to exceptional circumstances); see also
DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 683 (4th Cir. 1976)
(stating that courts pierce "reluctantly" and "cautiously").
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whether a shareholder "respects" the corporate form and, hence, is
entitled to the benefit of limited liability.'1 ' As discussed above,
however, this kind of analysis is antiquated and focuses the inquiry on
easily avoided failings that are irrelevant to efficiency and equity
concerns. 112 And, of course, corporate statutes no longer require
meticulously maintained formalities; on the contrary, modern statutes
expressly allow closely held corporations and hybrid entities to
structure and operate the firm with far greater informality than the
traditional corporation. 113
In addition, courts often include "undercapitalization" or "gross
undercapitalization" as a factor in determining whether to pierce.
Obviously, when the corporation's lack of capital is the result of
shareholder misconduct-such as a fraudulent transfer-producing
direct liability, creditors should be able to hold the shareholder
accountable. 1 4 And, as I discuss below, greater firm capitalization
may enhance efficiency." 5 But undercapitalization, by itself, cannot
justify piercing, because limited shareholder liability is a license to
111. See, e.g., United States v. Van Diviner, 822 F.2d 960, 965 (10th Cir. 1987)
("[C]onsiderable weight is attached to the respect given the corporate form by the corporation's
officers and shareholders."); Note, supra note 3, at 1195 ("Despite the 'piercing' doctrines, then,
shareholders are still virtually immune from the claims of tort victims so long as they treat the
corporate entity with proper respect.").
112. See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 553-54 (stating that a "single-minded emphasis on
formalities tends to lead the adjudicator down the wrong path by obscuring the real issues" and
that precautionary maintenance of formalities has little to do with "real policy concerns" in this
area); see also supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 351 (2002) (allowing shareholders to elect to manage
the affairs of the firm directly); MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. SUPP. § 25, in MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT ANN. (3d ed. Supp. 1997) (stating that the failure to observe corporate formalities is
not a ground for imposing personal liability on a shareholder); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 303(b)
(1996) (providing that the failure to observe usual formalities is not a ground for imposing
liability on LLC members or managers).
114. See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 561-62 (discussing undercapitalization and fraudulent
transfer).
115. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 59 (suggesting that undercapitalization
creates problematic incentives for shareholders). As I discuss below, a legal regime that induces
greater firm capitalization or insurance will enhance efficiency in some circumstances. Thus,
perhaps holding shareholders liable when they have failed to invest sufficient capital will create
an efficiency-inducing incentive. Of course, this may justify piercing only up to the level of
optimal capitalization. Moreover, piercing based on undercapitalization may not enhance
efficiency in the context in which voluntary creditors could, upon reasonable investigation,
determine the level of firm capitalization, since the creditor, as the cheapest cost avoider, can
simply demand personal guarantees from the shareholders or take other steps to protect itself.
See infra notes 227-230 and accompanying text; see also Lala v. Erin Homes, 352 S.E.2d 93, 100
(W. Va. 1986).
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undercapitalize.116 This is why promoters and investors incorporate in
the first place, 117 and why corporations form most subsidiaries.118 In
fact, with the exception of mandatory capital and insurance
requirements in certain industries, 1 9 modern corporate statutes
either contain no capitalization requirement or require only nominal
capital.1 20 The mutual exclusivity of limited shareholder liability and
"undercapitalization" is why no court, to my knowledge, has pierced
based on this factor alone. 121
Finally, I argue below that firm control is a critical
consideration in the efficient allocation of responsibility. 122 Yet
shareholder control of the entity, like undercapitalization, cannot be
independently decisive in piercing analysis, because corporation
statutes do not distinguish between controlling and passive
shareholders and a control-based piercing doctrine would swallow
limited shareholder liability, particularly in closely held firms. This
may explain why agency theory rarely stands alone as a basis for
shareholder liability and why courts require more than shareholder
116. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 3, at 11-12; see also Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 521 n.8
("The law permits incorporation of a business for the very purpose of avoiding personal
liability.").
117. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 543-44 ("[Iln the close corporation setting
externalizing such risks likely is the very purpose of incorporating."). That is why the defendant
in Walkovszky organized the business into ten different cab corporations. Walkovszky v. Carlton,
223 N.E.2d 6, 12 (N.Y. 1966) (Keating, J., dissenting).
118. Radaszewski v. Telecom Corp., 981 F.2d 305, 311 (8th Cir. 1992) ("The doctrine of
limited liability is intended precisely to protect a parent corporation whose subsidiary goes
broke. That is the whole purpose of the doctrine ....").
119. See, e.g., Huss, supra note 4, at 129 n.191 (discussing minimum capital requirements for
financial institutions). In fact, in Walkovszky, Carlton incorporated separate firms partly to limit
his exposure under New York's mandatory insurance regime. See 223 N.E.2d at 12. Also, in
some states, professionals engaged in practice in LLPs or otherwise must maintain minimum
levels of malpractice insurance. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 565-66.
120. William P. Hackney & Tracey G. Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital,
43 U. PITT. L. REV. 837, 853-54 (1982).
121. See, e.g., Fisser v. Int'l Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1960) (refusing to pierce the
corporate veil on undercapitalization alone). A Ninth Circuit opinion suggests that California
courts will pierce based on undercapitalization alone. See Nilsson, Robbins, Dalgarn, Berliner,
Carson & Wurst v. La. Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538, 1544 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he California Supreme
Court has held that undercapitalization alone will justify piercing the corporate veil."). The
California opinion the Ninth Circuit cites for that proposition, however, also discusses the lack of
corporate formalities. See Minton v. Cavaney, 364 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1961). Thus,
undercapitalization alone may not be sufficient. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Ter
Maat, 195 F.3d 953, 961 (7th Cir. 1999) ("Undercapitalization is rarely if ever the sole factor in a
decision to pierce the corporate veil."); Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 561; Mendelson, supra note 1,
at 1262.
122. And, of course, as I stated earlier, to this extent I agree with Professor Mendelson's
control-based approach to liability allocation.
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control or domination to pierce; 123 indeed, control alone is almost never
sufficient.124 In fact, upon closer inspection, some cases in which
courts have purported to pierce based on control alone contain another
element that otherwise justifies liability. 125 Courts applying Ohio law
have come closest to treating shareholder control as independently
dispositive, 126 but courts in other jurisdictions have not adopted this
approach.
This judicial reticence to pierce based solely on shareholder-
level control alone is apparent in the Supreme Court's unanimous
decision in United States v. Bestfoods.127  In Bestfoods, the Court
refused to extend "operator" liability under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
("CERCLA")128 to a parent corporation whose subsidiary owned a
polluted chemical manufacturing plant, although the parent's
management substantially overlapped with the subsidiary's, and the
parent otherwise exercised significant control. 129 Referring to the
limited liability of a shareholder as a "bedrock principle," the Court
concluded that Congress did not intend to extend CERCLA operator
liability to corporate parents based solely on the exercise of significant
control over the subsidiary. 130 Rather, the corporate veil can be
pierced to extend derivative liability to a shareholder under CERCLA
only when the shareholder used the corporate form for certain
wrongful purposes, including fraud. 131 Otherwise, the shareholder can
be directly liable as an operator only when the shareholder directly
operates the facility in question, not merely the subsidiary itself. 132
123. See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 547 (stating that control is an essential prerequisite for
holding a shareholder liable).
124. See Campbell, supra note 71, at 34 ("[Slomething more than control is needed ....
otherwise the corporate entity will stand." (quoting Brown v. Margrande Companie Naviera,
S.A., 281 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (E.D. Va. 1968))); see also Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1263
(stating that extensive control is unlikely to create a risk of veil piercing); cf. Bainbridge, supra
note 1, at 547, 549 (stating that courts would pierce much more often if domination and control
sufficed).
125. For example, although the Sixth Circuit indicated in Carter-Jones Lumber Co. v. LTV
Steel Co., 237 F.3d 745, 747 (6th Cir. 2001), that control alone is sufficient to pierce under Ohio
law, in the case before it, the shareholder at issue was actually involved in the illegal scheme.
126. See Janos v. Murduck, 672 N.E.2d 1021, 1023-24 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (piercing based
solely on shareholder domination and the fact that the corporation filed for bankruptcy and
therefore failed to honor the contract in question); see also Carter-Jones Lumber, 237 F.3d at 747
(citing Janos for the proposition that Ohio courts will pierce based on control alone).
127. 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000).
129. See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 61-64.
130. Id. at 62.
131. See id. at 62-63.
132. See id. at 66.
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Thus, while veil piercing and disregard of the corporate entity
have a long history, this history is deeply troubled. Except for
theories premised on shareholder fraud or statutory violations, which
appear to be forms of direct shareholder liability, piercing theory and
jurisprudence offer little coherence. Indeed, the law is so confused and
unpredictable that judges' decisions in this area may be ad hoc,
ensuring that indistinguishable cases will produce different outcomes
in different courtrooms. 133 The fact is, a principled piercing regime
that enhances efficiency or otherwise results in consistent, socially
beneficial outcomes cannot co-exist with statutorily mandated,
unqualified, and universally limited shareholder liability. Absent
statutory reform, this inherent conflict cannot be resolved. Solutions
to the social costs limited shareholder liability may inflict must be
found elsewhere.
C. Controlling Person Liability
The other, potentially significant hole in the preclusive web of
limited liability is the growing collection of theories that hold
controlling persons liable for corporate obligations. These theories
tend to originate in regulatory statutes or from judicial gloss on
statutory liability provisions. Controlling person liability theories
vary greatly in scope and substance; for example, given their essential
elements, many such theories do not impose true vicarious liability.
Yet, each of these theories extends liability to controlling persons who
would not otherwise be liable under traditional corporate, tort, or
agency law principles. More importantly, they often extend criminal
or civil liability without a demonstration of intent or negligence.
Federal securities laws are among the oldest examples of
regulatory statutes that impose liability on controlling persons for
corporate wrongdoing. Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, for
instance, holds certain corporate individuals liable for any materially
misleading registration statements, subject to a due diligence
defense. 34 Similarly, under Section 15 of the 1933 Act and Section 20
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, any person who controls a
liable corporation is also responsible for its securities violation, unless
133. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 23 ("The legal doctrine of piercing the veil is so
amorphous that it leaves a large area in which courts can impose liability based upon a 'smell'
test of fairness."). This incoherence also produces enormous transaction costs.
134. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000). Potentially liable parties under Section 11 are the issuing
corporation, anyone who signs the registration statement, anyone serving as a director at the
time the registration statement is filed, and every person named in the registration statement as
about to become a director. See id.; PAT K. CHEW, DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY § 6:2.3
(2001).
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the controlling person acted in good faith. 3 5 And Section 16(b) of the
1934 Act holds controlling persons strictly liable for short-swing
trading in equity securities. 136
Most recently, in response to a series of corporate disclosure
scandals, both the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and
Congress imposed new certification requirements on CEOs and CFOs.
Previously, officers of a publicly traded company, and, in the case of
annual reports, a majority of the company's directors, were required to
sign periodic reports made pursuant to Sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the
1934 Act. 137 However, the signing corporate officials were not subject
to certification requirements regarding the completeness and accuracy
of all aspects of these reports. Pursuant to an SEC investigative order
issued on June 27, 2002,138 the CEOs and CFOs of the largest 947
companies whose securities are registered with the SEC were required
to certify the validity and accuracy of their most recently filed reports
by August 14, 2002.139 In the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Congress, in
addition to enhancing penalties for fraud, required CEOs and CFOs to
certify the validity of certain matters disclosed in periodic reports filed
with the SEC. 140
Federal and state environmental statutes are another
significant source of controlling person liability. Again, CERCLA
creates liability for the cleanup of hazardous substances released into
the environment by certain parties, extending responsibility to the
current owner and "operator" of a facility and to "any person who
arranged for disposal or treatment. '14' CERCLA therefore imposes
liability on persons who traditionally have been shielded from liability
for tortious or illegal corporate actions, including corporate officers
135. See 15 U.S.C. § 77o; 15 U.S.C. § 78t; CHEW, supra note 134, § 6:3.4.
136. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
137. See William S. Duffey, Jr., Corporate Fraud and Accountability: A Primer on Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, 54 S.C. L. REV. 405, 409 (2002).
138. SEC, File No. 4-460: Order Requiring the Filing of Sworn Statements Pursuant to
Section 21(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (June 27, 2002) (expired Jan. 31, 2003),
http:// www.sec.gov/rules/other/4-460.htm.
139. See, e.g., Duffey, supra note 137, at 410.
140. Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 302, 906, 116 Stat. 745, 777-78, 806 (2002); Duffey, supra note
137, at 411. Thus, the CEO and CFO bear the ultimate responsibility for the certifications.
They cannot simply assert a "clean heart, empty head" defense. Rather, at the time the
certifications are filed, they "must have had a good faith basis, based on their own personal due
diligence, for their certification." Richard A. Rosen et al., Litigation Implications of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act: An Analysis of the Key Issues, SH097 ALI-ABA 115, 123 (2002).
141. See Cindy A. Schipani, Taking It Personally: Shareholder Liability for Corporate
Environmental Hazards, 27 J. CORP. L. 29, 33-35 (2001).
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and other persons exercising direct control over polluting facilities. 142
Similarly, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"),143
which provides for the comprehensive management of solid and
hazardous waste, imposes liability upon non-negligent waste
generators and transporters, as well as on the owners of waste
disposal sites, and thereby creates liability exposure for corporate
officials.1 44  Other federal and state environmental statutes also
extend liability to controlling persons. 145
Notably, in applying these kinds of public welfare statutes,
some federal and state courts have adopted the responsible corporate
officer ("RCO") doctrine. 146 Under this theory, controlling persons may
142. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 66-71 (1998); Tom McMahon & Katie
Moertl, The Erosion of Traditional Corporate Law Doctrines in Environmental Cases, 3 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 29, 29 (1988) (noting that court decisions construing CERCLA have imposed
direct liability on corporate officers and shareholders, thereby significantly eroding traditional
corporate law protection accorded to such parties); see also Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1265
("Caselaw under CERCLA over the last fifteen years or so also has been perceived to be 'eroding'
traditional corporation law concepts such as limited liability.").
143. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000).
144. See 1 WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND
DIRECTORS § 10-3 (6th ed. 1998).
145. The Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000), imposes strict civil
liability for discharges into navigable waters and criminal penalties, which does not require
fault, except in relation to the amount of the penalty. See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 144, §
10-5. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761, imposes strict liability for removal
costs and damages on owners and operators of the source from which oil is discharged but only
up to defined maximum limits. The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671k, controls the
emissions of air pollutants from stationary sources and imposes penalties for noncompliance with
permit on owners or operators. See Janet L. Woodka, Sentencing the CEO: Personal Liability of
Corporate Executives for Environmental Crimes, 5 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 635, 641 (1992). Some courts
have also based controlling person liability on the federal Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33
U.S.C. § 407. See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1265 n.261. In addition, some state
environmental statutes have parallel liability regimes. For example, in Wisconsin v. Rollfink,
the court held a corporate officer personally liable for corporate violations of Wisconsin's solid
and hazardous waste laws because the officer was responsible for overall operation of the
corporation's facility which violated the law. 475 N.W.2d 575, 576-80 (Wis. 1991). In so holding,
the court held that the officer's lack of personal authorization or participation in the waste
disposal activity was immaterial. Id. at 576-80; see also CHEW, supra note 134, § 6:2.
146. See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673-74 (1975) (stating, in determining
whether a controlling person is liable under the RCO doctrine, that the government may satisfy
its burden of proof by introducing "evidence sufficient to warrant a finding by the trier of the
facts that the defendant had, by reason of his position in the corporation, responsibility and
authority either to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to correct, the violation complained
of, and that he failed to do so"); United States v. Ming Hong, 242 F.3d 528, 531-32 (4th Cir. 2001)
(applying RCO under the CWA); United States v. Kelley Tech. Coatings, Inc., 157 F.3d 432, 438-
39 (6th Cir. 1998) (applying the RCO to RCRA); United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413, 1419
(10th Cir. 1991) ("[W]illfulness or negligence of the [corporate] actor would be imputed to him by
virtue of his position of responsibility."); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810
F.2d 726, 727 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying the RCO doctrine to CERCLA); BEC Corp. v. Dep't of
Envtl. Prot., 775 A.2d 928 (Conn. 2001) (applying RCO doctrine under the Connecticut Clean
Water Act); In re Dougherty, 482 N.W.2d 485, 488-89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (applying RCO
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be liable if they wield decision-making authority and control over the
operations of the regulated facility or activity, but failed to take action
that would have prevented the violation.147 Thus, the RCO doctrine
exposes controlling persons to liability for corporate misconduct
regardless of actual participation in or knowledge of any wrongdoing.
In imposing liability based on the failure to prevent misconduct by
subordinates, the doctrine imposes a form of liability on controlling
persons that, in practice, is akin to vicarious liability.148
There are a few controlling person liability provisions in other
areas. 49 And, as discussed previously, some jurisdictions extend
vicarious liability to a partner in an LLP for torts committed by those
acting under the partner's direct supervision. 50
In most circumstances, controlling persons remain immune
from liability for torts or tort-like statutory violations committed
within the corporate enterprise, absent actual participation in the
wrongful conduct. Nevertheless, the foregoing examples demonstrate
some willingness on the part of legislatures and courts to impose
supervisory or vicarious liability on controlling persons. 15' The
Supreme Court's opinion in Bestfoods evinces a continuing reluctance,
even in the face of statutory reform, to impose vicarious liability on
controlling shareholders, but there is less resistance to extending
liability to persons exercising direct supervisory control over corporate
affairs. 152
doctrine to Minnesota's hazardous waste laws); see also United States v. Hodges X-Ray, Inc., 759
F.2d 557, 558-59 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding an officer civilly liable under a federal health and safety
statute). But see United States v. MacDonald Watson Co., 933 F.2d 35, 38 (1st Cir. 1991)
(stating that because RCRA has an express knowledge requirement, a mere showing of official
responsibility is insufficient).
147. See, e.g., Park, 421 U.S. at 673-74; Ming Hong, 242 F.3d at 531-32; Noel Wise, Personal
Liability Promotes Responsible Conduct: Extending the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine to
Federal Civil Environmental Enforcement Cases, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 283, 286-89 (2002).
148. See Sidney M. Wolf, Finding an Environmental Felon Under the Corporate Veil: The
Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine and RCRA, 9 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 7 (1993).
149. For example, corporate officers have been held liable for violations of federal food and
drug laws occurring under their watch. See Park, 421 U.S. at 672; United States v. Dotterweich,
320 U.S. 277, 279 (1943). In addition, officers of nonprofit organizations may be liable for
organizational violations of federal tax law. See Celia Roady, Intermediate Sanctions, SH047
ALI-ABA 137, 140-41 (2002).
150. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
151. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 27-28 (discussing the trend towards holding corporate
managers accountable for the failure to monitor or supervise employees who commit torts or
statutory violations).
152. Again, even in Bestfoods, the Court was willing to extend liability to natural or
corporate persons exercising direct control over the polluting facility. See United States v.
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 67-71 (1998).
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III. LIMITED SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY: BENEFITS AND COSTS
As the preceding part demonstrates, limited liability for equity
stakeholders has a long history and, in all likelihood, is here to stay,
at least as the predominant default rule. Indeed, all states have
recently enacted statutes expanding the privilege of limited liability to
equity stakeholders in unincorporated firms. Although limited
shareholder liability has always had its critics and skeptics who
challenge it as just another benefit for our society's wealthiest
members, 153 it enjoys continuing and widespread support.
Whether limited shareholder liability produces a net social
benefit is a more complex question. Contrary to popular belief, there
is no convincing evidence that limited liability is essential for large-
scale capital investment or economic growth. Yet limited shareholder
liability produces some kinds of cost savings and market efficiencies.
In so doing, it also may produce distributive benefits. On the other
hand, even scholarly supporters of limited liability recognize that it
potentially creates social costs-most notably, a moral hazard
problem. 154 It encourages excessively risky activities by allowing
corporate actors to externalize some of their costs. The recent debate
among scholars then, properly framed, is whether or how to alter the
current limited liability regime to maintain or enhance its benefits
while reducing the social costs it inflicts.
A. An Overview of Potential Benefits and Costs
In the nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries, many
hailed limited shareholder liability as a cornerstone of the American
economic system.1 55 Some have gone as far as to suggest that the
emergence of limited liability was essential for the ultimate success of
the Industrial Revolution and, more generally, the American
economy. 156 A major premise underlying this argument is that limited
shareholder liability is necessary to facilitate large-scale capital
development: without limited liability, the argument goes,
promoters-industrialists and others-could not attract sufficient
capital to fund large-scale enterprises because potential passive
153. See, e.g., Halpern et al., supra note 3, at 117-18 (discussing the debate over limited
liability in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
154. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 49-50; Bainbridge, supra note 1, at
529.
155. WORMSER, supra note 27, at 14.
156. See, e.g., Dodd, supra note 30, at 1378-79 (quoting academics from the early twentieth
century who suggested that limited liability was the most important factor leading to industrial
growth in the nineteenth century); Hackney & Benson, supra note 120, at 841 (same).
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investors would not invest if they could be subject to personal liability
for firm obligations. 157 A related premise offers the broader, more
democratic conception that the protection limited liability affords is
necessary to promote widespread entrepreneurialism. 158
Furthermore, some have contended that limited shareholder liability
is essential for corporate risk taking, and that such risk taking, in the
aggregate, produces a net social benefit.159
Although limited shareholder liability has always had its
critics, 6 0 the arguments favoring limited liability persuaded policy
makers to adopt and retain it as the operative default rule. 161
Moreover, once legislators in one state enacted protective legislation,
lawmakers in other states had to follow to prevent capital from fleeing
the jurisdiction. 162 Today, many believe that, absent a compelling
demonstration to the contrary, we ought to presume that limited
shareholder liability is at least partially responsible for, if not
essential to, our economic progress. 63
Yet, despite the popular appeal of limited shareholder liability
and these claims regarding its role in our economic system, there is no
empirical evidence that it is essential for capital development,
entrepreneurialism, or economic growth. 64 In fact, some historical
indications are to the contrary. For example, Rhode Island did not
157. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 535 ("Indeed, there is a widely shared view that limited
liability was, and remains, essential to attracting the enormous amount of investment capital
necessary for industrial corporations to arise and flourish.").
158. See, e.g., Presser, supra note 30, at 155.
159. See e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 539 (questioning whether sound social policy would
require the complete internalization of tort risk); Jonathan R. Macey, The Limited Liability
Company: Lessons For Corporate Law, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 433, 448-52 (1995) (discussing the social
benefits of limited liability and risk taking).
160. See, e.g., Halpern et al., supra note 3, at 117-18 (discussing the debate over limited
liability in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
161. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
162. In the early 1800s, Massachusetts did not extend benefit of limited liability, but some
neighboring states did. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 532 n.59. During the 1820s, there was some
debate over whether capital was fleeing those states for neighboring states. Id. (citing HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836-1937, at 50 (1991)).
163. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 555 ("In my judgment, the case for limited liability
seems unassailable."). Some, for example, may contend that the historical success and current
pervasiveness of the corporate form provide strong evidence of the efficiency and/or social utility
of limited liability.
164. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1920; Lawrence E. Mitchell, Close
Corporations Reconsidered, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1143, 1155 (1989) ("Modern courts and
commentators often speak of limited liability as having developed as an incentive to industrial
growth.... Yet, although this rationale appears historically as one justification for limited
liability, little evidence supports the view that it caused the adoption of that policy. At best, the
rationale is only one of many reasons why limited liability became an accepted principle of
corporate law. At worst, it is a rationalization of that principle.").
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limit shareholder liability until 1847, yet before then, it retained its
position as the second leading producer of textile products. 165
Similarly, some states, including California, did not grant full limited
shareholder liability protection to all corporations until deep into the
twentieth century. 166 Also, there is growing agreement in recent
scholarship that large-scale enterprises and even public equities
markets would exist without limited liability. 167
The economic democracy and entrepreneurialism arguments
also prove too much since, in many circumstances, the owners of small
businesses are personally liable for corporate obligations despite
limited shareholder liability-as guarantor, tortfeasor, statutory
violator, or the target of piercing. 68 While the increased risk of
personal liability in an unlimited liability regime might deter some
entrepreneurs, the overall effect likely would be minimal. Given the
risk of personal liability for small business owners even with limited
shareholder liability, particularly risk-averse individuals would not
operate their own firms anyway, while risk-neutral and risk-
preferring individuals would still invest, given their ability to exercise
control over the firm and firm risks.1 69 Indeed, I have seen no study
suggesting that, prior to the recent extensions of limited liability
protections to LLCs and LLPs, the inability to take advantage of
165. See Dodd, supra note 30, at 1376.
166. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1924 ("California imposed unlimited
pro rata liability by statute on the shareholders of both domestic and foreign corporations..
until 1931, evidently without crippling industrial and commercial development."); see also id.
(discussing how most states imposed double liability on shareholders of banks until the 1930s).
167. See, e.g., Halpern et al., supra note 3, at 136-38 (discussing the alternative contractual
arrangements that might emerge in the absence of limited liability); Thompson, supra note 3, at
19 (noting the lack of evidence that public markets would not exist without limited liability and
discussing examples of liquid trading in contexts in which investors did not enjoy limited
liability); see also Joseph Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital
Markets Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387, 392-405 (1992) (discussing ways in which the markets
might respond to unlimited liability). For example, in a world without limited shareholder
liability, many large enterprises would simply be highly leveraged rather than widely owned; a
small number of promoter/managers would own these firms and would raise necessary capital
through debt rather than equity financing. Alternatively, investors or firms could purchase
insurance---"portfolio insurance"-thereby reducing or eliminating the risk of losses in excess of
their initial investment. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 48; Hansmann &
Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1901. But see Thompson, supra note 3, at 21 (questioning whether
insurance is an adequate substitute for limited liability, given loading costs and imperfect
coverage).
168. See Booth, supra note 4, at 143 (arguing that limited liability seldom insulates
shareholders in small firms from liability because contract creditors usually require guarantees
and tort creditors will almost always be able to show that shareholder-operators participated in
the wrongful acts).
169. Indeed, in many closely held firms, the risks associated with contractual liability are
more significant than the risks associated with tort liability. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra
note 5, at 1910.
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stakeholder limited liability deterred professionals from practicing. 170
Similarly, although limited shareholder liability facilitates firm risk
taking in some contexts, no one has demonstrated persuasively that
such risk taking produces a net social benefit or that equally or more
optimal levels of firm risk taking would not otherwise occur.171
At most, then, whether the American (or global) economy,
capital investment, and economic growth-past, present, and future-
depend on limited shareholder liability is an open question.172 Thus, I
agree with Professor Bainbridge that "[b]y allowing the public
corporation to develop, limited liability thus was in large measure
responsible for the development of our modern economic system."1 73
In the absence of empirical support, however, I question, as others
have,1 74  whether limited shareholder liability is necessary for
170. See Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and
Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1606 (2002) ("[O]verdeterrence rhetoric
has not been firmly grounded in fact. Most defensive-medicine studies have failed to
demonstrate any real impacts on medical practice arising from higher malpractice premiums.").
I have no doubt that professionals have recently perceived growing risks of liability. See Robert
W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present at the Birth (Nearly), 66 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1066, 1069 (1995) (noting that LLPs arose out of the swirl of litigation
spawned by the collapse of Texas banks and savings and loans in the 1980s). This perception
explains professionals' desire for greater liability limits, and public choice analysis may explain
their success in achieving some such limits. See Macey, supra note 159, at 451-52 (applying a
public choice analysis to the emergence of LLCs and stating that the comparative political power
of business people and entrepreneurs assured the extension of limited liability despite the
debates over its benefits and costs in the tort context). Neither this perception nor recent
legislative successes establish, however, that professionals would abandon their professions
without these new protections.
171. See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1217 n.52 ("Risk taking per se is not beneficial,
however. It is warranted only if the risk taken is to engage in an activity whose expected social
benefits, on the margin, outweigh its expected social costs .... [L]imited liability may encourage
overinvestment in activities with excessive social costs."). Professor Bainbridge questions
whether sound social policy mandates internalization of tort risk. See Bainbridge, supra note 1,
at 539. This is certainly a legitimate question, but one he implicitly concedes cannot be
answered. See id. That is why the debate has focused-appropriately in my view-largely on
the effects of limited liability. I agree with Professor Bainbridge, however, that, in addition to
efficiency, political reality must play a role in the analysis. See id. n.97.
172. I have no doubt that the existing structure of the capital markets and, more generally,
firm organization in the American-and now global--economy is closely tied to the corporate
form and limited liability. Given that this "need" for limited shareholder liability is unverified,
that the overall benefits of limited liability-induced risk taking are questionable, and that
limited shareholder liability also inflicts social costs, whether the existing regime produces a net
social benefit-and the extent of any such benefit-is unknown. In my view, historical success
alone is not strong evidence of limited liability's necessity or social utility. For example, "path
dependence" theory demonstrates how history may lock in inefficient or otherwise socially
harmful practices or norms. See generally Frederick W. Lambert, Path Dependent Inefficiency in
the Corporate Contract: The Uncertain Case with Less Certain Implications, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L.
1077 (1998) (describing various theories of path dependency and providing an analysis of each).
173. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 536.
174. See, e.g., supra note 164.
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economic growth or that an alternative system of allocating risk of loss
would not be equally or more socially beneficial. Therefore, it appears
that the more grandiose claims regarding the benefits of limited
shareholder liability lack support.
Rather than seeking to prove or disprove these kinds of claims,
recent scholarship has focused on various efficiency-based
justifications for limited shareholder liability.175 Commentators offer
strong arguments as to why limited liability produces information cost
savings and market efficiencies, and why some of these effects foster
corresponding distributive benefits. 176 Yet they also continue to
recognize that limited liability may inflict social costs, most notably as
a result of the moral hazard problem it produces.
1. Efficiency-Based Justifications
Limited shareholder liability corrects market imperfections
and reduces the overall costs of investment in a number of related
ways. First, and most fundamentally, limited liability facilitates
specialization (the separation of ownership and control) within the
firm. 177 Potential capital investors may not possess the resources,
time, or expertise to operate or closely monitor a business
enterprise. 178 If such investors faced the risk of unlimited personal
liability for firm obligations-in other words, losses in excess of their
initial investment-they might choose not to invest. 179  If they did
invest, they would face high information-gathering costs, such as the
costs of acquiring greater expertise, gathering substantial information
about firm operations and potential return, assessing potential firm
liabilities in excess of assets, and monitoring the wealth of other
investors.180 Limited shareholder liability limits investor risk to the
amount initially invested, thereby reducing the need for, and the costs
175. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1213, 1217 (noting that efficiency-based
justifications for limited liability now dominate).
176. Not everyone agrees that limited liability produces benefits, even in publicly traded
firms. See, e.g., Booth, supra note 4, at 147-49. Yet most scholars believe that limited liability
does produce some beneficial effects. The debate centers on the extent of these effects and
whether they are worth their costs.
177. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FIsCHEL, supra note 2, at 41-42.
178. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 94; Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1217.
179. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 41-42; Mendelson, supra note 1, at
1218. This is particularly true for the small investor. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 530 ("A
regime of unlimited personal liability thus would directly conflict with the efficient centralized
decisionmaking apparatus that is the hallmark of modern corporations." (footnotes omitted)).
180. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 41-42; Bainbridge, supra note 1, at
531; Halpern et al., supra note 3, at 136; Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1218.
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of, monitoring the firm closely.18' Investors with limited liability can
leave the task of managing the firm largely to agents and voluntary
creditors, who, on balance, are better situated to monitor and control
firm activities. Thus, limited shareholder liability facilitates low-cost
and more passive capital investment, and decreases the overall costs
of operating the firm by reducing the amount of investor monitoring
needed. 8 2
Second, limited shareholder liability decreases the
inefficiencies associated with excessive investor risk aversion. If
shareholder liability were unlimited, the possibility of losing more
than her initial investment would prompt a risk averse investor either
to avoid investing in enterprises that otherwise provide positive net
present values or to spend too many resources on managing and
monitoring the risk. 8 3  By limiting investor risk to the initial
investment, limited shareholder liability reduces these effects.1 84
Third, although perhaps not essential for the existence of
equities markets, 8 5 limited shareholder liability may enhance the
efficiency of these markets. In an unlimited liability regime, or at
least one that extends joint and several liability to shareholders, the
price of shares would vary by the wealth and risk preferences of
individual shareholders.18 6 Shareholders with greater wealth would
face greater risk per share, since they would have more to lose and
would more likely be "targets" of firm creditors. 8 7 Moreover, the
wealth and identity of other investors would be important in pricing
181. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 42.
182. Id. at 41-42. Professor Booth has argued that monitoring and information cost savings
are not an argument for limited liability because if shareholders needed someone to monitor
management, management would arrange for outside monitors-accountants, underwriters,
bond rating agencies, etc.-to perform such services to promote investment. Booth, supra note 4,
at 147. Today we know that such "outside" monitoring is not always reliable. But, more
importantly, passive and risk averse shareholders facing personal liability in excess of their
investment would still have to expend resources monitoring firm activities more closely or
demand significantly greater and more costly outside monitor oversight, and they would have a
greater incentive to monitor other investors. See, e.g., Leebron, supra note 1, at 1595-96, 1605.
183. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 94; Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1218.
184. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1218. See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 186-215 (1987) (discussing risk aversion, risk bearing, and social
welfare).
185. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
186. Several commentators have argued that this effect would be less pronounced under a
pro rata shareholder liability regime. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1903-
04; Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1296-97. However, the markets would still offer less efficiency
under such a regime, because investors would still have an incentive to monitor firm activities
and the wealth of other shareholders more closely, and market insurance and other protective
devices would have transaction costs. See infra notes 256-259 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 42-43; Halpern et al., supra note 3,
at 130, 136. Indeed, wealthy investors would forego small investments. Id. at 136.
366 [Vol. 57:2:329
2004] BEYOND "UNLIMITING" SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY 367
shares because the greater the wealth of other shareholders, the less
likely a single shareholder's assets would be needed to satisfy
judgments. 88 As a result, shares might not be fungible,18 9 or the
market might become illiquid.190 In a limited liability regime, because
the risk of loss is limited to shareholders' investment, shareholder
wealth is irrelevant.191 Therefore, shares are fungible and trade at one
price in a liquid market. Because prices in a liquid market reflect all
publicly available information about the firm, investors will not have
to expend substantial resources to determine which price or trade is
appropriate. 192 And, the resulting free transfer of shares on liquid
markets provides shareholders with the ability to exit and new
investors to assemble controlling blocks, which may create incentives
for management to operate efficiently in order to maintain share
values.193
Fourth, limited shareholder liability may facilitate cost-
effective diversification. In a truly unlimited liability regime,
diversification may increase rather than reduce investor risk, since a
single investment could result in the loss of all of an investor's
assets. 94 Thus, unless an investor has sufficient wealth to absorb any
loss, limited liability or a comparable substitute is needed for
diversification. 195 Yet, substitutes may impose additional costs. 196
Diversification, in turn, allows investors to avoid the risk and
monitoring costs of undiversified investments, and correspondingly
188. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 42.
189. Id.; Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 533 (arguing that joint and several shareholder
liability would destroy share fungibility and, hence, the efficiency of the secondary trading
markets); Halpern et al., supra note 3, at 131 (noting that a capital market would exist, but there
would not be a single price for shares). But see Booth, supra note 4, at 147-48 (arguing that since
the markets function well given disparate profit-side preferences, based on the marginal utility
of investment returns, there is no reason to believe that these markets would not also function
with disparate loss-side preferences).
190. Leebron, supra note 1, at 1609 (arguing that as the wealth effect becomes significant,
the market would become thinner and eventually illiquid).
191. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 42-43. Wealthy purchasers, for
example, no longer face the risk of becoming the "target" of creditors.
192. Id. at 43.
193. See id.
194. See Halpern et al., supra note 3, at 130 (noting that if each owner is liable for the full
loss, the wealthier the investor the riskier his position).
195. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 42; Leebron, supra note 1, at 1595-
96.
196. Market insurance, for example, may have loading costs and require the shareholder to
engage in greater firm monitoring and information gathering. These costs may be prohibitive for
smaller investors.
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allows firms to raise capital at lower costs. 197 Moreover, diversification
facilitates firm investment in projects potentially offering positive net
present values that otherwise would be too risky because such projects
will not expose diversified investors to the risk of ruinous losses.198
These effects of limited liability tend to occur in the publicly
traded rather than the closely held context. Indeed, separation of
ownership and control, efficient equities markets, and diversification
tend to characterize investments in, and the structure of, publicly
traded firms. 99 Thus, scholars have questioned whether limited
liability is justified in the closely held context. 200 Judge Easterbrook
and Professor Fischel ("Easterbrook and Fischel") have suggested that
these differences may explain the sharp distinction in piercing
doctrine between close corporations (which sometimes are pierced) and
publicly traded firms (which are never pierced). 201 Of course, limited
liability may offer efficiencies in some circumstances in the closely
held context; for example, some closely held firms have passive
shareholders who, without limited liability, may face prohibitively
high information costs.
Most recently, Professor Mendelson has argued that the
potential benefits of limited shareholder liability depend not only on
the nature of the firm-widely owned versus closely held-but also on
the nature of the shareholder.20 2 She contends, for example, that
information costs are an issue only for small, passive investors in
197. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 43; see also Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 531
(noting that unlimited liability would require greater monitoring, and, correspondingly, decrease
shareholders' ability diversify, increasing the cost of capital and harming economic growth).
198. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 43-44. As Professor Bainbridge argues,
unlimited liability would raise the cost to shareholders of investing:
With limited liability, shareholders are free to diversify and refrain from monitoring
portfolio firms. This is desirable because most investors are rationally apathetic....
Under conditions of limited liability and diversification, shareholder passivity is
possible because the shareholder stands to lose only a small portion of his or her
wealth in the event one of the portfolio firms goes bankrupt.
Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 530-31 (footnotes omitted). I therefore disagree with Professor
Booth's contention that diversification, rather than being an argument in favor of limited
liability, renders it unnecessary. See Booth, supra note 4, at 148. Although diversification will
offset some losses, a single, substantial loss-which is more likely in a diversified portfolio-may
substantially harm or ruin some portfolios absent the protections of limited liability. See, e.g.,
Leebron, supra note 1, at 1599-1600.
199. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 55-56 (arguing that limited liability does
not reduce monitoring costs in this context); Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1230-31 (arguing that
the information costs justification for limited liability does not apply to most shareholders in
closely held firms since they can monitor and control firm activities).
200. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 55-56; Mendelson, supra note 1, at
1230-31.
201. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 55-56.
202. Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1213, 1219-20.
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large enterprises. 20 3 Larger corporate, institutional, or other wealthy
shareholders, whether in publicly traded or closely held firms, have
the capability to monitor corporate activities relatively cheaply and to
force firm management to comply with their demands.20 4 Moreover,
she notes that institutional and corporate investors tend to be risk
neutral; therefore, limited liability serves no risk-aversion correction
function with regard to these shareholders.20 5 Thus, while limited
shareholder liability may produce certain benefits, its coverage is
overbroad, since its benefits will be forthcoming, if at all, only with
regard to small, passive investors.20 6
Finally, it should be noted that these potentially beneficial
effects, even if limited by Professor Mendelson's analysis, have related
distributional benefits. By facilitating low-cost, passive investment,
limited shareholder liability creates opportunities for broader
participation in corporate ownership than would otherwise exist.
20 7
Indeed, as discussed previously, although the claim that large-scale
business enterprises would not exist without limited liability is
dubious, limited liability probably has played a critical role in allowing
small and passive investors to participate in and benefit from
corporate activities and the equities markets. 2
08
2. Potential Social Costs
Although limited shareholder liability produces cost savings
and corrects certain inefficiencies, it also inflicts costs, and therefore
may not enhance social welfare. Limited liability produces the
203. See id. at 1206, 1230-31 ("A limited liability regime might indeed save significant costs
for a shareholder with only a tiny proportion of a corporation's shares and limited access to
information.").
204. See id. at 1219-20 (stating that for corporate shareholders and other shareholders with
a significant ownership share, information about the business is 'likely to be readily and cheaply
available").
205. See id. at 1225-27. Professor Mendelson also argues convincingly that the risk-aversion
justification is problematic given that tort victims as a class are less efficient risk bearers than
institutional and corporate shareholders and perhaps other shareholders. See id.
206. See id. at 1231-32. She also notes that there are far more closely held and controlling-
shareholder controlled firms than firms with dispersed ownership. See id. at 1215-18. She
further argues that less wealthy, passive shareholders are rare. See id. at 1227-29.
207. See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 537 (noting that, in a world without limited liability,
there would be few people willing to be shareholders, and large-scale firms therefore would have
few shareholders but great leverage).
208. Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV.
259, 262 (1967) ("Limited liability is probably an essential aspect of a large corporate system
with widespread public participation."); see Halpern et al., supra note 3, at 137 (stating that
unlimited liability would concentrate the ownership of equity in the hands of wealthy
shareholders and active trading would be unlikely).
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aforementioned effects not by reducing the overall level of risk, but
rather by allowing shareholders to externalize part of the cost of their
investment onto corporate creditors and society at large.20 9 By capping
shareholder liability at the level of the shareholder's investment,
limited shareholder liability ensures that, if the enterprise suffers
losses and ultimately becomes insolvent, someone else will bear those
losses. By shifting the risk of loss to firm creditors, limited liability
may increase the cost of credit capital, even though it reduces the
investment costs for shareholders. 210 In addition, if the creditor who
ultimately bears the risk of loss under a limited shareholder liability
regime is a less efficient risk bearer than the shareholder who is
immune from liability, the regime has allocated risk inefficiently. 211
Limited shareholder liability also raises distributional concerns if, by
shifting losses, it serves as a social subsidy for one segment of society
while transferring wealth away from another. 212
Moreover, limited shareholder liability creates or, at a
minimum, accentuates a moral hazard problem. As residual
claimants, shareholders get compensated last in the corporate
structure and therefore prefer projects with high rates of return.21 3
Such projects usually entail greater levels of risk than do those with
lower rates of return. 214  Yet, because limited liability caps
209. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1220 (stating that limited liability addresses
investor risk aversion by shifting rather than reducing risks, and that, in the tort and statutory
context, these risks are shifted from shareholders to tort victims and the community at large);
see also Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 528 (arguing that limited liability allows shareholders to
externalize investment costs to society); Thompson, supra note 3, at 2.
210. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 44-45 (acknowledging this potential
increase but arguing, for various reasons, that the increase will be lower than the cost savings
offered by limited liability); Leebron, supra note 1, at 1584-85.
211. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 46 (indicating that the issue is whether
limited liability is borne equally well by creditors and stockholders); SHAVELL, supra note 184, at
180-92 (discussing how loss bearing by risk averse parties harms social welfare); Alexander,
supra note 33, at 390 ("Unlimited liability is said to produce a net gain to society because the
rule shifts risk to better risk bearers."); Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1220-21 (arguing that risk
shifting will improve social welfare-measured as total social utility--only if the risk-shifting
party is not in a better position than the risk-receiving party to monitor and manage the risk and
the receiving party is less risk averse than the risk-shifting party).
212. Cf. Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1219 n.63 ("The distributional concern is that
individuals who benefit from corporate activity may be able to shift some of its costs to others
who benefit little or not at all from the corporate activity.").
213. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 529 ("Because creditors (such as a bank) have a prior claim
on the firm's assets and earnings, they get paid first; shareholders get the residue (i.e., whatever
is left over). Shareholders, thus, prefer projects offering potentially high rate of returns, so there
will be something left over after the creditors get paid.").
214. See, e.g., HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 233 (4th ed. 1996) ("[A] risk-
averse investor would never hold the risky asset if it had a lower expected return than the risk-
free asset. It follows that if you choose to devote a higher fraction of your wealth to the risky
asset, you will get a higher expected return, but you will also incur higher risk.").
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shareholders' risk of loss at the level of their equity, shareholders will
not be concerned about risks in excess of this amount. So, from the
shareholders' perspective, any risk of loss in excess of their equity, no
matter how large, simply equals the value of their equity. For
shareholders, this substantially increases the net present value of
highly risky projects. 215 Limited liability therefore does not merely
shift risks from shareholders to creditors; it creates an incentive for
shareholders to press the firm to engage in higher risk projects. 216
Such projects, although favored by shareholders, may be excessively
risky and inflict large social costs. 217
At the same time, limited liability reduces or eliminates
shareholder incentives both to gather information about firm risk
taking and to encourage management to take precautions, whether or
not the shareholder is able to do so cheaply.218 Likewise, this regime
removes the incentive to maintain levels of capital or insurance
adequate to cover potential losses, or otherwise spread risk
efficiently.21 9 Indeed, limited liability creates the incentive for firms to
structure their operations and manage risk-such as by shifting risky
215. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1883 ("[A] corporation engaged in highly
risky activities can have positive value for its shareholder, and thus can be an attractive
investment, even when its net present value to society as a whole is negative."); Mendelson,
supra note 1, at 1233 ("As a matter of economic theory, a shareholder will favor increases in
risky activity as long as the anticipated marginal benefit to the shareholder from an increase in
risky activity ... exceeds the anticipated marginal loss ... up until the point where the marginal
benefit and marginal loss from an incremental increase in risky activity are equal. Under
limited liability rules, the shareholder's total losses are capped at the value of the shareholder's
potential lost equity. Thus, such risky projects may appeal to the shareholder even though they
are socially costly."). Because the amount of the loss in excess of firm assets is irrelevant, the
key variables are the potential return from the project and the likelihood of the loss. Limited
liability therefore creates a preference for projects presenting a small risk of a large liability.
Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1235-36.
216. See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 529 ("Limited liability thus generates negative
externalities by creating incentives for shareholders to cause the company to invest in higher
risk projects than would the firm's creditors. Because shareholders do not put their personal
assets in jeopardy, they effectively externalize some portion of the risk associated with such
investments to creditors." (footnotes omitted)); Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1233 (stating that,
because limited liability caps losses, shareholders will prefer the project with the greater
potential benefit even if the net social benefit, which accounts for the total potential loss, is
smaller); see also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1883; Leebron, supra note 1, at 1586;
Thompson, supra note 3, at 14. Indeed, limited liability's moral hazard will create an incentive
for the firm to engage in projects that have greater potential losses because those projects are
likely to offer a greater potential return. See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1235-36.
217. Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1233 ("Thus, such risky projects may appeal to the
shareholder even though they may be socially costly.").
218. See SHAVELL, supra note 184, at 168 (contending that the incentive to take care to avoid
risk is diluted if the potential injurer can shield assets); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5,
at 1882; Thompson, supra note 3, at 14.
219. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1889; Mendelson, supra note 1, at
1233-34.
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or hazardous activities to subsidiaries-in such a way as to reduce
amounts available to satisfy judgments in favor of creditors.220
Correspondingly, firms enjoying limited shareholder liability will be
inclined to select projects with delayed expected costs, so that the firm
and its shareholders can separate assets and reap benefits (through,
for example, the payment of dividends) before any judgment.221
Going forward, the incentive to maximize and then distribute
short-term gains may be enhanced by the recently enacted reduction
in the dividend tax. Indeed, this shift in tax policy reduces an existing
incentive-tax avoidance or deferral-to maintain or reinvest capital
in the enterprise. 2 2 Obviously, the overall effect of such reform on
investor and firm behavior is unknown, but a case can be made that it
will induce further excessive risk taking. The much-discussed
elimination of such taxes might have an even more profound effect.
Commentators agree that limited shareholder liability
encourages excessively risky activities. 223 Indeed, there is some
evidence that corporations actually engage in such activities. 224 And
there is no doubt that shareholders and firms structure their
operations to avoid foreseeable tort liabilities, thereby reducing the
costs of monitoring, capitalization, and insurance-the firm
220. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1234.
221. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1884 (discussing the shareholders' option
to liquidate the firm before tort liability attaches); see also Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1236
(noting that delayed judgments allow shareholders greater opportunities to separate corporate
assets from risky activities). Delayed judgments resulting from delayed injuries or latent defects
are typical in cases involving defective product and environmental injuries. See Mendelson,
supra note 1, at 1237.
222. See Andrew Leckey, Once Snubbed, Dividends Are Regaining Favor, CHI. TRIB., June
10, 2003, at C5 (noting that the new tax rate on dividends received after January 1, 2003, is 15
percent, or 5 percent for certain investors in lower tax brackets); see also Ken Brown, Tax-Cut
Plans Spark a Rally-Can It Last?-Dividend Proposal Won't Quickly Solve Market's Problems,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2003, at C1 (noting that a dividend tax cut could pressure companies to pay
a dividend, which could reduce available cash for beneficial corporate undertakings).
223. See supra notes 213-217 and accompanying text. Even limited liability's staunchest
defenders recognize that limited shareholder liability creates an incentive to engage in
excessively risky activities. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 49-50;
Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 529.
224. See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1239-47 (arguing that veil piercing cases, subsidiary
bankruptcies, and the purposeful utilization of limited liability devices to minimize liability risk
suggest that corporations engage in excessively risky activities); see also Hansmann &
Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1881 (discussing empirical evidence of strategies to avoiding tort
risk in high risk industries and incomplete insurance). Hansmann and Kraakman also argue
that the small number of bankruptcies in publicly traded firms may underrepresent the
frequency with which such firms cause tort damages exceeding their net worth, since tort victims
have strong incentives to accept a settlement for less than the full value of the firm. Id. at 1895.
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disaggregation in Walkovszky offers but one example. 225 However, the
aggregate costs of these activities, like the aggregate benefits of
limited liability, remain empirically unquantified and perhaps
unquantifiable.226
Yet certainly, the potential social costs of limited liability and
the corresponding distributional concerns vary by creditor type. These
costs and concerns are reduced in the context of voluntary creditors, or
at least sophisticated contracting parties such as commercial lenders.
While limited shareholder liability increases the risk, and therefore
the cost, of credit capital, this increase may be lower than the
information costs savings to many shareholders. 227  Sophisticated
voluntary creditors often have the knowledge and ability to monitor
firm activities more cheaply than shareholders can, and, to lower risk
premiums, firm managers have an incentive to facilitate such creditor
oversight.228 In addition, voluntary creditors are in a position to
forego much of this monitoring: to the extent they are concerned about
the risk of firm insolvency and nonpayment, they can take steps ex
ante-including demanding shareholder guarantees, securing the debt
with collateral, charging appropriate premiums, and diversifying their
debt investments-to insure against nonpayment ex post.229  The
moral hazard problem will remain, but these types of creditors often
are well positioned to manage that risk or to forgo the investment.
They are thus likely to be efficient risk bearers relative to
225. See Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d. 6, 7 (N.Y. 1966); see also Hansmann &
Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1881 & nn.3-4 (discussing the efforts by firms in the tobacco and
environmental services areas to use subsidiaries to evade tort liability).
226. Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1204, 1239 ("Since we lack the 'control set' of an
industrialized regime without limited liability, the extent of the overinvestment in this type of
excessively risky activity remains an empirical question that is difficult to answer precisely.");
see Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1880 (noting that the empirical issues are difficult
to resolve on existing evidence). Again, some may argue that the universal acceptance of the
corporate form and the absence of alternative regimes are themselves evidence of the efficiency
of limited liability. See supra note 163. Again, I find this argument to be unpersuasive, and the
historical evidence that is available is mixed. See supra notes 164-173 and accompanying text.
227. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 45-46. Shareholders not only may
have less ready access to firm information, but also have a greater incentive to monitor firm
management closely because, as residual claimants, they get paid last (after creditors). See id.
228. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 541; Thompson, supra note 3, at 13. These
creditors are also willing to tolerate some risk because they get paid before shareholders. See
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 45-46.
229. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 45-46 (noting that voluntary creditors face
lower monitoring costs than shareholders because they often get paid before shareholders and
often can secure their debt); Halpern et al., supra note 3, at 128 ("The voluntary creditor will
consider the probabilities that these outcomes will occur and determine an expected yield at
which funds will be lent to the corporation to compensate for the risk."). These creditors
therefore are likely to be risk neutral.
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shareholders. 23 0 Moreover, shifting the risk of loss to these types of
creditors raises few distributional concerns.
Although some observers have suggested that, in the closely
held context, limited liability should not be the default rule, even for
voluntary creditors, 231 prevailing thought is to the contrary. 232 Indeed,
the notion that voluntary creditors ought to bear the burden of
hedging against or bargaining around limited shareholder liability is
consistent with the courts' increasing reluctance to pierce in contract
cases absent shareholder fraud or illegal conduct. 233 Thus, there is
growing agreement that limited shareholder liability is an efficient
default rule in the voluntary creditor context.
Nevertheless, in the involuntary creditor context-the focus of
this Article-limited liability's potential costs and distributive
concerns are paramount.234 To begin with, tort victims and the
victims of tort-like statutory violations, the quintessential involuntary
creditors, rarely have the ability to avoid losses caused by corporate
activities because they face prohibitively high information and
monitoring costs. 235 Moreover, they rarely are able to bargain with
the firm ex ante for protection against firm-created risks and losses.23 6
In addition to their inability to avoid firm-created risks, tort victims
are less likely than many shareholders to be able to insure adequately
230. See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 542 (arguing that voluntary creditors are the "cheapest
cost avoiders"); see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 48 (noting the plausible
assumption that creditors are often the most efficient risk bearers). Also, unlimited liability may
produce no net benefit for voluntary creditors, since their information costs, including monitoring
the wealth of shareholders, might be higher than under limited liability. See Halpern et al.,
supra note 3, at 135.
231. Halpern et al., supra note 3, at 148-49; see Robert W. Hamilton & Larry E. Ribstein,
Limited Liability and the Real World, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 687, 687-92 (1997) (debating
whether partners in LLPs should have limited liability against contract creditors).
232. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 45-46, 55 n.8, 58; Bainbridge, supra
note 1, at 534; Booth, supra note 4, at 157-58; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1919-20;
Leebron, supra note 1, at 1589; Richard Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated
Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499 (1976); Thompson, supra note 3, at 13.
233. See supra note 84-88 and accompanying text.
234. Cf. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1920; Thompson, supra note 3, at 14.
235. See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1222. There may be some limited exceptions, including
the purchase of products with obvious defects or when the tort victim is a business or other
institution. See id. at 1222 nn. 75-76. But the vast majority of tort cases are brought by
individual plaintiffs. Id. at 1222 n.76. Small, passive investors likewise may find information
and monitoring costs to be prohibitive. See id. Yet, shareholders still have some advantage in
acquiring firm information over tort victims.
236. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1920; Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1222.
Small shareholders usually do not have de facto bargaining power either, but they can sell their
shares to avoid risk. Id.
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against losses or otherwise spread risk efficiently.237 And some
common consequences of tortious activity, including physical injuries
and death, cannot be diversified.238 Obviously, generalizations are
difficult, but, for all of these reasons, tort victims often are inefficient
risk bearers.239 Indeed, Professor Mendelson and other scholars make
a compelling argument that tort victims are, as a class, less efficient
risk bearers than many shareholders. 240
Limited shareholder liability therefore produces social costs in
the tort context when shareholders-regardless of their particular risk
characteristics-shift some of their risk of loss to a class of more
inefficient risk bearers. 241 The moral hazard problem enhances these
inefficiencies: shareholders enjoying limited liability have an incentive
to engage in excessively risky activities and to externalize these risks
onto potential tort victims. 242 And, accordingly, limited liability and its
moral hazard may impair the aims of our tort system-deterrence,
adequate compensation, and the efficient allocation of risk.243 This
shift of the risk of loss from one segment of society to another also
237. See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1224-25. Tort victims generally are individuals and,
using the most conservative assumptions, are likely to be randomly distributed by income. See
id. at 1224. Thus, they are likely to be more risk averse than institutional and other wealthy
individuals.
238. See id. at 1221-27; see also Leebron, supra note 1, at 1602-03 n.116 (stating that tort
injuries are often nondiversifiable).
239. See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1221-27. The ability of a tort victim to bear the loss
efficiently may depend on a number of factors, including the size of injury, the nature of the
injury, and the victim's wealth. Id. at 1223; see SHAVELL, supra note 184, at 189 (noting that
risk aversion will depend on the size of the risk). Nevertheless, a tort victim's inability to
monitor firm activities and bargain for protection, combined with the potential for
undiversifiable risks, insufficient insurance, and relatively low wealth, makes this assumption a
defensible one. But see Leebron, supra note 1, at 1630 (arguing that shareholders in closely held
firms may not be efficient risk bearers relative to tort victims, particularly when injuries are
small and widespread).
240. Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1221-27 (arguing that tort victims are likely to be less
efficient risk bearers than at least institutional and other wealthy shareholders, and perhaps all
shareholders); id. at 1230-32 (discussing individual investors in closely held firms). Indeed,
Professor Mendelson argues that the vast majority of shareholders are either institutional
investors or wealthy individuals. See id. at 1227-29 (citing various statistics regarding
shareholder characteristics).
241. Risk shifting in this context therefore harms social utility. See SHAVELL, supra note
184, at 207 ("In the case where victims are risk averse and injurers are risk neutral, it will be
optimal ... for injurers to bear the risk of victims' losses."); Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1225
(stating that risk shifting in this context would harm social utility).
242. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 3, at 14.
243. See infra notes 480-484 (discussing the aims of our tort regime); see also Halpern et al.,
supra note 3, at 145 ("Limited liability here may undermine the deterrent objectives of the tort
system because of moral hazard problems. In addition, there is no incentive for the owner to
carry adequate insurance since, in the event of default, there is no cost to the owner."). This
impairment is enhanced by the fact that tort victims, as unsecured creditors, are paid off last in
bankruptcy.
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raises distributional concerns, particularly since tort victims, as a
class, are likely to be less wealthy than shareholders. 244
In sum, while limited shareholder liability produces some
beneficial effects, it can inflict social costs. Commentators agree that
these costs, including the moral hazard problem, are most pronounced
in the context of tort creditors. But that is where their agreement
ends. The debate over whether and how to alter the current limited
liability regime focuses largely on the extent of these costs. Scholars
disagree on the size and scope of the moral hazard problem, whether
an alternative regime would maintain the beneficial effects of limited
liability while lowering its costs, and the extent to which such
alternatives would produce other costs that may exceed the costs
inflicted under the current regime.
B. Parsing the Arguments to Reform or Retain the Existing Regime
Scholarly responses to the social costs limited shareholder
liability inflicts in the tort context vary widely. Some commentators
have offered fairly targeted proposals; for example, some have
proposed statutory reforms or modifications to piercing doctrine in
specific contexts and others have proposed minimum insurance or
capitalization requirements in particular industries. 245 These kinds of
proposals, however, tend to ignore resulting inefficiencies, larger
conceptual issues, and application problems. Statutory insurance or
capitalization requirements, for example, are likely to be inefficient
and ineffective since legislatures rarely will be able to set these
requirements at optimal levels, much less make necessary
adjustments to account for variables such as firm size and structure,
market conditions, changing risk factors, and inflation.246  In
244. Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1224 n.86 (noting that tort victims may not be randomly
distributed and may in fact tend to be low income, given that some kinds of hazards, such as
environmental harms, tend to be concentrated in low-income areas and wealthier individuals are
more able to take steps to avoid certain risks); id. at 1227 n.95 (suggesting that distributional
concerns might weigh against shifting losses from shareholders to tort victims). The various
normative bases for these distributional concerns are beyond the scope of this Article. However,
I suggest that my proposal ultimately may be consistent with various normative analyses of the
proper allocation of responsibility in the tort context.
245. See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 167, at 421 (discussing various alternatives to
shareholder liability, including minimum capitalization requirements). Professor Leebron has
suggested that subordinating all lenders to tort claimants in bankruptcy might create
efficiencies. See Leebron, supra note 1, at 1648-49. However, changing bankruptcy priorities
may have a limited effect on limited liability's moral hazard. See Hansmann & Kraakman,
supra note 5, at 1929-30 (likewise rejecting the bankruptcy approach to reform).
246. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 60-61 (discussing the problems with
these proposals including inefficiencies, administrative costs, and resulting barriers to entry);
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1928-29; Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1205-06 n.7
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Walkovszky, there were minimum insurance requirements in place,
but the statutory amount was set far too low to cover foreseeable tort
judgments and failed to address judgment avoidance techniques, such
as dividing the enterprise into separate corporations. 247 Also, as
discussed previously, proposals to alter various aspects of piercing
doctrine fail to consider the larger conceptual problems with
piercing.248
More comprehensive proposals fall roughly into three groups.
The first group of commentators seeks to end the externalization of
risk onto tort creditors by extending vicarious liability for corporate
torts to all shareholders. Professors Hansmann and Kraakman
("Hansmann and Kraakman") offer the most well known of these
proposals, advocating pro rata shareholder liability for corporate
torts. 249  The second group, conversely, largely defends limited
liability, even in the tort context, arguing that it avoids transaction
costs and that, at least in the publicly traded context, its moral hazard
is checked by managerial risk aversion and other factors. These
commentators tend to acknowledge, however, that limited liability's
costs are greater-and its benefits fewer-in the closely held context,
and thus they are more willing to support vicarious shareholder
liability in some closely held firms.250 The third group similarly
argues that limited liability is socially costly in the closely held
context, yet they advocate the extension of vicarious liability for
corporate torts to one or more controlling stakeholders in publicly
traded firms as well. 25 1
As I discuss below, although the Hansmann and Kraakman
proposal has generated enormous scholarly interest, it is widely
viewed as an unattractive approach to addressing limited liability's
social costs. The second and third groups agree that at least some
shareholders should retain the benefit of limited liability, but differ
over whether and when to hold other corporate stakeholders liable for
corporate torts. The third group's parsing of the justifications for and
costs of limited shareholder liability-and, in particular, Professor
Mendelson's control-based analysis-is more persuasive.
Nevertheless, much is missing in the current proposals, including a
thorough analysis of the role of limited managerial liability and the
(noting that these kinds of proposals would require the government to anticipate risks and set
levels accordingly, despite inferior information).
247. Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 7 (N.Y. 1966); see supra note 63.
248. See generally supra Part II.B.
249. See infra Part III.B.l.a.
250. See infra Part III.B.l.b.
251. See infra Part III.B.l.c.
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feasibility of significant reform in the current shareholder liability
regime. Indeed, by taking aim at limited shareholder liability,
Professor Mendelson's proposal, like many that preceded it, would
prove to be both unrealistic and ineffective.
1. Existing Responses to Limited Shareholder Liability
As a threshold issue, various sides in the debate over
limitations on shareholder liability have sought to define its starting
point. Some of the defenders of limited liability caution against
upsetting the current regime absent a compelling, perhaps empirically
supported demonstration that an alternative would reduce the social
costs of limited liability. At the same time, the alternative must not
inflict even greater costs, such as increasing transaction costs and
deterring socially beneficial corporate risk taking.252 Hansmann and
Kraakman contend that the burden is on proponents of limited
liability to justify its continued existence. 25 3 Although I agree that
careful consideration should precede any reform, there should be no
presumption one way or the other. As discussed previously, there is
evidence of excessive corporate risk taking, but the aggregate
marginal benefit or cost of limited shareholder liability and its
alternative regimes has not been and cannot be quantified. 254
a. Pro Rata Liability
In recent years, few commentators have advocated joint and
several shareholder liability for corporate torts.255 Such a regime, it is
largely agreed, would destroy many of the beneficial effects of limited
liability. Others have argued, however, that all shareholders should be
subject to pro rata liability for corporate torts. 256  Most notably,
Hansmann and Kraakman contend that a pro rata regime, which
would limit a shareholder's exposure for tort losses to the
shareholder's proportionate share of ownership, would retain the
252. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 555-56 (arguing that the status quo deserves to be
the null hypothesis); see also EASTERBROOK & FIsCHEL, supra note 2, at 49-50 (stating that
whether limited liability ought to be retained for torts is an empirical question and then
suggesting that, given the survival of the current regime, a preferable regime seems unlikely).
253. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1880 ("[We conclude that the burden is now
on the proponents of limited liability to justify the prevailing rule.").
254. Like other scholars, I question whether existing levels of corporate risk taking are
either beneficial or necessary. And, even if some current risk taking is socially beneficial, and
therefore should be subsidized, blanket limited liability protection is still too broad. See, e.g.,
Leebron, supra note 1, at 1574-78.
255. Cf. Gabaldon, supra note 5, at 1440 (suggesting limited liability is unjustified).
256. See supra note 5.
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benefits of limited liability, including information costs savings,
diversification, and share fungibility. 257 At the same time, such
unlimited shareholder liability would force the firm to internalize the
risks created by its activities, thereby inducing socially efficient levels
of monitoring to avoid risk as well as capitalization and insurance to
cover unavoided risks.258 Hansmann and Kraakman further contend
that the new transaction and administrative costs that this regime
would create would not be serious and, in all likelihood, would be
offset easily by the social costs it would prevent. 259
So thorough and provocative is their critique of limited liability
that Hansmann and Kraakman have all but defined the debate in the
last decade. 260 Yet such a pro rata regime, while preferable to joint
and several liability, might prove more costly and less effective than
Hansmann and Kraakman acknowledge. They concede that this
regime would induce some additional shareholder monitoring of the
firm and each other, inflicting some costs. 261 But others argue that
passive and certain other shareholders may be poorly suited to
assume the risk of corporate activities, even on a pro rata basis, which
might result in inefficient levels of monitoring or a reduction in
investment by shareholders unable to control corporate affairs. 262 In
addition, a pro rata regime might reduce beneficial monitoring of
agency costs because it would discourage investors from assembling
controlling blocks of shares and thereby becoming visible targets of
tort plaintiffs.263 Conversely, if investors do become controlling
shareholders, Professor Mendelson argues that pro rata liability is
insufficient to deter them from engaging in excessively risky activities
257. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1892-93, 1903-06.
258. See id. at 1904.
259. Id. at 1896-1901. Rather than adopt an occurrence-based regime, which they contend
would be difficult to administer, Hansmann and Kraakman propose a modified claims-made rule,
attaching liability at the time the claims are filed or when management becomes aware of a high
probability of such a claim, whichever comes first. Id. at 1897.
260. For example, both Professors Bainbridge and Mendelson treat Hansmann and
Kraakman's pro rata proposal as the major alternative to limited shareholder liability. See
Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 536-40 (critiquing pro rata liability); Mendelson, supra note 1, at
1280-96 (comparing her proposal to the current regime and a pro rata regime).
261. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1906.
262. See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 539-40; Leebron, supra note 1, at 1600 ("[U]nlimited
liability in either of its forms might significantly deter from equity investments those investors
seeking to diversify their investments, which would include most passive and fiduciary
investors.").
263. See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 539-40; Leebron, supra note 1, at 1610; Thompson,
supra note 3, at 18 (noting that mutual funds would decline because they would become a target
of tort plaintiffs and therefore offer lower rates of return). Hansmann and Kraakman
acknowledge this risk, but downplay its significance in a pro rata regime. See Hansmann &
Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1905.
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since they could use their control to extract greater than a pro rata
share of benefits from the firm.264 And, according to Professor
Grundfest, capital market participants would respond to this regime
by engaging in various forms of risk arbitrage, thereby evading
liability.265
Moreover, a number of scholars have argued that this kind of
regime would be costly and ineffective because of the enormous
collection costs it would inflict ex post.266 For example, Professor
Alexander has detailed the enormous procedural and other hurdles
tort plaintiffs would have to overcome to hold large numbers of
shareholders accountable. 267 Other commentators have noted, given
the constantly changing ownership of publicly traded firms, the high
cost of utilizing litigation to determine which shareholders in such
firms are accountable. 268 In turn, Professor Mendelson argues that the
excessive costs of seeking to hold numerous small shareholders liable
on a pro rata basis would preclude tort victims from receiving full
compensation, and thereby would only partially address the
externalization of risk.269 These significant transaction costs and
collection difficulties, combined with the potential costs described
above, render pro rata liability an unattractive alternative.
b. Retaining Limited Shareholder Liability
The most ardent efficiency-based defenders of limited
shareholder liability for corporate torts recognize that limited liability
potentially inflicts social costs and creates a moral hazard problem.
Nevertheless, these commentators reject broad reform for a number of
reasons. As discussed above, this group warns that alternative
regimes, such as pro rata shareholder liability, will inflict significant
transaction costs and may deter socially beneficial corporate
264. See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1283-84 (concluding that a pro rata regime would tend
to underdeter controlling shareholders from influencing the corporation to engage in excessively
risky activity and would create an insufficient incentive to capitalize or insure appropriately).
265. See generally Grundfest, supra note 167, at 392-405.
266. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 536-37 (discussing the significant procedural
hurdles-choice of law, personal jurisdiction-tort creditors would face in seeking to hold
shareholders liable); Leebron, supra note 1, at 1610-11 (discussing the substantial collection
costs associated with pro rata liability).
267. See Alexander, supra note 33, at 398-99; see also Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 536-37.
268. See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 537. This would be true even under Hansmann and
Kraakman's claims-made rule. See id.
269. See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1284-85; id. at 1292 ("Considerable transaction costs
could consume much of the potential recovery.").
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activity.270 But, they also question the extent to which the current
regime actually inflicts social costs.
A core argument of this group is that there are other corporate
constituencies, more risk averse than shareholders, who will compel
the firm to reduce risks and insure against firm losses, thereby
blunting the effects of limited liability's moral hazard. Primary among
these constituencies are firm managers. Because managers have firm-
specific investments of human capital, the argument goes, they cannot
diversify away the risk of business failure.271 Managers, who possess
the authority to make risk-bearing decisions on behalf of the firm, are
unlikely to select activities that create a threat to the existence of the
firm and, hence, to their jobs and livelihood. 272 Management therefore
may prefer a strategy of achieving profits at a level sufficient to satisfy
shareholders and to receive performance-based compensation, rather
than a strategy of unrestrained profit maximization. 273
Correspondingly, management, unlike shareholders, will have an
incentive to maintain sufficient levels of capital to protect against
business failure or to insure corporate activities in excess of capital.27 4
And, to reduce insurance premiums, managers will have a further
incentive to avoid risks. 275 At the same time, agency costs may prevent
270. See supra notes 252, 261-265 and accompanying text. Easterbrook and Fischel also
argue, for example, that managerial liability will cause overdeterrence. See EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 61-62.
271. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 53 ("Human capital, for example, is
notoriously difficult to diversify. Managers who have firm-specific investments of human capital
cannot diversify the risk of business failure."); Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories
of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80, 128 (1991) (making an assertion similar to that of
Easterbrook and Fischel); see also Kraakman, supra note 6, at 863-66 (discussing managerial
risk aversion).
272. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 53; Bainbridge, supra note 1, at
573-74; Thompson, supra note 3, at 19-20.
273. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate
Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 29 (1986) (stating that managers seek profits at a level sufficient to
prevent external intervention by dissatisfied creditors or stockholders); see also Mendelson,
supra note 1, at 1248 ("[M]anagers might prefer to select corporate activities.., that will satisfy
stockholders enough to keep managers' jobs, even if such an approach does not obtain every
possible profit dollar for stockholders.").
274. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 53. This does not mean that management
always takes sufficient care or will avoid all overly risky activities. If management feels that the
firm is adequately insured against losses, another moral hazard problem emerges, since the
insurer, rather than the firm, will bear much of the risk of loss. Id. at 54. However, insurer
monitoring and premiums provide some check against such behavior. See id.
275. See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 573-74 (summarizing this argument); see also
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 53-54 (stating that the purchase of insurance creates
a contract creditor where none existed before and the firm therefore faces costs if it engages in
risky activities).
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shareholders from ensuring that managers seek to maximize
profits.276
In addition to management, a corporation's voluntary creditors
have incentives to prevent business failure. Voluntary creditors face
the risk of nonpayment or incomplete payment if the firm fails.277
Thus, voluntary creditors may bargain for protections that reduce
their repayment risk, such as access to firm information, veto power
over certain decisions, premium rates that reflect the level of risk of
firm activities, or maintenance of insurance or minimum levels of
capital.278 Firms may have corresponding incentives to reduce risk and
adequately insure to lower risk premiums. 279 Creditor bargaining and
corresponding monitoring provide imperfect protection, however, 280
since many creditors may forgo the costs of monitoring and seek to
reduce nonpayment risk in other ways, such as charging higher
premiums ex ante and diversification. 28 1 Yet, voluntary creditors may
provide a check against excessive risk taking in some circumstances.
But even the defenders of limited liability recognize that the
offsetting effects of managerial and creditor risk aversion do not apply
equally in every context and can be avoided through judgment-
proofing techniques. First, managerial risk aversion is reduced and
perhaps extinguished in the closely held context because small firms
tend to be shareholder managed,28 2 and, as shareholders, these
managers are likely to prefer risky projects that offer greater
returns. 28 3 Second, the nature of closely held corporations-for
276. See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1248-49.
277. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 50.
278. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 544; Ribstein, supra note 271, at 128; Thompson,
supra note 3, at 36-37.
279. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 52.
280. See, e.g., id. (noting that voluntary creditors may have imperfect information about firm
risk or insufficient incentives to monitor risks); id. at 51 (suggesting that there may be an
externality at the point at which the firm no longer must raise new capital); Thompson, supra
note 3, at 37 ("This protection for tort creditors from the existence of contract creditors would
decrease or disappear, however, if a corporation never enters the credit market, if it does not
plan to go back to the credit market (a 'final period' problem), or if its only creditors cannot
effectively learn of the risks so as to charge an appropriate premium .... "). Voluntary creditor
insistence on the maintenance of adequate operating reserves also will provide insufficient
protection since tort judgments may greatly exceed such operating levels. See Mendelson, supra
note 1, at 1236-37. Moreover, a high ratio of debt to equity may accentuate limited shareholder
liability's moral hazard. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1884.
281. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 533 ("To the extent that the creditor is concerned
about the corporation's creditworthiness it can simply raise the interest rate it charges to reflect
the risk that the firm will not repay the obligation.").
282. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 56; Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 541.
283. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 56; Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 541; see
Halpern et al., supra note 3, at 141 (arguing that the moral hazard problem is particularly
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example, their relative informality and exemption from public
disclosure requirements-may make creditor oversight less
effective.28 4 Thus, rather than seeking to control the activities of
closely held firms, voluntary creditors of such firms may simply
bargain for personal guarantees, higher premiums, or other security,
which, in turn, will not curb shareholder tendencies toward risky
behavior.2 5 These differing incentives, combined with the fact that the
beneficial effects of limited liability are less pronounced in closely held
firms, have led even some otherwise ardent defenders of limited
liability to question the efficiency of limited shareholder liability for
the torts of close corporations. 28 6
Moreover, defenders of limited liability acknowledge that
neither managerial risk aversion nor voluntary creditor oversight is
likely to offset limited liability's moral hazard if the firm can structure
its operations to protect the firm, its management, and its voluntary
creditors from tort judgments. Most often, firms seek to externalize
this risk by forming wholly owned subsidiaries. 287 Firms that would
otherwise operate within the constraints of risk aversion can engage
in excessively risky activities-to seek maximum returns-by
assigning those activities to separately incorporated subsidiaries that
maintain capital and insurance far below expected liabilities.288
Limited shareholder liability prevents tort victims from collecting
judgments from the parent, and, thus, the parent's managers and
creditors will not face the risk of business failure. Managers of the
subsidiary likewise will not be risk averse as long as they are also
managers of the parent, since the failure of the subsidiary will not
cause them to lose their investment of firm-specific human capital.
Relatedly, such judgment proofing does not produce the beneficial
pronounced in closely held firms); Thompson, supra note 3, at 19-20 (suggesting that risk
aversion may have an effect on participants in closely held firms, but noting that shareholder-
managers in these firms may not overinvest in safety because of the upside potential of greater
returns).
284. See, e.g., Halpern et al., supra note 3, at 143-45 (discussing the incentives for firms to
take risks unanticipated by creditors and the heightened moral hazard problem in the closely
held context).
285. Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 533 (noting that creditors need not worry about firm
creditworthiness since they can simply raise the interest rate to reflect the risk of nonpayment).
286. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 56 (stating that piercing in favor of
tort and trade creditors unable to negotiate with the firm reduces the externalization of costs).
287. See id. at 56-57 (stating that the moral hazard problem is probably greater in the
parent-subsidiary context because the parent can reap the benefits of subsidiary activities but
there are fewer risk aversion effects and incentives to monitor and insure); Bainbridge, supra
note 1, at 569 ("[T]he ability to allocate business activities between a parent and various
subsidiaries facilitates the externalization of risk.").
288. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 56-57.
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offers in other contexts. 28 9
Thus, scholars in this group generally defend limited liability
for shareholders in publicly traded firms, but recognize that the
arguments in favor of limited liability for closely held corporations and
parent-subsidiary groups are weaker. 290 Yet some still question
whether, on balance, shareholder liability should be unlimited in these
contexts. Professor Bainbridge, for example, argues that other factors,
including reputational considerations and demands by voluntary
creditors, may create sufficient incentives for shareholders in closely
held corporations to take precautions and insure.291 Scholars have
noted that substitutes for limited liability, including market insurance
and veil piercing, would not eliminate moral hazard entirely and
would impose additional transaction costs. 292 For example, Professor
Bainbridge contends that veil-piercing doctrine-which, given the
current statutory framework, would be the primary means of imposing
shareholder liability-imposes costs in the form of ex ante uncertainty
and unpredictability, and ex post collection costs. 293  In addition,
289. See Blumberg, supra note 3, at 630 ("If a subsidiary corporation constitutes only one of a
number of components of a corporate group collectively conducting a fragmented unitary
business, the very basis for the establishment of limited liability as a matter of general legal
policy disappears.").
290. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 55-56. Professor Bainbridge notes
that concerns about diversification and excessive monitoring are far less significant in this
context. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 543. He also points out that the collection costs of
unlimited liability are greatly reduced in the closely held context, given the small number of
potential defendants. See id. at 541. And, he discusses why holding a parent liable for a
subsidiary's conduct will not discourage investor diversification or cause the parent's
shareholders to invest excessively in firm monitoring. See id. at 569.
291. See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 544. Professor Bainbridge and others also argue that
some owners of closely held firms will avoid the risk of insolvency because the venture may be
his or her livelihood. Id.; Booth, supra note 4, at 156 (arguing that small business owners tend to
have a substantial portion of their wealth tied up in the firm, and thus, are unlikely to "bet the
farm" on risky projects); Leebron, supra note 1, at 1628 (arguing that owners of small firms often
are undiversified); Thompson, supra note 3, at 33 (noting that the inability of participants to
diversify their human or financial capital may lead to overdeterrence). This is true in some
circumstances, although Professor Bainbridge concedes that it will not be true in others. See
Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 544 n.120. Indeed, where the perceived risks of bankrupting losses
resulting from an activity are low, but the potential return is high, it would make economic sense
under a limited liability regime for such an owner to have the firm engage in such a project. Cf.
Booth, supra note 4, at 156 (conceding that this bet may make economic sense).
292. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 50 (suggesting the moral hazard problem
will remain even without limited liability); Halpern et al., supra note 3, at 140-43 (discussing
how the moral hazard problem will remain even with insurance); Hansmann & Kraakman,
supra note 5, at 1889-90 (noting the transaction costs associated with insurance). For example,
if a firm is fully insured against tort losses, and therefore judgment proof, the firm's participants
would have incentives to engage in risky activities since they would not bear the cost of those
activities. See Halpern et al., supra note 3, at 140-41.
293. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 554-55, 575.
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Easterbrook and Fischel argue that holding corporate parents andlor
affiliates liable for the obligations of subsidiaries would have the
perverse effect of giving the smallest, independent firms a competitive
advantage over larger firms.294 Thus, Easterbrook and Fischel, along
with Professor Bainbridge, support parent liability for subsidiary torts
only when the overall risk level from that corporate structure exceeds
the level that would result if the subsidiary were organized as a
separate venture. 295
However, these arguments against extending vicarious liability
to shareholders in the closely held firms may be overstated. As I
discussed previously and will revisit below, Professor Bainbridge's
practical concerns regarding piercing doctrine are warranted. Yet,
some other kind of alternative liability regime that is conceptually
sound, contains clear standards, and targets a discrete subset of
stakeholders need not inflict the transaction costs he discusses. Also,
while reputational factors and voluntary creditor demands may
occasionally neutralize limited liability's moral hazard, they are not a
sufficient proxy for shareholder liability. These supposed neutralizers
will have no effect on some shareholders and a limited effect on
others, 296 while shareholders enjoying limited liability will always
have a strong, countervailing incentive to externalize risk. Moreover,
market insurance is not a perfect check against moral hazard, and is
not free of transaction costs. But such insurance does preclude the
costless externalization of risk onto involuntary creditors and provide
compensation for some creditors that may not otherwise exist, and,
relatively speaking, its transaction costs are not serious.297
294. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 57. They argue that if all affiliated entities
were liable for the losses of the entire enterprise, this would require greater (group-wide)
monitoring by voluntary creditors, and hence, greater costs. See id. Moreover, corporate groups
responding to managerial and creditor risk aversion would have to retain greater capital or
insurance to protect against these losses. Small, independent firms would not have to carry the
same level of insurance. See id. Such a rule would promote corporate disintegration, harming
potential tort victims, since smaller firms may be less likely to carry adequate insurance. Id.
295. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 57; Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 574 (stating
his proposal for a restricted form of enterprise entity liability, which would focus on whether the
firm has split up a single enterprise into multiple corporations with the goal of externalizing
specific risks).
296. Again, monitoring by voluntary creditors is an imperfect check against externalization,
particularly in the closely held context. See Halpern et al., supra note 3, at 144-45; see also supra
notes 280-281 and accompanying text. And, reputational concerns cut both ways since higher
returns offer reputational advantages.
297. See Halpern et al., supra note 3, at 145-46; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at
1889-90 (discussing transaction costs). Although imperfect, insurer monitoring and premiums
would provide some check against this moral hazard. See, e.g., Halpern et al., supra note 3, at
138-41, 145-46; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1890. Since the premium will depend
on the behavior of the firm, shareholders will have an interest to undertake some cost-justified,
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Furthermore, I question whether subsidiaries usually are
better insured for foreseeable risks than are small, independent
firms.298 Even if they are, parent or affiliate liability would create a
competitive advantage for small, independent firms only if the
individual shareholders of those firms were not likewise subject to
liability for corporate torts. Larger corporate groups would retain
greater capital and insurance, but at levels commensurate with their
greater overall levels of risk. Indeed, under a regime in which all
shareholders of closely held corporations-both individuals and
corporate parents-were liable for corporate torts, the more likely
effect would be a barrier to entry for firms too new or too small to
secure adequate insurance, maintain sufficient capital, or otherwise
spread risk efficiently. 299 This cost of reduced competition should not
be ignored, but it would have the opposite effect of that described
above: although there might be fewer firms engaging in some risky
activities or industries, the participating firms would be more likely to
satisfy tort judgments. 300
c. Control-Based Approaches
The final group of commentators agree that limited
shareholder liability produces certain beneficial effects. They also
agree that limited liability is less justified in the closely held context,
although they are less hesitant about extending liability for corporate
torts to some or all shareholders in closely held firms.30 1 But, unlike
the previous group, these scholars argue that certain controlling
risk-reduction precautions. Halpern et al., supra note 3, at 145-46. Moreover, in an unlimited
liability regime, the risk that losses may exceed insurance will create ongoing incentives to take
care. Finally, even if insurance is not a perfect check against moral hazard, it will provide
compensation for losses that otherwise would not have been available.
298. See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1234 ("Because corporations can limit liability by
forming subsidiaries, the corporate tendency will be to divert investment from other, more
efficient risk management strategies. For example, a corporation will be less likely to purchase
adequate insurance or otherwise allocate risk through contracts."). Unless the continued
existence of the particular subsidiary is essential for the achievement of some other goal, then
there is no reason for a parent seeking maximum returns to capitalize and insure the firm
adequately. And subsidiaries usually are formed to externalize risk. Lynn M. LoPucki, Virtual
Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 107 YALE L.J. 1413, 1427 (1998) ("Limiting liability is widely
understood to be the principal reason for the separate incorporation of subsidiaries.").
299. See, e.g., Halpern et al., supra note 3, at 138 (discussing the potential that under
unlimited liability, insurance may not exist for small, high-risk companies); Leebron, supra note
1, at 1615-16 (discussing the enterprise and integration efficiencies of such groups).
300. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1914 (arguing that the net cost of the use
of subsidiaries as an evasion strategy today probably outweighs the costs of unlimiting liability).
301. See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1247; see also Halpern et al., supra note 3, at 141, 144-
45 (arguing that the moral hazard problem is more severe in tightly held companies and, for this
reason and others, shareholders in closely held firms should not enjoy limited liability).
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stakeholders in both closely held and more widely traded firms should
be liable for corporate torts.
For example, a number of years ago, Professor Halpern and his
coauthors argued that shareholders in closely held firms should be
liable for corporate torts-for reasons similar to those discussed
above-and that vicarious liability should also extend to directors of
publicly traded corporations. 302 In proposing director liability, they
reasoned that such a rule would minimize the monitoring costs for
shareholders, reduce enforcement costs for tort creditors, and create
incentives to adopt avoidance precautions. 303
Although much of their economic analysis of limited liability
has proven influential, the proposal by Halpern and his coauthors to
hold directors vicariously liable for corporate torts has not gained
adherents. Critics of director liability argue that the risk of potentially
catastrophic tort liability would be socially costly by, for example,
deterring otherwise qualified persons from becoming directors. 304 It
also would overdeter corporate risk taking, inducing directors to select
only activities offering sub-optimal levels of risk to avoid potential tort
losses.30 5 For these reasons, few others have seriously considered
extending vicarious liability to (nonshareholder) directors or other
managers of publicly traded corporations. 306
In a later article, Professor Thompson offers the most thorough
discussion of managerial liability. In addition to advocating greater
veil piercing in the parent-subsidiary context, 30 7 he approves the trend
towards holding corporate managers accountable for the failure to
monitor or supervise employees who commit torts or statutory
302. Halpern et al., supra note 3, at 148.
303. See id. at 148-49. Their proposal rejects extending liability to employees of the firm,
contending that employees often cannot diversify against business failure and are relatively less
able to bear losses. Id. at 149-50.
304. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1929 (arguing that managerial
liability is most likely to lead to resignations).
305. See id.
306. Professor Kraakman discussed the potential benefits and costs of managerial and other
forms of "gatekeeper" liability in his 1984 article, suggesting that managerial liability may be
socially beneficial in some circumstances where enterprise liability fails as a legal control. See
generally Kraakman, supra note 6, at 868-98. However, he and Professor Hansmann later
dismiss managerial liability as inefficient. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1929.
Also, although Professor Mendelson's critique of limited liability is otherwise thorough, she only
contrasts her controlling shareholder regime with the current limited liability regime and a pro
rata shareholder liability regime. See generally Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1279-96 (comparing
these regimes). She does not consider liability for firm managers.
307. Thompson, supra note 3, at 37-38 (arguing that parent liability is appropriate when the
parent corporation so controls the subsidiary as to leave the usual incentives to reduce risk and
insure ineffective).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
violations.30 Professor Thompson also suggests that limited liability
is least justified for individuals who are both managers and
shareholders, since shareholder-managers have an incentive to
externalize risk that may offset managerial risk aversion. He stops
short, however, of offering a more specific proposal for modifying the
current regime. 30 9
Recently, Professor Mendelson has offered the most
comprehensive critique to date of limited liability's potential benefits
and costs, including its moral hazard. 310 She begins by emphasizing
the qualitative differences between shareholders. As discussed
previously, she demonstrates convincingly that the efficiency-based
justifications for limited liability-information costs savings,
facilitating diversification, and risk-aversion correction-apply only to
small, passive investors. 311 She also argues compellingly that there is
no reason to believe that externalization of risk by institutional or
other wealthy shareholders is efficient, given that these investors are,
as a class, more efficient risk bearers than the tort victims upon whom
limited liability shifts risk.312
Building on these distinctions between shareholders, she next
argues that a shareholder with the capacity to control the
corporation-whether closely held or widely owned-is more likely to
select excessively risky activities. 31 3  These shareholders have a
greater ability than passive investors to benefit from excessively risky
activities, including the ability to control the timing and size of
distributions, the greater capacity to sell and shift assets strategically,
and the means of achieving taxation and operational synergies. 314
Indeed, she details how these benefits will be disproportionate to the
308. Id. at 27-28, 40.
309. See id. at 41 ("Liability for those who combine both functions presents the easiest case
for departing from limited liability, but even in this context, nonlegal constraints temper
application of the legal rule."). Professor Thompson also states that "Pliability for managers can
be extended if appropriate consideration is given to possible overdeterrence." Id. In their recent
article, Professors Gulati, Klein, and Zolt suggest that directors, officers, and employees might be
"fair game" for liability for corporate obligations, but they do not advocate such liability. See G.
Mitu Gulati et al., Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REV. 887, 930 (2000).
310. See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1203.
311. Id. at 1219-32.
312. Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1231-32 ("Consequently, shifting the costs of excessively
risky corporate behavior likely will not increase social utility, but will reduce it."); see supra
notes 202-206 and accompanying text.
313. Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1247.
314. Id. at 1250-56.
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controlling shareholder's equity stake.315 Moreover, faced with fewer
information costs, and armed with the ability to replace managers or
relocate displaced ones, controlling shareholders, unlike passive ones,
can compel managerial compliance with their interests and otherwise
avoid the effects of risk aversion.316 Likewise, voluntary creditor
oversight and insistence on the maintenance of adequate operating
reserves may provide insufficient protection, since tort judgments may
greatly exceed such operating levels.317 Furthermore, Professor
Mendelson notes that other potential neutralizers, including current
veil piercing rules and new statutory impositions of controlling person
liability, apply rarely and therefore are unlikely to deter most risk
taking.318
Thus, she concludes, the presence of a controlling shareholder
enhances limited liability's moral hazard problem. Corporations with
controlling or potentially controlling shareholders-which includes
virtually all closely held corporations and many publicly traded
firms-therefore are more likely than corporations with widely
dispersed ownership to engage in excessively risky activity.319
Based on this analysis, Professor Mendelson advocates a
regime in which all shareholders with the capacity to control corporate
activity would be vicariously liable for corporate torts and tort-like
statutory violations. 320 When there is more than one shareholder with
315. Id. For all of these reasons, combined with disproportionate voting power, controlling
shareholders are positioned to benefit in excess of their pro rata share of corporate equity. Id. at
1252.
316. See id.
317. Id. at 1236-37.
318. See id. at 1259-71, 1291-92.
319. Id. at 1258. Professor Mendelson then adds a corollary: "[U]nder limited liability, there
is a set of risky activities that a company with a dispersed share ownership would not select, but
a company with a controlling shareholder would." Id. And, again, a shareholder's ability to
benefit from risky activities may be enhanced if the dividend tax is eliminated. See supra note
222 and accompanying text.
320. See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1271-74. She states that her "capacity to control"
regime would include shareholders that actually exercise control by involvement or selection of
the board of directors, control over major activities such as asset sales, or participation in other
major decisions. Id. at 1272. It would also include shareholders who have significant potential
control. Id. at 1273. This would certainly include majority shareholders. Id. It may also
include some minority shareholders, depending on a number of factors such as whether there is a
majority shareholder, the relationships between shareholders, and the relationship between a
shareholder's board representatives and other shareholders. Id. at 1273-74. Professor
Mendelson would hold accountable shareholders with the capacity to control at the time the
tortious conduct occurred. Id. at 1278. She argues that an occurrence-based rule is superior to
the other choices because it would encourage those in control to monitor and influence decision
making, and would be easy to administer. See id. at 1278-79 (arguing that a modified claims-
made rule, as proposed by Hansmann and Kraakman, is unnecessary in a control-based regime
because there would be few administrative difficulties). Some years earlier, Professor Leebron
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the capacity to control, all such shareholders would be jointly and
severally liable with the right to contribution. 321 Such a regime, she
argues, would force those most likely to engage in excessively risky
activity to internalize the costs of such activity, neutralizing the effect
of limited liability's moral hazard. 322  Controlling shareholders
therefore would have an incentive to monitor and avoid risk and to
secure insurance or maintain capital adequate to cover foreseeable
tort judgments. 323 While determining who is a controlling shareholder
will inflict litigation costs, she contends that, in most circumstances,
this determination will not be difficult.324 She then defends this
regime against other potential criticisms, arguing that it is not likely
to overdeter corporate risk taking,325 preclude investment in risky
industries, 326 or adversely affect securities markets. 327 She further
details why such a regime is likely to be less socially costly than the
current regime and more effective than a pro rata liability regime.328
Finally, she argues that in the special case of a corporation without
even a single shareholder with the capacity to control, shareholder
liability is unnecessary because managerial risk aversion combined
with agency costs will neutralize limited liability's moral hazard. 329
Professor Mendelson's careful analysis of the effects of limited
liability and shareholder control in any corporation offers a powerful
rebuttal to those who generally defend limited shareholder liability in
larger corporations, including those that are publicly traded. Indeed,
she shows why the widely accepted critique of limited liability in
closely held corporations and parent-wholly owned subsidiary groups
applies with equal force in many larger, publicly traded corporations.
suggested the possible efficiency of abolishing limited liability for corporate parents owning a
majority of the shares of their subsidiaries. See Leebron, supra note 1, at 1622-23.
321. Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1271.
322. See id. at 1281 ("Firms would more likely internalize their costs, rather than shift
excess costs to involuntary creditors such as tort victims. Tort and statutory claimants would
more likely be compensated.").
323. See id.
324. See id. at 1288-89.
325. Id. at 1294-96.
326. Id. at 1297-98.
327. Id. at 1296-97.
328. See id. at 1280-96; see also supra notes 261, 265 and accompanying text. For example,
she argues that a pro rata regime is less likely to deter risky conduct by controlling shareholders
who receive proportionately more benefits from such activities than other shareholders.
Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1281-85. She also argues that tort victims facing excessively high
collection costs would not be able to receive full compensation whenever the firm has dispersed
ownership. Id. Controlling shareholder liability avoids these problems. Id.
329. Id. at 1291-92.
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Her parsing of the benefits and costs of limited shareholder liability is,
in my view, the most persuasive to date.
2. The Problems with "Unlimiting" Shareholder Liability
The previous section outlines the various scholarly attempts to
assess and enhance the efficiency of limited shareholder liability.
Although I disagree with a few aspects of Professor Mendelson's
analysis, her critique is compelling. She demonstrates why the current
regime extends the protective shield beyond what is needed to produce
beneficial effects and why such protection for controlling shareholders
in all types of firms is socially costly. Yet, like most previous attempts
to address limited liability's social costs in the tort context, her
proposed reform is inadequate because it depends on "unlimiting"
shareholder liability. Reform that unlimits the liability of some or all
shareholders is unrealistic, would be ineffective, and may have
adverse downstream consequences for corporate governance.
For example, Professor Mendelson contends that her
controlling shareholder-based liability regime can be implemented
through either statutory reform or an overhaul of the veil-piercing
doctrine.330 Yet, as I discussed earlier, limited shareholder liability is
an enduring and ever expanding feature of our economic landscape,
despite scholarly criticisms.33 1 Business corporation statutes draw no
distinction between controlling and passive shareholders, between
closely held and publicly traded firms, or between voluntary and
involuntary creditors. Plus, the trend in the last two decades has been
towards extending limited liability protections to various hybrid
entities.332 Again, this expansion is particularly telling because these
hybrid firms usually are closely held, the context in which limited
liability is least justified. And, although the historically successful
arguments in favor of shareholder liability-economic democracy,
entrepreneurialism, economic growth-are overstated at best, such
arguments retain their political appeal. Thus, widespread statutory
reform in favor of unlimiting shareholder liability, including
controlling shareholder liability, is simply not going to happen. 333
330. Id. at 1207 (suggesting that implementation of a controlling shareholder regime can be
achieved through statutory reform or extension of common-law piercing rules).
331. See supra Part II.A.
332. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
333. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 540 (noting that since Hansmann and Kraakman's article
was published, no state has repealed limited liability, and that, indeed, "states have been busily
expanding the scope of limited liability through the creation of such new enterprise forms as
limited liability companies and limited liability partnerships"); id. at 571 (stating that
shareholder liability is almost certainly a political nonstarter); Leebron, supra note 1, at 1567-68
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Moreover, without statutory reform, veil piercing is a dead end.
As I outlined, except for theories premised on shareholder fraud or
statutory violations, which are essentially forms of direct shareholder
liability, piercing theory and jurisprudence offer little coherence. 334
Given this disarray and uncertainty, the transaction costs of utilizing
piercing doctrine to achieve significant reform would be substantial, as
Professor Bainbridge details. 335 But that is just the beginning. As
discussed, a principled piercing regime-one that enhances efficiency
by extending liability to a class of shareholders--cannot coexist
coherently with statutorily mandated, unqualified and universal
limited shareholder liability. Indeed, because piercing is supposed to
be an "exception" to limited liability, courts almost never pierce based
on shareholder control alone. 33 6 Although Professor Mendelson
acknowledges the judicial reluctance to extending liability to
controlling shareholders in her discussion of current veil piercing
doctrine337 and the Supreme Court's Bestfoods decision, 338 she offers
no way to overcome it. Absent statutory reform, linking control and
accountability in the tort context cannot be achieved through piercing.
Furthermore, even if a shareholder-based liability regime were
implemented via statute or common law, it would be likely to be
ineffective and to raise serious corporate governance concerns. For
example, under Professor Mendelson's "capacity to control" regime,
investors at risk of being deemed controlling shareholders would find
ways to maintain control while evading liability or would reduce their
equity stake in any one corporation to below the level at which they
would have the capacity to control the entity.
(noting the unlikelihood of such reform). Professor Mendelson concedes that statutes that
purport to apply liability to controlling shareholders are, in the wake of Bestfoods, unlikely to
broaden liability for shareholders. See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1266-69.
334. See supra Part II.B.
335. See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 554-55; see also supra notes 78-81 and accompanying
text.
336. See supra notes 123-124 and accompanying text.
337. See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1263 ("In short, a shareholder may maintain limited
liability despite a high degree of potential or actual control over a corporation's activity.
Extensive control of a corporation by a shareholder-including selection of the subsidiary's board
of directors and control over major financial decisions-is treated by courts as fairly run-of-the-
mill and is unlikely to create a significant risk of veil piercing.").
338. See id. at 1266-69 ("Indications are, however, that such statutory efforts to hold
shareholders directly liable for corporate torts, as they currently stand, are unlikely to substitute
for directly revisiting vicarious liability rules. The purported 'erosion' of traditional corporation
law concepts under CERCLA, for example, was set back sharply in 1999.").
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Evasion imposes a major impediment to preventing the
externalization of risk through shareholder liability. 339 As Professor
LoPucki has demonstrated, a sophisticated or institutional investor
can reap the benefits of an enterprise while remaining judgment proof
through restructuring the enterprise with symbiotic contracts. 340 In
the current regime, an easy and obvious example of such judgment
proofing is the allocation of risky activities to a subsidiary.341
Although that technique would no longer be available in a controlling
shareholder liability regime, there are other, low-transaction-cost
alternatives for facilitating the externalization of risk. Highly
sophisticated investors-today's controlling shareholders in large
firms-may abandon their direct, shareholder relationship with the
firm and seek control-level benefits through other types of
relationships. For example, they could convert from equity to various
forms of debt financing and bargain with management for concessions
to ensure adequate control. With relatively few transaction costs, and
with agency costs preventing passive shareholder interference, the
investor could structure the repayment and its relationship with firm
management in such a way as to have controlling shareholder-like
incentives (including the incentive to engage in excessively risky
activities) and influence. In addition, former controlling shareholders
might seek to participate and exercise control through multiple
intermediaries or subsidiaries. They also could contract out risky
activities to firms with no controlling shareholder or to firms with a
single "high roller" with limited assets, but bargain to retain
significant control and shareholder-like returns. 342
339. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1895 (suggesting that without a uniform
rule, covering both closely held and publicly traded entities, firms will find ways to alter their
equity structure to avoid liability); Thompson, supra note 3, at 20 (discussing the likelihood of
evasion after liability is unlimited for some participants).
340. See generally LoPucki, supra note 17, at 147-50.
341. See supra notes 287-289 and accompanying text.
342. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 20 (noting the likelihood of evasion strategies such as
the transfer of assets to judgment-proof investors or managers); see also Hansmann &
Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1911-12 (discussing the high-roller strategy and coining the term).
Professor Mendelson recognizes the possibility of such judgment-proofing techniques, although
she suggests they may be infrequent. See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1301. She acknowledges
that controlling shareholders might have an incentive to establish contractual relationships with
risk-bearing firms rather than vertically integrate, but she argues that this incentive would be
offset by the loss of the advantages of integration. See id. I disagree. As Professor LoPucki's
analysis of judgment-proofing demonstrates, through contractual arrangements, firms can
bargain for and exert an enormous amount of control over affiliated firms-debtors, trading
partners, franchisees, etc.-and remain judgment-proof. LoPucki, supra note 17, at 151-55.
Indeed, lenders and other creditors can, among other things, utilize this control to exact
shareholder-like returns, take advantage of synergies, hedge against market risks, and gain
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:2:329
The point is that any reform that leaves classes of shareholders
or firms free from vicarious liability will create opportunities for
judgment proofing.343 Although some courts have been willing to
extend tort liability through several levels of ownership or to lenders
and other voluntary creditors, such an equitable extension of the
control-based approach is likely to be rare, unpredictable, and-like
piercing doctrine-internally problematic. 344  While this does not
mean that a pro rata shareholder liability regime would be
preferable, 345 it does mean that more limited reform may be largely
ineffective in reducing the moral hazard problem.
On the other hand, a "capacity to control" liability rule may
inflict unintended costs by driving certain institutional investors from
the equities markets. These investors-including pension funds,
mutual funds and other fiduciaries-may have longer-term objectives
or lower tolerances for risk, and, thus, may be uninterested in reaping
short-term gains or controlling shareholder-like benefits, despite
holding large equity stakes in a firm. And some of these investors,
seeking steady returns through substantial but diversified portfolios,
simply could not tolerate the risk of vicarious liability for a single
investment. To this extent, a "capacity to control" rule is overbroad. 346
other benefits. In essence then, sophisticated investors can exact benefits similar to those of a
controlling-shareholder through other kinds of relationships, while remaining judgment proof.
343. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1894, 1931-32 (discussing the advantages of
promulgating a single rule for all corporations). Again, this is consistent with Professor
LoPucki's core thesis. Indeed, his examples of judgment evasion through restructuring the
enterprise depend on limits on the liability of shareholders, lenders, or other contracting parties.
See generally LoPucki, supra note 17, at 147-55.
344. Indeed, Professor LoPucki argues that, while courts will search for the boundaries of the
"enterprise," such boundaries are "ethereal"-the enterprise has "no sharp boundaries" in the
shifting web of relationships between firms and participants engaged in commercial activity.
LoPucki, supra note 17, at 157-58. Thus, "[t]he search for the boundaries of the 'enterprise' will
fail." Id. at 158.
345. Besides the costs of this regime discussed previously, pro rata shareholder liability is
subject to some of the same evasion techniques. And I question whether an amorphous
"constructive equity" doctrine would be useful in preventing evasion. Cf. Hansmann &
Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1913 (discussing this notion). Again, Professor LoPucki argues that
the search for principled distinctions between contracting firms will fail. See supra note 344.
346. Professor Mendelson acknowledges that a capacity-to-control rule, which places a tax on
control, might affect equity ownership patterns. Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1293-94. However,
she contends that it will not deter many from retaining control level equity stakes because of the
disproportionate benefits of control. See id. Yet I believe she underestimates the potential effect
of such a regime on certain kinds of large investors. For example, suppose a large pension fund
owns 5 to 10 percent of the outstanding shares of a smaller publicly traded firm. Such an
ownership stake, in and of itself, might be viewed as creating the capacity to control, particularly
in firms without a larger shareholder or cumulative voting, and with otherwise widely dispersed
ownership (many, rationally apathetic small investors). Add a few more facts-such as the
fund's offering a successful shareholder proposal in the past, making a few recommendations to
the board of directors, or assisting in the appointment of a new director to the audit committee-
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These types of institutional investors, therefore, would choose
to eliminate the risk of vicarious tort liability by divesting or
drastically reducing their equity interests and avoiding direct
involvement in corporate governance. 347 Yet, if these institutions
reduce their participation in the equities markets or in corporate
governance, publicly traded firms will lose an important check against
managerial abuse.348 Indeed, particularly in the wake of Enron and
other corporate scandals, long-term institutional investors are widely
regarded as the most effective, internal check against the agency
problem. 349 Ironically then, a "capacity to control" regime may move
more publicly traded firms toward the Berle and Means model, 350 a
model Professor Mendelson suggests is now atypical.351 Perhaps this
concern can be addressed by adjusting the test for determining who is
a controlling shareholder, but, as it stands, a "capacity to control" rule
and the fund would be even more likely to be found to have the "capacity to control." Yet this
type of fund, which invests widely in the market, may not have interest in investing in greater
firm monitoring and, correspondingly, seeking disproportionate, controlling shareholder-type
benefits. The fund therefore will have an incentive to reduce its stake in the corporation and
reduce its participation in corporate governance.
347. Similarly, institutional investors likely to become the target of tort victims may reduce
their equity interests in any one corporation. See Leebron, supra note 1, at 1611 (discussing how
sophisticated investors would reduce their investment in any one firm in a pro rats regime); see
also Thompson, supra note 3, at 31 (arguing that pro rata shareholder liability would "discourage
mutual funds from holding large blocks of stock, since a large, well-financed shareholder would
be a much more attractive defendant than would many dispersed shareholders").
348. Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 540 (suggesting that a liability regime that discouraged
the assembling of controlling blocks of shares would reduce oversight of corporate management).
349. See, e.g., Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered
Management Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6,563, 6,564-65 (Feb. 7, 2003) (noting that in
September 2002 mutual funds held $2 trillion of corporate equity, representing 18 percent of
U.S. market capitalization, and discussing "the enormous influence of mutual funds in the
capital markets and their huge impact on the financial fortunes of American investors"); Proxy
Voting by Investment Advisors, 68 Fed. Reg. 6,585, 6,586 (Feb. 7, 2003) (noting that equity
advisors registered with the SEC have discretion in the management of over $19 trillion in
assets, often on the behalf of institutional investors); see also Kate Kelly et al., Behind Chiefs
Departure, A Profit Squeeze, Governance Questions, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2003, at Al (describing
Richard Grasso's departure from the New York Stock Exchange and pressures brought to bear by
large institutional investors); Joann S. Lublin, Proxy Voting Is a Fiduciary Duty, SEC Chief Says
in Letter to Group, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2002, at C20 (describing a letter from Harvey Pitt to an
investment firm in which he urges money managers to vote proxies consistent with fiduciary
duty to clients and describing the recent trend for pension funds to exercise voting power);
Martin Peers & Julia Angwin, Steve Case Quits as AOL Chairman Under Pressure, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 13, 2003, at Al (describing the role a long-term institutional investor played in forcing Steve
Case to step down as Chairman of AOL Time Warner).
350. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 47-65 (1932) (examining the dispersion of stock ownership).
351. Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1216.
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may have unintended effects that have troubling consequences for
corporate governance. 352
In conclusion, scholars who seek to reform the current regime
usually propose unlimiting shareholder liability in one way or
another. But such reform is unrealistic. In addition, shareholder
liability proposals fail to grasp a broader conception of accountability
within the firm and therefore are vulnerable to a wide variety of
evasion techniques. Lastly, targeting shareholders may have other
adverse effects on corporate governance. Thus, the challenge of
finding a way to retain the beneficial effects of limited shareholder
liability while reducing its costs remains.
IV. A NEW APPROACH: EXTENDING VICARIOUS TORT LIABILITY TO
HIGHEST-RANKING CORPORATE OFFICERS
Several scholars recently have questioned why, given the now
predominant contractarian view of the firm, so few reform proponents
have sought to apply the arguments for personal shareholder liability
to other firm participants. 353 Although these commentators do not
offer such proposals, 354 I will take the bait.
I propose that the highest-ranking corporate officers, rather
than controlling shareholders, be subject to vicarious liability for torts
and tort-like statutory violations committed within the corporate
enterprise. In seeking to reduce limited shareholder liability's social
costs, including its moral hazard, Professor Mendelson appropriately
focuses on the implications of corporate control. Like many before her,
however, she largely confines her discussion to shareholder liability.
But shareholders are not the only potentially controlling participants
within the firm; by definition, management also exercises control. In
particular, high-ranking officers, who exercise control over the daily
and ongoing operations of the firm, wield the most significant and
direct control over many firm activities. 355 And, as discussed earlier,
352. Professor Bainbridge offers a similar assessment of seeking to hold controlling
shareholders liable. See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 571.
353. See id. at 538-39 ("[W]hy should not other corporate constituents-such as creditors,
employees, and managers-be liable for the corporation's torts as well?"); Gulati et al., supra
note 309, at 930 ("From the perspective of the connected contracts model, it is interesting and
surprising that no one seems to have considered the possibility of applying the arguments for
shareholder personal liability to other participants such as creditors, suppliers, customers,
directors, officers, and employees.").
354. Professor Bainbridge, for example, is a leading proponent of the contractarian view of
the firm, but, again, he also is largely a defender of limited liability.
355. Officers of a corporation are selected by the board of directors and carry out their
decisions. ROBERT W. HAMILTON, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: UNINCORPORATED BUSINESSES AND
CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS: ESSENTIAL TERMS AND CONCEPTS 200 (1996). They also have
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firm managers, like shareholders, usually enjoy limited liability for
corporate torts under the current regime.356 While most other
commentators have dismissed unlimiting managerial liability, often
on risk aversion and overdeterrence grounds, 357 I argue that imposing
vicarious tort liability on this discrete subset of corporate
management is the most efficient, most effective, and most realistic
means of retaining limited shareholder liability's social benefits while
reducing its social costs.
By "highest-ranking corporate officers," I refer to a limited
subgroup of corporate management exercising control at the time the
tortious activity occurs. My proposed regime would extend vicarious
tort liability to the highest named officer in the firm; for example, the
CEO or president in a corporation, or the top "manager" in an LLC. 358
It also would extend liability to any other officer-perhaps a CFO or
division head-who exercises ultimate executive authority over
certain firm activities either because the officer does not report to the
highest named officer, or because there is no highest named officer, or
because, as a practical matter, the structure of the firm provides that
officer with such authority. However, vicarious liability for the latter
set of officers would extend only to torts committed within their area
of ultimate control. Finally, liability would extend to any other
natural person or entity actually exercising high-ranking officer-like
control in addition to or instead of firm officers. To the extent there is
more than one highest-ranking officer, each would be jointly and
severally liable.359
This liability regime therefore excludes directors acting only,
for example, in their oversight and decision-making capacities as
members of the board or board committee. It also does not include
other officers, lower-level managers, or employees. Finally, it does not
extend liability to shareholders in their capacity as shareholders. Of
executive authority over firm activities and oversee the business on a day-to-day basis. Id.
Boards of directors rely heavily on the expertise, managerial skills, information gathering, and
strategic decision making of officers. Indeed, corporate law facilitates this reliance by allowing
directors to rely in good faith on the reports and opinions of officers. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 141(e) (2002).
356. See supra Part II.A.
357. See infra notes 373-376.
358. To the extent official firm books and records name one person as the highest-ranking
officer, but another person is held out to the public as that officer, both would be jointly and
severally liable. This rule would avoid any potential advantage-including judgment evasion-
from such a misleading holding out.
359. Perhaps these high-ranking officers would have a right to contribution from one another
in some circumstances, although such a right may not be necessary, since these officers are well
positioned to bargain for rights to contribution or indemnity.
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course, directors or shareholders may be held liable if they also serve
in a high-ranking officer capacity.
The advantages of my "highest-ranking corporate officers"
liability proposal require a fairly detailed explanation. Below, I begin
by outlining why my alternative control-based approach preserves the
beneficial effects of limited shareholder liability while neutralizing its
moral hazard. I demonstrate why, contrary to the views of other
scholars, high-ranking corporate officers are more efficient risk
bearers than other firm participants, and, hence, why they should
bear this burden in all firms. I then show why judgment evasion is
less likely under my approach; indeed, given that every enterprise will
contain at least one natural person subject to liability for firm torts,
there will always be a firm participant with the strong incentive to
reduce risks and maintain adequate insurance or capitalization. Next,
I discuss why high-ranking officer liability is a realistic alternative to
the (highly unrealistic) shareholder liability proposals. I recount how
long-existing legal norms and recent reforms, including Sarbanes-
Oxley, link officer-like control and accountability. I further explain
how courts can easily implement this regime through a natural
extension of respondeat superior and enterprise liability principles. I
conclude by arguing that my proposal is the only one to date that
successfully synthesizes tort law and the contractarian view of the
firm, and resolves the lingering conflict between limited liability and
the aims of our tort regime.
A. Retaining Beneficial Effects and Reducing Social Costs
My control-based approach preserves the beneficial effects of
limited shareholder liability. By extending liability only to high-
ranking officers, my proposal threatens none of the efficiency-based
justifications for limited shareholder liability discussed earlier,
including specialization, correcting investor risk aversion, enhancing
equity market efficiency, and facilitating diversification. 360 Indeed,
these effects largely or exclusively accrue in the context of passive
investment, and officer liability, by definition, will never extend to
these passive participants. Thus, unlike pro rata shareholder liability,
for example, my proposal does not threaten to increase shareholder-to-
shareholder monitoring costs. And, by limiting officer liability to firm
torts and tort-like statutory violations, my proposal, like most others,
retains the limited liability default rule in the voluntary creditor
360. See supra Part III.A.1.
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context, which most agree is efficient. 361 Moreover, since the
distributive benefits of limited shareholder liability are a product of
facilitating participation in firm ownership by small, passive
investors, these benefits likewise will remain unaffected.
In addition, high-ranking officer liability avoids most of the
new transaction costs unlimiting shareholder liability would inflict.
For example, because my proposal extends liability to a clearly defined
and numerically small set of corporate participants, it would not
produce the potentially enormous collection and litigation costs of a
pro rata regime. 362 Indeed, the definition of "highest-ranking officers"
discussed above seeks to limit the universe of potential defendants as
much as possible while ensuring the internalization of risk and
preventing evasion. Likewise, by extending liability to those who were
highest-ranking officers at the time the tortious conduct occurred, this
regime avoids the costs associated with determining who ought to be
liable given firm personnel and organizational changes over time.363
Also, it undoubtedly avoids the existing veil-piercing quagmire and
the enormous transaction costs of seeking to implement a shareholder
liability regime through that doctrine.
Similarly, my officer-based approach avoids the costs of a
"capacity-to-control" shareholder liability regime. Of course,
internalization of risk will reduce the need for plaintiffs to resort to
vicarious tort liability in either regime, assuming no evasion. 364
Nevertheless, determining whether a shareholder has the capacity to
control the firm will be a highly fact-intensive inquiry in many larger
firms. A capacity-to-control regime therefore will produce both ex ante
uncertainty and ex post litigation costs, and, as discussed previously,
may have adverse consequences for corporate governance. 365 The
highest-ranking corporate officer or officers, on the contrary, are
usually apparent in both publicly traded and closely held firms. In the
rare circumstance in which a tort plaintiff claims another, less visible
361. See supra notes 227-228 and accompanying text.
362. Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 533, 541 (discussing the enormous transaction costs a
pro rata regime would inflict in the publicly traded context but noting the minimal costs of
litigation and collection when the potential universe of defendants is small).
363. Cf. Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1278-79 (arguing an occurrence-based rule is workable
and efficient).
364. Cf. id. at 1282-83 (arguing that a control-based regime that forces internalization of
firm risks will produce an overall reduction in risky activities undertaken by corporations).
365. Professor Mendelson acknowledges that a capacity-to-control regime would inflict some
of these costs, although she argues that, on balance, these costs would be lower than its benefits
and would avoid the problems of seeking to define and implement a bright-line rule. Id. at 1288-
91. Again, however, she does not consider the advantages of holding high-ranking officers liable,
which provides the same benefits and comes closer to offering a bright-line rule.
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person actually exercised ultimate officer-like control, the inquiry will
be far more limited: the plaintiff must demonstrate that the unnamed
person or entity actually (rather than potentially) wielded direct
supervisory control of the day-to-day operations of the business. 366
While such inquiry will be fact intensive and sometimes costly, the
focus on actual, direct control, rather than on the capacity to control,
will substantially reduce doctrinal unwieldiness and corresponding
costs.
Most importantly, highest-ranking officer liability reduces the
social costs of limited shareholder liability by counteracting its moral
hazard. Everyone agrees that an unlimited liability regime would
neither eliminate all corporate torts or tort-like statutory violations
nor eradicate moral hazard. 367 And no regime guarantees that all tort
victims will receive full compensation for their injuries. But, like
other proposals, my approach reduces the externalization of firm risk
onto tort creditors by forcing one or more of the firm participants to
internalize such risk. Although officer-based liability does not reduce
shareholders' incentives to engage in excessive risk taking, this
regime reduces or neutralizes limited liability's moral hazard by
imposing vicarious liability on corporate officers. As a result, these
officers will seek to avoid risk and spread the cost of unavoided risk
across firm participants. And, like other occurrence-based proposals,
this regime reduces the incentive to engage in activities with short-
term returns but long-term risks, such as activities that create a
substantial risk of latent injuries or temporally distant environmental
damage.
Yet my proposal offers greater efficiency than other proposed
reforms because, contrary to the claims of other scholars, high-ranking
corporate officers are the most efficient initial risk bearers within the
corporate enterprise. 368  Officers are in a better position than
366. This kind of actual and direct oversight of day-to-day operations would be rare. One
example of usurpation of officer functions is State Department of Environmental Protection v.
Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 155 (N.J. 1983), in which the parent's employees took over control
of the day-to-day operations of the polluting subsidiary. Another example, this time in the
lender context, may be found in A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 293
(Minn. 1981), in which a lender essentially took over its debtor's operations.
367. Again, insurance carries with it its own moral hazard, although one that is less serious
than limited liability. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
368. By "most efficient initial risk bearer," I mean the person who can avoid or reduce
preventable harms most cost effectively and spread the risk of loss across firm constituencies in
such a way that these losses are born most efficiently. See Howard C. Klemme, The Enterprise
Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 153, 179-84 (1976) (stating that the criteria for
determining the superior risk bearer-the one who ought to have the initial burden-are who is
in the most effective position to cause preventative action to be taken and to cause the costs of
such preventative action or insurance to be spread most efficiently); see also Guido Calabresi,
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shareholders-even controlling shareholders-to monitor corporate
activity and control risks.369 Although I agree with Professor
Mendelson that controlling shareholders encounter fewer information
costs in monitoring firm affairs than do other shareholders, 370 and
that these shareholders by definition have the ability to exercise
significant control over firm conduct,371 they still must expend more
resources than officers to monitor firm activities closely. Indeed,
controlling shareholders cannot effectively monitor and alter firm
activities without resort to officers, because officers have direct access
to firm-specific information and are responsible for the day-to-day
operations of the business. 372 In much the same way, directors, who
perform monitoring and decision-making functions to protect the
interests of shareholders, lack the expertise and access to information
that officers possess. Moreover, ensuring officer compliance with
directives constitutes an additional agency cost for directors. Because
officers (or those assuming officer-like functions) are the firm
participants best able to observe and alter firm activities, placing the
burden of risk avoidance on them, rather than on shareholders or
directors, reduces costs.
Similarly, because high-ranking officers have more direct
access to information and expertise regarding firm activities than
shareholders or directors, they are in the best position to determine
both the nature and size of potential, unavoided risks and to spread
Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 543-44 (1961)
(discussing primary risk bearing).
369. Cf. Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the
Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 569-70 (1988)
(arguing that vicarious liability is more efficient when the party subject to such liability can
more cheaply observe the employee's activity).
370. See supra notes 203, 316 and accompanying text.
371. See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1213 (discussing controlling shareholders' ability to
exercise significant control over firm activities and ways in which they can benefit from those
activities).
372. Controlling shareholders have the ability to exercise great control over the firm, and, as
Professor Mendelson argues, they can substantially influence the firm's risk preferences to gain
unique benefits from its activities. See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1213, 1249-58; see also supra
notes 313-316 and accompanying text. But, to achieve enhanced benefits, or conversely, to
implement greater risk avoidance and risk spreading, they must resort to the firm's officers or
usurp direct, officer-like control. Only officers (as opposed to directors) have direct access to firm
operations, record keeping, and expertise, and only officers can alter and monitor firm activities
directly. The point is not that controlling shareholders are unable to appoint officers who will do
their bidding; rather, they need to appoint officers to do this bidding. Cf. Mendelson, supra note
1, at 1249-50 (discussing the ability of parent corporations to place their own employees in
"positions of control" in the subsidiary). Indeed, in Professor Mendelson's discussion of why
controlling shareholders are in a better position than other shareholders to benefit from risk
externalization, she often refers to the use of corporate managers to achieve these ends. Id. at
1253, 1258, 1294.
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those risks efficiently. For example, these officers are in the best
position to determine where to set the price of firm goods and services
to take into account the cost of the risk of tort liability that a
particular product or service creates. Similarly, officers are best able
to calculate the optimal level of retained capital or insurance to cover
potential losses while otherwise maximizing returns. Thus, officers
are in the best position both to monitor and avoid risks and to
determine how to spread excess risk efficiently among customers,
shareholders, and insurers. 373
The efficiency of high-ranking officer liability may face a
number of challenges. First, some may contend that corporate officers
are risk averse because potential tort losses may exceed their wealth.
Such risk aversion, it may be suggested, will lead to overdeterrence-
overinvestment in risk prevention and risk spreading or
underinvestment in projects that pose some, but not socially excessive,
risk-particularly given imperfect information and insurance.37 4
Second, many scholars have argued that managers are inherently risk
averse because of their firm-specific investments of human capital.37 5
If this is true, then imposing on officers the risk of tort liability is
unnecessary, since they will take steps to reduce or cover risks
anyway, 376 and expanding the potential number of defendants in a tort
373. See Klemme, supra note 368, at 213 (discussing the criteria for determining the most
efficient cost distributor, including a sophisticated understanding of business practices, an
ability to calculate risks accurately, and the ability to add insurance and other costs to the price
of goods and services).
374. Easterbrook and Fischel elaborate on the flaws of managerial liability:
The problem with managerial liability is that risk shifting may not work perfectly. It
is unlikely, for example, that managers who are liable for mass torts, with mammoth
but uncertain expected liabilities, could shift all of this risk.... To the extent that
risk is not completely shifted, a legal rule of managerial liability creates risk for a
group with a comparative disadvantage in bearing that risk. This inefficiency leads to
both an increase in the competitive wage for managers and a shift away from risky
activities. And there is no guarantee that the social costs of this shift away from risky
activities will not exceed the social costs of the excessively risky activities in the
absence of managerial liability.
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 62; see Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1929
("In the absence of insurance, imposing personal liability for the firm's entire tort losses on its
managers would create a powerful incentive to overinvest in safety measures or, what is more
likely, to resign."); Kraakman, supra note 6, at 876, 887 (suggesting that managerial liability is
justifiable only if firm risk shifting is relatively costless, adequate insurance coverage is
available, and legal rules are relatively clear cut).
375. See supra notes 271-272 and accompanying text.
376. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 19-20 (suggesting that risk aversion may induce
managers to overinvest in safety); see also SHAVELL, supra note 184, at 189 ("The attitude
toward risk of firms will reflect the attitudes towards risk of their managers, employees, and
shareholders. To the extent that the managers and employees of a firm are risk averse and that
their rewards (or positions) are tied to the firm's performance, they will want the firm to behave
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action would cause overdeterrence and inflict unneeded costs. 3 77
Third, even if they are not particularly risk averse, officers might still
respond to potential liability by overinvesting in risk prevention and
risk spreading if they do not bear all of the costs of such
overinvestment. Finally, there may be inherently hazardous or risky
activities that are uninsurable but socially desirable. If highest-
ranking officer liability eliminates such activities, there may be social
loss.
1. Risk Bearing and Overdeterrence
In response to the first argument, it is important to begin by
distinguishing between initial risk bearing and ultimate loss
bearing.378 Some high-ranking corporate officers may not be able to
bear losses as efficiently as some wealthy shareholders, such as large,
institutional investors. 379 But initial risk bearing and ultimate loss
bearing are not the same. High-ranking officers, unlike lower-level
managers, have the means to protect themselves from most such
losses through risk avoidance and risk spreading. 380 In many small,
closely held firms, the highest-ranking officers own the firm and
therefore can avoid and spread risk by investing in monitoring,
retaining capital, and purchasing insurance. They also can
compensate themselves for the risk they bear.381 In firms in which
in a risk-averse way. One would therefore expect there to be some tendency for firms to avoid
risks jeopardizing their profitability or their assets.").
377. Voluntary creditors may also serve as a check against the firm's engaging in excessive
risk. Yet, as discussed previously, voluntary creditors provide an imperfect check in some
circumstances and no check in others. See supra notes 277.281, 317 and accompanying text.
378. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 368, at 543-44 (discussing primary risk spreading);
Klemme, supra note 368, at 179-80.
379. Professor Shavell describes an individual's risk aversion as largely depending on the
size of the risk in relation to his or her assets and needs (the marginal utility of wealth).
SHAVELL, supra note 184, at 186-89. An individual who may lose all of his or her wealth
therefore will be more risk averse than an institutional or other more wealthy investor. See id.
at 19; Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1224. Risk-averse parties dislike the uncertainty of large
losses, and requiring such parties to bear such losses will harm social welfare, deterring them
from engaging in socially desirable, risky activities. See SHAVELL, supra note 184, at 190-91.
380. Obviously, social welfare can be enhanced by the avoidance of activities that harm social
utility. But it can also be enhanced by shifting risks from the more to the less risk averse, or by
the sharing of risks among risk averse parties. See SHAVELL, supra note 184, at 189-91
(discussing how the sharing of risks or shifting risks to the less risk averse enhances social
welfare); Klemme, supra note 368, at 179-89 (discussing efficient risk bearing); cf. EASTERBROOK
& FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 61-62 (although ultimately arguing managerial liability is
inefficient, acknowledging that if managers are potentially liable they will have incentives to
monitor the firm's capital and insurance).
381. Where the high-ranking officer is one of a number of shareholders in a small firm, the
officer can bargain for such compensation, and such bargaining will entail relatively few
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management and ownership are separated, the highest-ranking
officers can bargain with shareholders or directors for protection.3 2 In
exchange for their services, high-ranking officers can bargain for the
resources needed to monitor risk, for the retention of firm capital to
support indemnification, for indemnification from controlling
shareholders, for the purchase of liability insurance in excess of
retained capital or shareholder indemnification, and for additional
compensation for the excess risk they bear.38 3 In this way, although
high-ranking officers may not be the most efficient ultimate loss
bearers in the enterprise, they are the most efficient initial risk
bearers: if given the incentive to do so, they will reduce risks and
spread the risk of loss across firm constituencies. 38 4
Nevertheless, despite the greater care that firms will take in
reducing risks by maintaining adequate capital and/or insurance,
imperfect information and insurance leave open the possibility that
high-ranking officers will still face significant personal liability for tort
transaction costs. Cf. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1891-92 (discussing how
heterogeneous shareholders in small firms can bargain with limited transaction costs for
compensation for the risk they bear).
382. Transaction costs for such bargaining, which will involve relatively few participants,
will not be substantial. Indeed, over time, standard contracts for indemnification and other
terms are likely to emerge.
383. Hansmann and Kraakman suggest that if potential tort losses were large relative to a
manager's assets, managerial liability might generate an incentive for a manager to take a very
high salary (rather than seeking to properly capitalize or insure the firm) in exchange for
undertaking risky activities on behalf of shareholders, because the manager would be judgment
proof. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1929. I find this to be highly improbable. In
small firms, officers and shareholders usually are the same people. In larger firms, officers
would quickly acquire sufficient wealth that they would have a significant amount to lose. It is
doubtful that rational, wealthy individuals would accept such risks, even if they have a risk-
preferring outlook. In addition, as discussed below, this is really just a variation on the "high
roller" evasion technique Hansmann and Kraakman discuss in their article, except the high
roller is a manager rather than a shareholder. Yet they contend high-rolling shareholders will
be rare, and I argue that high-rolling officers-those who have sufficient sophistication,
expertise, and business acumen to run the firm-will be even rarer. See discussion infra notes
442-443 and accompanying text. Moreover, because my officer-based proposal extends to other
persons who exercise officer-like control, shareholders will not be able to recruit a stand-in to
serve as a highest-ranking officer only in name. See discussion infra notes 440-441 and
accompanying text. While high-ranking officers may demand some premium to compensate
them for the risk of liability, they also will bargain with the firm for the resources to avoid and
spread risk.
384. Indeed, as discussed below, after taking these steps, officers often will bear no losses.
And, if an officer is indemnified by a controlling shareholder, then the shareholder will be the
ultimate loss bearer, as Professor Mendelson wishes. Moreover, to address tort claims with "long
tails," officers can bargain for protection over time, including the long-term provision of adequate
insurance and personal guarantees by incoming officers or controlling shareholders for amounts
up to a point of reasonable indemnification.
404
2004] BEYOND "UNLIMITING" SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY 405
losses.38 5 This risk alone-even if slight-appears to be enough for
some commentators to question whether officer liability is efficient, or
rather, will lead to overdeterrence. 3 6 In my view, this residual risk of
liability does not render this regime inefficient.
Again, limited shareholder liability facilitates risk-creating
behavior and then shifts losses to tort victims, who, as a class, are
inefficient risk bearers. 38 7 The possibility-and, hence, occasional
imposition-of personal liability is necessary to induce officers to
undertake the aforementioned risk avoidance and risk spreading that
significantly reduce this externality. At the same time, an officer who
compels (or bargains with) the firm to implement these measures
substantially reduces the probability of personal liability. Some
residual liability for an officer or indemnifying shareholder will have
an additional efficiency-enhancing effect: this risk will create an
ongoing incentive-after risk spreading-for officers to monitor and
avoid risks.388
In addition, after risk avoidance and spreading, actual
imposition of personal liability is most likely in small, individually
held firms, although it may be infrequent even in this context. 38 9
Sometimes officers in small firms may not be able to foresee or insure
385. For example, the firm may be bankrupted by market conditions or significant or
unforeseeable liabilities. Also, not all risks are insurable and insurance may not cover maximum
foreseeable losses. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 54 ("Even when offered,
the insurance will exclude very large losses."). Plus, there is no guarantee that insurers and
insurance markets will not fail.
386. See, e.g., id.; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1929.
387. As discussed above, Professor Mendelson argues convincingly that tort victims are often
less efficient risk bearers than shareholders. See supra notes 235-240, 312 and accompanying
text. As I have discussed above, high-ranking corporate officers are, as a class, even more
efficient initial risk bearers than shareholders. And, although officers may be less capable of
bearing losses than some institutional shareholders, officers can seek indemnity from these
shareholders. Moreover, although officers are less wealthy than some shareholders, they
undoubtedly are, as a class, wealthier than tort victims and more capable of protecting their
assets through insurance and other means. They also have the ability to bargain for firm level
risk avoidance and risk spreading. This does not mean that they would bear losses more
efficiently than tort victims in every circumstance, as, for example, when tort losses are massive
but widely dispersed among victims. But I contend that, for all of the foregoing reasons, highest-
ranking officer liability will allocate risk efficiently in the vast majority of circumstances.
388. SHAVELL, supra note 184, at 197 ("[Ihe expected utility maximizing level of coverage
will be the greatest level that will still leave the insured bearing enough risk to induce him to
take the risk-reducing action."). Risk spreading through insurance may create its own moral
hazard since someone elsebesides officers and shareholders-insurers--often will bear part or all
of the risk of firm activities. See supra note 274 and accompanying text. Insurer monitoring and
premiums blunt this moral hazard to some extent, see supra note 274, but a low risk of officer
liability in excess of insurance will ensure that the incentive to avoid risks remains.
389. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1890 (arguing that unlimited
liability in the small firm context will lead to the purchase of adequate insurance in most
contexts).
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against all potential losses,390 yet these officers are still in the best
position to bear the risk. They usually are the controlling
shareholders, and, as such, are able to compensate themselves for the
risk they bear. 391 In addition, they may not be particularly risk averse
as a class anyways, given that even in today's regime, they are likely
to be personally liable for many corporate obligations-as guarantor,
tortfeasor, statutory violator, or the target of piercing. 392 And, as a
class, they are likely to be better risk bearers than tort victims. 393
Furthermore, limited liability for officer-shareholders produces few
countervailing benefits worth preserving.394 Indeed, because officers
and shareholders in these firms are one and the same, the effect of my
proposal differs little from the intended effect of the many other
proposals that, for similar reasons, seek to unlimit shareholder
liability in close corporations. 395 It is, however, simpler to administer.
Finally, to the extent some firms with officer-shareholders exit certain
industries or markets because they either cannot adequately insure
against tort risks or are risk averse, their absence may have positive
net social value since, among other things, their participation would
390. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 184, at 197-98. Adequate insurance is likely to be
available in many contexts. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1888; see infra note 400
(discussing the stability of comprehensive general liability insurance). Yet there will be some
contexts in which insurance adequate to cover all losses is not available, or information is
sufficiently imperfect that individuals or firms will miscalculate the appropriate level of
insurance.
391. See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 168-169 and accompanying text. Indeed, in many closely held firms,
the risks associated with contractual liability are more significant than the risks associated with
tort liability. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1910. Moreover, excessive risk aversion
seems unlikely since, even in today's regime, people engage in risky behavior-such as driving
automobiles-all the time, and the empirical evidence suggests that few individuals purchase
exceptionally high levels of insurance for such activities. See id. at 1904 n.72 (discussing this
evidence); Leebron, supra note 1, at 1574-75 (stating that the impact of unlimited liability is
likely to be less than many commentators suggest, given that "we constantly take risks far more
drastic than those posed by unlimited liability").
393. Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1231; supra notes 234-244 and accompanying text
(discussing why tort victims are likely to be inefficient risk bearers and why shareholders in
closely held firms are likely to be more efficient risk bearers). Also, if the shareholder-manager
is a particularly poor risk bearer because the person's wealth is dwarfed by the potential
liability, the plaintiff(s) may not find it worthwhile to pursue the matter against the
shareholder/manager. And, the plaintiff(s) may prefer to settle than drive the
shareholder/manager into bankruptcy. See infra note 404 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text (discussing the limited benefits of
limited liability in the closely held context).
395. See supra notes 3, 298-300 and accompanying text. Of course, a regime that imposes pro
rata liability on all shareholders or liability on all shareholder-managers also would extend
liability to this group. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1907, 1928-29. And, again,
support for limited liability, even by its defenders, is not particularly strong in this context. See
supra notes 287-288 and accompanying text.
406
2004] BEYOND "UNLIMITING" SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY 407
otherwise lead to the externalization of risk onto tort victims and
society as a whole. 396
In larger firms, the actual enforcement of tort judgments
against high-ranking corporate officers will be very rare. These
officers will have sought to reduce risk. They also will have bargained
for indemnification for unavoided risks, which will be available absent
firm insolvency. 397 Larger firms, including those that are publicly
traded, go bankrupt,3 98 but they do so less often than small, closely
held firms.399 If a larger firm becomes insolvent, and unpaid tort
judgments remain, the officer may have bargained for indemnification
by a controlling shareholder. If there is no controlling shareholder
able to indemnify the officer, the insurance for which the officer also
bargained will often cover these losses. And, although insurers and
insurance markets can fail, comprehensive general liability insurance,
unlike other types of insurance, enjoys a long history, sophisticated
markets, and relative stability.400  If the firm's insurance is
396. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1888 ("ETihere is no reason to assume that
such small firms should exist-that is, that they have positive net social value. In fact, an
important advantage of unlimited liability is precisely that it would force such firms-which are
effectively being subsidized by their tort victims--out of business."); Mendelson, supra note 1, at
1295-96. The reduction in competition might inflict a social cost in the form of super-optimal
pricing. But the remaining competitors will be more likely to compensate tort victims, which will
reduce the social costs of the activity.
397. Again, officers will be liable for torts even after they leave the firm, as long as the
tortious conduct occurred during the officer's tenure. Once they leave, they cannot ensure that
the firm will retain sufficient capital. Yet, officers can bargain with incoming officers for
indemnification to ensure that the incoming officers bargain with directors or shareholders for
sufficient retained capital, and incoming officers will have an incentive to maintain such capital
anyway, since they may be subject to liability for firm losses.
398. See, e.g., Booth, supra note 4, at 154 (stating that small and closely held corporations
are much more likely to become bankrupt). Sometimes these firms go bankrupt because of tort
liability, such as environmental and mass tort liability. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 1, at
534. However, high-ranking officer liability will reduce the number of tort-induced bankruptcies.
Increases in such bankruptcies would be only indirect-the result of plaintiffs' willingness to
push the firm into bankruptcy knowing that high-ranking officers may also be liable. Cf.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1909 (making this argument with regard to unlimited
shareholder liability). But this regime's more direct effect will be to reduce such bankruptcies.
High-ranking officers will force firms to internalize the risk of tort losses ex ante, thereby
reducing risks and ensuring greater capital and insurance to cover losses ex post.
399. In fact, large, wholly owned subsidiaries go bankrupt because corporate parents can
drain the subsidiary of cash or assets. See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1214 (discussing the
depletion of Pacific Gas and Electric Company's cash reserves by its parent prior to its
bankruptcy and subsidiary bankruptcies). Other subsidiaries would go bankrupt if creditors
were not willing to settle for lesser amounts to avoid bankruptcy. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra
note 1, at 1241-42. At least in the subsidiary context, tort-induced bankruptcies are likely to
decline under a high-ranking officer regime.
400. See Robert A. Buhlman, Comprehensive and Commercial General Liability Policies, in
MASSACHUSETTS LIABILITY INSURANCE MANUAL § 4.1 (2000) ("Broadly defined, a liability
insurance policy is an insurance policy purchased to provide insurance protection against
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insufficient, 40 1 the officer likely will have purchased individual
liability insurance. 402 After all of this, if the officer still faces liability,
he or she may be sufficiently wealthy to absorb the uncollected portion
of the judgment.40 3 If not, the threat of personal bankruptcy is likely
to induce tort creditors, even those seeking damages for catastrophic
losses, to settle for an amount less than the total value of the officer's
assets.40 4 Thus, there is a small risk of personal liability in the
liability to third persons for covered losses. It is one of the oldest forms of insurance in the
United States." (citing Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Merrill, 29 N.E. 529 (Mass. 1892)));
Eugene R. Anderson et al., Policyholder Claims for Insurance Coverage Because of
Environmental Damage, C427 ALI-ABA 427, 434 (1989) ("Liability insurance is one of the oldest
and most common forms of insurance purchased by American businesses.... Liability insurance
policy forms are standardized and prepared by insurance industry-wide organizations."); Thomas
M. Reiter & John K. Baillie, Better Late Than Never: Holding Liability Insurers to Their Bargain
Regarding Coverage for Unforeseen, Gradual Pollution Under Pennsylvania Law, 5 DICK. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 8 (1996) (stating that business liability insurance became widely available
in the 1880s); Timothy Stanton, Comment, Now You See It, Now You Don't: Defective Products,
the Question of Incorporation and Liability Insurance, 25 LOY. U. CHlI. L.J. 109, 111-13 (1993)
("Insurance companies have long tried to implement standard CGL terms and conditions. They
have largely succeeded. Standard language promotes price competition and fosters useful legal
precedent." (internal citations omitted)); Susan Warren, Plaintiffs Target Companies Whose
Premises Contained Any Form of Deadly Material, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2003, at B1 (stating that
many corporate asbestos defendants that have exhausted their products liability coverage may
still have sufficient insurance to pay claims falling under their general liability coverage); see
also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1888 (stating general liability insurance is
available for most businesses). But see Thompson, supra note 3, at 22 (stating that some
evidence exists that insurance is unavailable or inadequate for many environmental liabilities).
Although there have been recent discussions of insurance market problems in the terrorism and
medical malpractice contexts, there has been no suggestion that comprehensive general liability
insurance is at risk.
401. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 48-49 (noting that insurance will
not necessarily cover all claims in bankruptcy). But see Warren, supra note 400 (stating that
many asbestos defendants still have ample insurance to pay claims falling under their general
liability coverage).
402. Officers of large corporations are, as a class, among the wealthiest segments of our
society. They therefore have greater access to risk spreading-such as insurance-than other
segments of society.
403. Again, officers of large corporations are among the wealthiest segments of our society.
They therefore are more likely to be able to absorb excess tort liabilities than other segments. Of
course, they will not be able to absorb the kinds of catastrophic losses that may result in the
mass tort, environmental, and defective product areas. But, these kinds of catastrophic losses,
although much discussed, are not common. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at
1903. These losses would be even less common under a regime that requires firms to internalize
the costs of risky activities. See id.
404. Indeed, no one really faces absolute unlimited liability: the availability of bankruptcy
protection and other evasion techniques ensures that some assets will be judgment proof. Tort
creditors often will seek to avoid the transaction costs and risks associated with pressing for a
greater recovery in bankruptcy. Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1241-42 (noting that many
potential subsidiary bankruptcies are averted because claimants-tort victims or the
government-settle for lesser amounts to avoid bankruptcy); see Hansmann & Kraakman, supra
note 5, at 1895 (noting that tort victims have strong incentives to accept a settlement for less
than the full value of the firm).
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context. But, as long as the officer has taken appropriate steps to
avoid and spread losses, that risk is sufficiently remote, and the risk
of personal-bankruptcy-inducing liability is so improbable, that,
absent other circumstances, it is not likely to lead to overdeterrence. 405
2. Managerial Risk Aversion
Managerial risk aversion arising from the firm-specific
investment of human capital also does not render high-ranking officer
liability unnecessary or inefficient. Even the defenders of limited
liability concede that managerial risk aversion does not neutralize
limited shareholder liability's moral hazard in the closely held
context.4 6 But I reject the contention that managerial risk aversion
neutralizes the moral hazard problem in firms in which management
and share ownership are separated, most notably in larger
corporations.
405. I recognize that there are influences on risk preferences besides wealth and risk of loss,
including psychological and social influences; for example, there is a growing body of behavioral
law and economics literature that suggests that decision makers sometimes assign greater
weight to potential losses than potential gains. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk
Preference, and the Law, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1115 (2003) (describing prospect theory and
summarizing the scholarship in this area); Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles
in Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 277, 331 (1990) (noting that the individual psychology
of managers often defies precise characterization in economic models and that "prospect theory"
holds that decision makers tend to overweigh small probabilities and underweigh large
probabilities). While a thorough examination of behavioral psychology is beyond the scope of this
Article, these psychological influences will not necessarily lead to overdeterrence. Assuming
corporate officers take the aforementioned steps to reduce the risk of personal liability, they
would have to overvalue dramatically their probability of liability to conclude that the risk is too
great to justify their compensation. And again, the impact of such residual risk may be less than
many commentators suggest. See Leebron, supra note 1, at 1574-75; supra note 392. For
example, even in today's regime, there are real risks of criminal or civil liability for high-ranking
officers under federal securities laws, federal and state environmental statutes, and various
public welfare regulations. See supra Part II.C. Yet there is no convincing evidence of
substantial overdeterrence. See infra note 423 and accompanying text. My proposed regime
would increase the risk of personal liability, but this increase will be slight if officers convince
the firm to take steps to avoid and spread the risk. And this country's history of
entrepreneurialism belies the contention that individuals-wealthy or otherwise-are unwilling
to accept substantial investment and liability risks, particularly when presented with a far
greater likelihood of significant gains. See supra notes 168-169 (discussing why entrepreneurs
face substantial risks of personal liability despite limited shareholder liability). Indeed, aspects
of prospect theory itself arguably suggest that officers may be willing to overlook small chances
of significant liability where the potential for gain is more certain. See, e.g., Guthrie, supra, at
1119 (quoting James D. Cox, Private Litigation and the Deterrence of Corporate Misconduct, 60
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 5 (1997)). Thus, there is much that casts doubt on dire predictions of
officers and entrepreneurs heading for the exits; and, as discussed below, there will be
substantial, additional checks against other forms of firm overdeterrence, including
overinsurance and underinvestment in socially beneficial activities.
406. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 56.
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As an initial matter, as Professor Mendelson has argued,
controlling shareholders can overcome such risk aversion through a
variety of means.40 7 These shareholders, owners of controlling blocks
of shares and corporate parents, will be present in many larger
firms.
4 08
Furthermore, to date, the discussion of managerial risk
aversion largely has failed to take into account the qualitative
differences among firm managers, except for recognizing the special
category of shareholder-managers. Certainly, lower-level officers and
employees-who have firm-specific investments of human capital,
limited bargaining power, and limited wealth-are risk averse. But
strategic decisions about risk management often are made at higher
levels. On the other end of the spectrum, directors have the authority
to manage the affairs of the corporation, but face high information
costs and receive relatively low compensation. 409 Thus, if outside
directors were subject to vicarious liability for corporate torts, they
would most likely head for the exits, or, if not, would demand far
greater compensation and excessive levels of monitoring, insurance,
and capitalization. This may be why the proposal for director liability
offered by Professor Halpern and his coauthors has received no
scholarly support.410
High-ranking corporate officers, however, differ from both
lower-level managers and directors. 411 With regard to their incentives
to externalize risk, they may be more like shareholder-managers or
controlling shareholders. Although it is true that their investment of
human capital is undiversified at a given point in time, this does not
necessarily alter their risk preferences. High-ranking officers are able
to bargain for compensation that aligns their incentives much more
407. See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1247-50; id. at 1264 ("The greater the degree of
shareholder control, the less the degree of expressed managerial risk aversion, since managers
will have reduced latitude to serve their own goals in preference to maximizing shareholder
welfare.").
408. See id. at 1215-18, 1227-30 (detailing how, in the last couple of decades, corporate
ownership has moved toward greater concentration and away from the Berle-Means corporate
model).
409. Outside directors are highly dependent upon officers. Corporate law recognizes this
informational disadvantage by allowing outside directors to rely in good faith upon the
information provided by officers and experts. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2002). I
therefore disagree with Professor Halpern and his coauthors that directors are best situated
within the firm to respond to risk avoidance incentives. See supra notes 302-303.
410. Deterring otherwise qualified candidates from becoming outside directors also would
have negative consequences for corporate governance.
411. See Kraakman, supra note 6, at 871 (discussing some qualitative differences, including
informational and other advantages, between high corporate officials and lower-level corporate
agents).
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with those of shareholders than with those of other managers or
employees. In fact, high-ranking officers may even have greater
incentives than shareholders to engage in excessively risky activities,
since they are able to demand performance-based compensation that
both enhances their returns relative to shareholders and allows them
to reap the benefits from the activities sooner than shareholders. 412
Certainly, to the extent high-ranking officers are compensated faster
(or sooner) than shareholders, like controlling shareholders are, they
can compel the firm to engage in activities with risks that do not
mature until after they have received enhanced returns, giving them a
tremendous incentive to externalize risk.413 Furthermore, given the
relative size and speed of their compensation, high-ranking officers
can quickly reallocate their portfolios to diversify away some of the
risk of their undiversified investment of human capital.41 4
Indeed, there is a growing body of literature suggesting that
the investment outlook of high-level officers in large firms is not
particularly long term nor firm specific, and that such officers, as a
group, may be risk preferring.415 For instance, many commentators
have observed that stock option-based compensation, which enjoyed
412. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 54 (noting firms may pay managers a
premium for the firm-specific risk they face); see also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at
1909 ("[Managerial decision making is commonly shaped in important part by market-based
performance incentives that work to align management's interests with those of shareholders.").
413. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1908-09 ("Many important classes of
torts which create a risk of catastrophic loss that might bankrupt the firm ten or twenty years in
the future seem unlikely to carry any weight in management's incentive calculus today beyond
their effect on share prices. Consequently, even if managerial risk aversion might overdeter
projects with volatile near-term payouts, it is unlikely to overdeter distant harms that may
remain undiscovered until well after management's tenure is over.").
414. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1223 n.80 (stating that wealthy individuals are
generally in a better position to diversify risks (citing Blumberg, supra note 3, at 613)).
415. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the
Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1233 (2002)
("[M]anagers with a rich load of options have incentives to get the stock price high by any means
necessary, fraud included. In particular, they have incentives to increase the riskiness of the
firm .... Managers become risk-preferring."); Hu, supra note 405, at 325 (noting that when
managerial compensation depends on perceived corporate performance and actual corporate
performance is difficult to measure, a manager "will be sorely tempted to take large,
unrecognized risks"); Michael Maccoby, Narcissistic Leaders, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at
68, 77 (providing a psychological profile of the so-termed "narcissistic leader," whose "sometimes
flagrant risk-taking ... can lead to catastrophe"; suggesting that many corporate leaders of the
1990s exhibited this trait); see also Christopher Avery et al., Why Do Managers Undertake
Acquisitions? An Analysis of Internal and External Rewards for Acquisitiveness, 14 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 24 (1998) (reporting the results of a study of 346 CEOs which found that those who
undertook corporate acquisitions gained more seats on boards than did non-acquisitive CEOs
and suggesting this may give CEOs an incentive to "build empires" rather than maximize
shareholder wealth).
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rapid growth in the 1990s, 416 may encourage officer risk taking.417
There is also evidence that high-ranking officers, as a class, are
becoming more likely to move quickly between firms.418 To the extent
their expected firm-specific tenure is short, officers, like some
controlling shareholders, may seek to enhance short-term returns and
to exit prior to potential tort exposure.419 And, again, the incentive to
produce and distribute short-term gains may be enhanced by the
newly lowered dividend tax.420
Obviously, to the extent high-ranking officers are risk neutral
or risk preferring, the concern is not risk aversion or overdeterrence,
but, rather, limiting shareholder-like excessive risk taking. I therefore
question the assumption that excessive risk taking is not a concern in
widely held firms without a controlling shareholder. 421  The
conventional wisdom regarding managerial risk aversion may apply to
lower-level management and to directors, but it does not necessarily
apply to high-level officers in either closely or widely held firms. Thus,
416. See Brian J. Hall, What You Need to Know About Stock Options, HARv. Bus. REV., Mar.-
Apr. 2000, at 121, 121 ("[S]tock option grants have come to dominate the pay-and often the
wealth-of top executives throughout the United States.").
417. Roy F. Price, Options, Waste and Agency Costs in the Corporation, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 391 (1995) (arguing that lack of downside risk on stock options means that "holders of at-or
out-of-the-money options will act much more aggressively than other financial claimants on the
firm"); see supra note 415.
418. See William J. Byron, Coming to Terms with the New Corporate Contract, Bus.
HORIZONS, Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 8, 9-10 (discussing the growing free-agent mentality among
workers and management); Peter Cappelli, A Market-Driven Approach to Retaining Talent,
HARv. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 103, 104 (citing data from the executive search business of
A.T. Kearney that showed CEO job searches in 1997 were up 28 percent over 1996); James
Thomson, Life Is Short, BUS. REV. WKLY., Aug. 8, 2002, at 32 (citing a Booz Allen Hamilton study
that found that chief executive turnover had increased 53 percent between 1995 and 2001), 2002
WL 9046824.
419. See Mark Gimein et al., You Bought. They Sold., FORTUNE, Sept. 2, 2002, at 64, 65-66
(describing a study documenting a market-wide stock sell-off by corporate fiduciaries who, in
aggregate, realized approximately $66 billion just before their respective stock prices
plummeted); see also supra notes 313-319 and accompanying text (discussing controlling
shareholder incentives).
420. A recent article hailed the dividend tax cut as means of aligning management and
shareholder incentives, because firms will be encouraged to give stock grants rather than stock
options. Burton G. Malkiel, The Dividend Bounce, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2003, at A10. I agree
that aligning incentives between management and shareholders can be beneficial. But this
analysis fails to take into account the corresponding incentive to distribute more of the firm's
cash flows through dividends. This incentive, in turn, further facilitates risky behavior by
allowing both managers and shareholders to reap greater short-term gains and cash out before
tort judgments may be enforced against the firm.
421. But see Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1247-48 (adopting the conventional view that
managerial risk aversion blunts the effect of limited liability in firms in which ownership is
widely dispersed).
412
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managerial risk aversion is not a compelling argument against
vicarious tort liability for these officers.
3. The Costs of Overdeterrence
High-ranking officer liability may still produce overdeterrence
if these officers do not bear their relative share of the costs of both
overinvestment in risk avoidance and spreading, and
underinvestment in socially beneficial projects. 422 However, I suggest
these kinds of concerns are overstated. As an initial matter, in areas
in which controlling person liability-civil or criminal-currently
exists for high-level managers, including the antitrust and
environmental areas, we have not experienced the overdeterrence
effects some initially feared.423
And, again, overdeterrence is unlikely in small firms in which
high-ranking officers are also substantial shareholders. These officer-
shareholders will bear the full costs of firm monitoring and insurance,
and therefore will seek to avoid and spread risks as efficiently as
possible. Overdeterrence likewise will not be a significant problem in
larger firms with controlling shareholders. Because they will be
immune from liability, such shareholders will still prefer risky
projects offering high returns. Given their greater access to firm
information and their strong bargaining position compared to non-
controlling shareholders, such shareholders will be able to bargain
with high-level officers to strike the right balance. 424 Indeed, optimal
422. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 61-62; see supra note 374 and accompanying
text.
423. See George E. Garvey, Study of Antitrust Treble Damage Remedy, 46 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 356, 367 (Mar. 1, 1984) (arguing that the lack of evidence of
overdeterrence of pro-competitive conduct despite concerns to the contrary weakened "the logical
and intuitive support for the overdeterrence argument"). A major criticism of environmental
crime prosecution is that "civil liability provides a sufficient deterrence and criminal laws
'overdeter.' " Robert G. Kondrat, Punishing and Preventing Pollution in Japan: Is American-
Style Criminal Enforcement the Solution?, 9 PAC. RIM L. & POLY J. 379, 408-09 (2000). Yet,
despite a high rate of imprisonment in the United States for those convicted of environmental
crimes, there is little evidence to suggest that criminal sanctions have deterred beneficial
activities. Id. at 409-10 (noting that criminal enforcement has had largely positive effects on
pollution reduction). For instance, since passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, which provides
for criminal sanctions, oil spilled in United States waters has decreased by 81 percent. Id. at 410
& n.225. At the same time, oil imports have continued to grow. See Jeffrey Sachs, America's
Disastrous Energy Plan, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2003, at 15 (describing growing United States
dependence on imported petroleum).
424. See SHAVELL, supra note 184, at 189-90 ("[S]hareholders will often wish firms to be
operated in an approximately risk-neutral manner, and firms will be operated in that way
insofar as shareholders exercise control over managers and employees."); supra notes 310-329
and accompanying text (outlining Professor Mendelson's discussion of controlling shareholder
monitoring and oversight capabilities).
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risk taking is most likely to occur in circumstances in which
participants have significant information, conflicting incentives, and
equal bargaining power.
In large or publicly traded firms without a controlling
shareholder, overdeterrence may be more likely. Shareholders in
these firms may prefer risky projects offering high returns, but agency
costs will make it more difficult for them to compel high-ranking
officers to internalize their preferences. 425 Likewise, agency costs will
make it harder for shareholders to prevent officers from exacting an
excessively high risk premium. 426
Yet, even in this context, there are checks against
overdeterrence. First, as Professor Mendelson argues, as long as the
corporation is adequately capitalized and insured, overdeterrence in
the form of underinvestment in socially beneficial projects is
unlikely. 427 Second, the equities markets will provide some check
against both underinvestment in projects with net positive values and
overinvestment in monitoring and insurance: the value of a firm that
consistently underperforms will be reduced and the firm may be taken
over by shareholders who will remove the incumbent officers. 428 Third,
appropriately structured incentive-based compensation, which aligns
officer returns with those of shareholders, will force high-ranking
officers to internalize some of the costs of overdeterrence. 429 Fourth,
outside directors and institutional investors, acting on behalf of
shareholder interests, will provide some counterbalance, particularly
given post-Enron board reforms and enhanced institutional investor
oversight.430 Finally, the aforementioned checks combined with the
425. Cf. Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1248-49 (arguing that when shareholders are numerous
and dispersed they face agency costs-greater information costs and greater difficulty in
compelling managerial compliance-in seeking to get management to conform to their wishes).
426. Cf. id.
427. See id. at 1294-95.
428. Cf. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 42 (stating the equities markets provide a
check against firm underperformance and that underperforming firms will have discounted
share prices, subjecting them to takeover); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1907
(discussing market mechanisms for holding managers in check).
429. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1908.
430. See Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered
Management Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6,563 (Feb. 7, 2003) (requiring registered
management investment companies, such as mutual funds, publicly to disclose their proxy voting
policies and how they voted); Proxy Voting by Investment Advisors, 68 Fed. Reg. 6,585 (Feb. 7,
2003) (requiring investment advisors publicly to disclose their proxy voting policies and how they
voted); see also New York Stock Exchange Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards
Committee, Untitled Report 2 (June 6, 2002) (proposing that "[i]ndependent directors must
comprise a majority of a [NYSE member] company's board"). The NYSE board of directors voted
to approve the proposed rules on August 1, 2002. Press Release, New York Stock Exchange,
NYSE Approves Measure to Strengthen Corporate Accountability (Aug. 1, 2002),
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market constraints on the price of firm goods and services will
restrain officers from charging customers an excessive risk premium.
These checks are not perfect, but, in combination, reduce the risk of
overdeterrence, even in firms more closely resembling the Berle and
Means model.
4. Uninsurable Activities
Finally, some may argue that any regime that imposes liability
on one or more corporate participants-officers or shareholders-that
cannot be evaded raises the specter of social loss because there may be
some corporate activities that, although socially beneficial, create
risks too great to insure against or otherwise spread efficiently. This is
a possibility.431  However, as Professor Mendelson contends, the
existing regime may be socially costly because it draws no distinction
between insurable and uninsurable risks, allowing both to be
externalized. 43 2  Moreover, the universe of truly uninsurable,
undiversifiable risks that produce net social benefits may not be
significant. For example, in some contexts, smaller firms that cannot
obtain insurance will abandon such high risk activities, while larger
firms more capable of reducing and spreading the risk will remain. 433
http://www.nyse.com/press/pl020656068695.html?displayPage=%2Fpress%2F12O656068695.ht
ml. The SEC has recently requested that the NYSE strengthen the proposed language by adding
more "bright line tests." Phyllis Plitch, NYSE to Amend Proposed Independent Director
Definition, Dow JONES NEWS SERV., Feb. 25, 2003. It is also worth noting the role institutional
investors played in pressuring Richard Grasso to resign as the CEO of the New York Stock
Exchange. See, e.g., Kate Kelly et al., Behind Chief's Departure, A Profit Squeeze, Governance
Questions, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2003, at Al.
431. Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1295-96. There is some dispute over whether, under the
existing regime, products liability claims deter socially beneficial corporate activity in the
pharmaceutical industry. Compare S. REP. No. 102-215, at 8 (1991) ("In 1984, two of the three
companies manufacturing [the diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis (DTP)] vaccine decided to stop
producing it because of product liability costs."), with Michael D. Green, Prescription Drugs,
Alternative Designs, and the Restatement (Third): Preliminary Reflections, 30 SETON HALL L.
REV. 207, 224 (1999) ("With regard to overdeterrence, existing evidence is equivocal and does not
get to the heart of the question. There is no method for systematically identifying or measuring
the foregone research and development efforts of pharmaceutical companies, its consequences for
new drug development, or the drugs that were driven off the market because of liability
concerns."). Of course, this does not mean that officer-based liability would create any further
deterrence of beneficial activities. Again, there is no evidence that controlling person liability
has created overdeterrence in other contexts. See supra note 423 and accompanying text.
432. Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1298 ('These rules encourage all risky activities, without
distinguishing uninsurable activities or those that society might wish to subsidize from those
that it does not.").
433. Cf. Halpern et al., supra note 3, at 140-41 (suggesting that uninsurable risks are more
likely to exist in small, tightly held companies); Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1296 (noting that
the precise scope of overdeterrence of uninsurable activities is an empirical question that has not
been answered).
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Reduced competition may inflict social costs, but it seems doubtful
these costs will exceed the social and distributive costs highest-
ranking officer liability avoids. And, to the extent the loss of certain
corporate activities or competition is viewed as socially harmful, that
harm can be addressed by legislation subsidizing such activities or
capping potential damages in discrete areas, while maintaining the
remainder of the otherwise socially beneficial highest-ranking officer
liability regime. 434
5. Conclusion
Highest-ranking officer liability is more efficient than proposed
reforms that seek to unlimit shareholder liability. Of course, like
other proposals, mine would not eliminate corporate torts, completely
eradicate moral hazard, or ensure that all tort victims receive full
compensation. 435 But my regime both retains the beneficial effects of
limited shareholder liability and reduces its social costs, while only
inflicting minimal transaction costs. 436 Most importantly, it allocates
the risk of liability to the firm's most efficient initial risk bearers:
high-ranking officers are best situated to monitor and reduce risk cost
effectively; to determine appropriate levels of risk taking, capital
retention, and insurance; and to spread risk efficiently among firm
customers, shareholders, and insurers. These efficiencies usually will
not be offset by risk aversion. And, while high-level officers are
capable of bargaining with other firm constituencies for protection,
they face counterbalancing interests and checks that prevent both
overinvesting in monitoring and risk spreading and underinvesting in
projects with socially beneficial levels of risk.
434. See Leebron, supra note 1, at 1578 (stating that an approach whereby particular
enterprises must seek a subsidy to engage in certain uninsurable activities is superior to more
general limited liability).
435. See supra note 367 and accompanying text.
436. Although I do not analyze limited shareholder liability from a "corporate social
responsibility" perspective, I note that my proposal would further some of the same ends.
Indeed, my approach may be more effective in some circumstances. For example, Professor
Green has argued that, given the social harm limited liability and the corresponding lack of
corporate responsibility may inflict, corporate managers ought to be able to consider the impact
of their decisions on nonshareholder constituencies. See Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as
Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corporate Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1409,
1414-15 (1993). My proposal would not just give high-ranking officers the ability to consider the
welfare of potential tort victims; it would force them to internalize the risk of loss.
[Vol. 57:2:329416
2004] BEYOND "UNLIMITING" SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY
B. An Effective Response to Judgment Evasion
Under my proposal, it will be more difficult for firms to
externalize all of the risks of tort liability through restructuring the
enterprise. Thus, in addition to its initial efficiency advantages,
highest-ranking officer liability is more effective than shareholder
liability regimes, and particularly than those that extend liability to
only some shareholders.
No regime can eradicate judgment proofing, nor should it
attempt to do so. Judgment proofing that does not externalize the risk
of tort losses is not a concern. For example, firms can always avoid
tort judgments by ceasing involvement in risky activities or by
contracting out those activities to others in exchange for a lower
return. Similarly, firm participants are also "judgment proof' if their
personal assets are not at stake because the firm or the firm's insurers
are able to cover the judgment. The challenge, therefore, is to ensure
that someone within an enterprise initially internalizes the risk of tort
losses, thereby preventing the inexpensive externalization of risk onto
tort victims and the moral hazard that accompanies such
externalization. Under the current regime, the most obvious example
of such an evasion technique to avoid risk internalization is a parent's
relegating risky activities to a wholly-owned subsidiary.437
Because limited shareholder liability itself is a license to
externalize risk, no proposal to reform the current regime that
unlimits shareholder liability for only limited types of shareholders
will be an effective check against the externalization of risk.
Similarly, any regime that allows other firm constituencies, such as
lenders or third-party contractors, to exercise direct control over an
enterprise and seek shareholder-like returns without having to pay for
their corresponding risk will be subject to evasion. 438  Thus, as
discussed in the last section, a sophisticated investor can avoid
controlling shareholder liability while retaining controlling
shareholder-like control and returns. Such an investor can achieve
these results by converting from equity in a publicly traded firm to
various forms of debt financing, by investing and participating
through multiple intermediaries, or by contracting out risky activities
to firms with either no controlling shareholder or a single "high roller"
with limited assets. This is consistent with Professor LoPucki's
437. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 569 (discussing the externalization of risk through
subsidiaries).
438. This goes to the essence of Professor LoPucki's critique of judgment proofing. See supra
notes 340, 342.
417
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assertion that an owner can structure the enterprise and its
operations to externalize risk with relatively few transaction costs. 439
The characteristics of highest-ranking officer liability are
different, however. In every firm-closely held, wholly owned, or
publicly traded-there will be at least one natural person who cannot
evade vicarious liability if the corporate entity lacks adequate assets
or insurance to satisfy a tort judgment. 440 The highest-ranking named
officer will always be vicariously liable. If the firm has no named
highest-ranking officer, or other officers in fact wield ultimate
authority over some or all firm activities, then these officers also will
be liable.
Highest-ranking officers, like corporate entities, may seek to
evade liability, but, as Hansmann and Kraakman suggest, evasion
techniques for individuals are limited, and courts can more easily
prevent the opportunistic shielding of personal assets. 441 Unable to
evade such liabilities in their entirety and unwilling to forgo most of
their wealth (and reputations) in personal bankruptcy, highest-
ranking officers will be forced to internalize the risk of corporate
activities. In response, these officers will bargain for various
protections-resources for monitoring, indemnification, the purchase
of insurance, and greater compensation-regardless of whether the
participant seeking to retain the benefits of risky activities while
externalizing the risk is a board of directors, a corporate parent, a
lender, or a third-party contractor. In the parent-wholly owned
subsidiary context, for example, although the parent will enjoy limited
liability for the subsidiary's torts, the subsidiary's highest-ranking
officers' preferences will offset those of the parent, and the officers will
make sure the parent invests in risk prevention and loss coverage.
This is true whether or not the subsidiary's highest-ranking officers
are also the parent's officers. Either way, the officers will demand
indemnification and insurance from the parent. Thus, high-ranking
officers of a risk-taking entity will compel the larger enterprise,
regardless of its structure, to internalize the risk of tort losses.
Perhaps a board of directors, controlling shareholder, lender, or
third-party contractor might seek to avoid this result by installing a
439. LoPucki, supra note 17, at 147-55; supra note 338 and accompanying text.
440. See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 167, at 422 (suggesting that no market arbitrage can
hedge away an individual executive's exposure to liability). Of course, individuals also can seek
to evade tort judgments through a number of techniques, and personal bankruptcy provides the
ultimate limit on personal liability. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1885, 1911-12.
However, as Hansmann and Kraakman argue, these evasion techniques are themselves limited,
and courts may prevent individuals from engaging in an opportunistic shielding of assets. Id. at
1910-11.
441. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1885, 1910-12.
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highest-ranking officer who will not bargain for such protection.
Professors Hansmann and Kraakman discuss the possibility of a
similar evasion technique-the shareholder who is a "high roller"-in
their discussion of pro rata shareholder liability. 442 They suggest that
this approach to judgment proofing will be infrequent, 443 but it is even
more unlikely under my proposed regime. An officer who is in direct
control of the business is less likely to be a "high roller" than a person
who is simply a shareholder or other, more passive corporate
participant. Although officers who truly wield such authority may be
risk preferring, 444 they are likely to be both sophisticated and rational.
In addition, if one of these other corporate constituencies
installs a stand-in-a highest-ranking officer only in name-or
otherwise takes over officer functions, a tort plaintiff can seek
recovery from the person(s) exercising actual, direct control. As I have
previously discussed, my definition of "highest-ranking officers"
includes other natural persons who actually exercise high-ranking
officer-like control in addition to or instead of named officers. 445 This
is not a "capacity-to-control" analysis since it requires the actual
exercise of officer-like control over firm activities. Directors,
controlling shareholders, lenders, and third-party contractors
ordinarily exercise control without displacing officers or usurping
officer-like control. They often, for example, perform monitoring
functions, reserve the power to approve or veto important financial
and other decisions, and participate in control on a strategic level.446
My definition seeks to limit the extension of liability to these other
persons to only those circumstances in which they take direct
supervisory control over the firm activities: executive decision making
and direct control over the operations or day-to-day affairs of the
business. When non-officers exercise this kind of direct control over
firm activities, they are able to alter the firm's risk characteristics
without substantial interference. And, given how atypical such direct
control is for a non-officer, it suggests that, when it occurs, the named
officer(s) lack de facto bargaining power and that the firm is being
utilized as a means to externalize excessive risk.
Similarly, high-ranking officer liability avoids the quest to
define a larger enterprise, a search that may be in vain.447 Nor does it
rely on vague and problematic veil piercing or constructive equity
442. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1911-13.
443. Id. at 1912-13.
444. See supra notes 415-420 and accompanying text.
445. See supra notes 358-359.
446. See supra note 372 and accompanying text.
447. See LoPucki, supra note 17, at 156-58.
419
420 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:2:329
analyses. 448 My proposal avoids these problems because it is neither a
veil piercing theory nor a larger attempt to allocate liability between
firms in commercial relationships. 449 It ensures internalization of risk
by focusing on persons who are in fact acting as an operating firm's
highest-ranking officers. 450 Application to persons not named as
officers is likely to be rare; indeed, as long as there are named highest-
ranking officers who actually exercise real authority over firm-wide
activities, there can be no liability for other persons.451
Thus, given the reach of highest-ranking officer liability, it is
unlikely that firms will be able to evade the costs of risky activities by
planting a "stand-in" in a subsidiary or affiliate. Nevertheless, some
may still argue that firms will seek to externalize risk by contracting
out risky activities to small firms operated by individuals who, given
448. Courts have, on occasion, extended vicarious tort liability to those who actually exercise
officer-like control in both the parent-subsidiary and voluntary creditor contexts. See, e.g., supra
note 106 and accompanying text (discussing cases). To date, however, such extensions are
unpredictable at best, and the underlying reasoning, whether premised on veil-piercing or
agency principles, is vague and problematic. Again, I am skeptical that a "capacity to control"
test could be applied coherently and predictably. For similar reasons, I question whether
Hansmann & Kraakman's "constructive equity" doctrine would be useful in preventing evasion.
See supra notes 346-347 and accompanying text.
449. There may be additional theories that appropriately allocate risk among commercially
affiliated firms. For example, aspects of enterprise liability theory in tort seeks the efficient
allocation of responsibility among firms engaged in commerce of defective products. See infra
note 492. Likewise, even if my regime were adopted, there may be reasons for extending
vicarious tort liability to firms that make assurances of control or quality to the market or create
customer confusion or reliance. Nevertheless, the utility of theories that seek to allocate
responsibility among commercial affiliates-other than unlimiting shareholder liability-is
beyond the scope of this Article.
450. This inquiry is both narrower and broader than other approaches to preventing
judgment evasion. It is narrower because it focuses on actual control of firm activities or
operations; it is broader because it is not limited to persons within the particular firm or a firm's
parent.
451. The distinction I draw between more indirect forms of control and officer-like control is
quite similar to the Supreme Court's discussion of CERCLA operator liability in United States v.
Bestfoods. 524 U.S. 51, 64-71 (1998). The Court emphasizes the difference between a
shareholder's normal exercise of (significant) control over a subsidiary and the shareholder's
direct control of the polluting facility, drawing on corporate law norms:
[T]he acts of direct operation that give rise to parental liability must necessarily be
distinguished from the interference that stems from the normal relationship between
parent and subsidiary. Again norms of corporate behavior (undisturbed by any
CERCLA provision) are crucial reference points.... [S]o here we may refer to
[corporate norms] in distinguishing a parental officer's oversight of a subsidiary from
such an officer's control over the operation of the subsidiary's facility. "Activities that
involve the facility but which are consistent with the parent's investor status, such as
monitoring of the subsidiary's performance, supervision of the subsidiary's finance
and capital budget decisions, and articulation of general policies and procedures,
should not give rise to direct liability." The critical question is whether, in degree and
detail, actions directed to the facility by an agent of the parent alone are eccentric
under accepted norms of parental oversight of a subsidiary's facility.
Id. at 71-72 (citation omitted).
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their limited wealth and relative immunity to tort judgments, are
willing to take uninsured or underinsured risks. 452 This kind of
outsourcing is possible under a highest-ranking officer liability
regime, but complete judgment evasion through outsourcing is likely
to be rare. First, not all risky activities can be contracted out to small
firms. 45 3 Second, there may be a limited universe of such limited-
wealth, high-rolling operators. 454 Finally, because the risk-exporting
firm will not be able to maintain direct control over the activities of
the risk-importing firm and remain judgment proof under my
proposal, the exporting firm will face information costs and the risk of
lower returns.455 The risk-importing firm also may charge some
premium for bearing the risk, even if the premium is lower than that
which full risk-internalizing firms may charge. These costs, in
combination, may well exceed the costs-the investment in risk
avoidance and risk spreading-of keeping the risky activity in
house. 456
452. Professor Mendelson refers to these as the "fly-by-night" corporations. Mendelson,
supra note 1, at 1298-99. Like firm disintegration, such outsourcing might make tort victims
worse off because they would be likely to recover less from such firms than from larger firms that
retain such activities. See id.
453. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1912-13 (arguing that many hazardous
activities-such as the manufacture of chemicals and pharmaceuticals-require significant
investments in specialized equipment and that individuals with limited assets will not be able to
secure debt financing).
454. See id. Obviously, outsourcing is an important externalization strategy in the current
regime. See LoPucki, supra note 17, at 157. Yet the current regime facilitates judgment proofing
through outsourcing by allowing the participants in small firms to avoid vicarious tort liability
and by rarely holding accountable risk-exporting firms that exercise significant control of
outsourced activities. Under my proposal, most officers of small risk-importing firms, seeking to
retain the benefits of their labor, will attempt to avoid personal liability through risk reduction
and insurance. These operators will then charge the risk-exporting firm a premium to cover the
cost of risk reduction activities and insurance.
455. Professor Mendelson makes a similar argument, contending that controlling
shareholders might have an incentive to purchase goods and services rather than vertically
integrate, but this incentive would be offset by the loss of the advantages of integration, such as
economies of scale, oversight capabilities, and assurances of product quality. See Mendelson,
supra note 1, at 1301. However, as discussed previously, many of the benefits of integration,
including controlling-shareholder-like control, can be achieved through symbiotic contracts, as
Professor LoPucki has argued. See supra notes 340-342 and accompanying text. My proposal,
which extends liability to anyone (shareholder, lender, contractor) who actually exercises officer-
like control, avoids this problem.
456. Firm disintegration also is unlikely because operators of small firms, like officers of
larger firms, will face vicarious liability for firm torts and may, in fact, face proportionately
greater costs of avoiding risks because of higher insurance premiums, the inability otherwise to
spread risk efficiently, and economies of scale. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5,
at 1913-14 (arguing that disaggregation is unlikely for these reasons and that larger, parent
firms are likely to retain ownership); Leebron, supra note 1, at 1615-16 (discussing the enhanced
efficiencies of firm integration). And, as discussed previously, such operators, although likely
less wealthy, will have strong incentives to retain the fruits of their labor.
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The point is that, while firms always will seek to achieve high
returns by engaging in risky activities while externalizing the costs of
these risks, a highest-ranking officer liability regime makes such
externalization difficult. Because officer liability ensures that there
will be at least one natural person within the enterprise who is
vicariously liable, complete evasion of liability through restructuring
is nearly impossible. And the extension of liability to persons who
take over officer-like functions ensures that formalistic distinctions
between firms and firm participants will not serve as a loophole. As a
result, there is almost always going to be someone who has both the
capability and the incentive to compel the enterprise to internalize the
risk of tort liability.
C. A Realistic Approach to Synthesizing Tort and Corporate Law
If, as I have argued, highest-ranking officer liability is both
more efficient and more effective than unlimiting shareholder liability,
the question remains whether such a regime is more realistic. As
discussed earlier, unlimiting shareholder liability-in whole or in
part-is simply not going to happen.457 Limited shareholder liability
remains politically popular, the legislative trend is towards expanding
the limited liability to non-corporate forms, and, as a conceptual and
practical matter, veil piercing cannot serve as a vehicle for
implementing such a regime. Again, highest-ranking officer liability is
different. Holding these participants vicariously liable for corporate
wrongs is more consistent with long-existing legal norms and recent
reforms. Moreover, unlike unlimiting shareholder liability, courts can
implement this regime through an extension of common-law tort and
agency principles. Finally, highest-ranking officer liability is
preferable to and more realistic than unlimiting shareholder liability
because it synthesizes the modern view of the corporation and the
aims of our tort system.
There remains a risk that some firms may seek to externalize risk through shifting risky
activities to foreign subsidiaries operating in foreign jurisdictions in which enforcement of tort
judgments against firms or firm officers are unlikely. This kind of cross-national externalization
is exemplified by the Bhopal disaster. See Green, supra note 431, at 1419-20 (discussing Union
Carbide's use of an Indian affiliate). International risk arbitrage raises important issues beyond
the scope of this Article. Tentatively, however, I would suggest that this may be a circumstance
in which a domestic court might extend highest-ranking officer liability to officers of the domestic
parent, since such officers are in the best position of anyone within the reach of a domestic
judgment to ensure the subsidiary avoids and covers risks.
457. See supra Part III.B.2.
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1. The Normative Appeal of Highest-Ranking Officer Liability
Holding high-ranking corporate officers vicariously liable for
corporate torts is more socially and politically acceptable than
unlimiting shareholder liability. As discussed previously, firm control
and accountability have long been linked. The ancient forms of
limited liability usually protected more passive participants while
imposing liability on the controlling participant in the enterprise. 458
Until recently, limited partnership law drew the same distinction
between controlling and passive participation. 459 Likewise, partners
in a general partnership are jointly and severally liable for firm
obligations because all general partners presumptively exercise
control over firm activities. 460  In each of these contexts, which
historically have involved relatively small organizations, the law
placed the risk of liability on the party or parties exercising the most
direct control over the enterprise. 461
Limited liability's expansion to the modern corporation
seemingly severs this link between control and accountability.
Corporate statutes grant unqualified and universal limited liability to
shareholders, and courts traditionally have recognized that the
corporate entity itself, rather than its controlling participants, is the
principal/master under tort and agency law. Limited shareholder
liability has held fast and has, indeed, recently expanded to include
equity stakeholders in other types of "hybrid" entities. At the same
time, piercing doctrine generally leads nowhere. 462
458. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text. The exception, of course, was the
"mudaraba" under Islamic law. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
459. See, e.g., Pear v. Grand Forks Motel Assocs., 553 N.W.2d 774, 780 n.2 (N.D. 1996) ("In
sum, in a limited partnership, general partners, with unlimited liability, manage the business;
limited partners contribute only investment capital without participating in the business and
without liability beyond capital contributed."); REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT §§ 303, 404 (2001).
With the advent of LLCs, and LLPs, limited partnerships are utilized only in rare
circumstances-for example, when the enterprise is beyond the scope of these other business
forms-and most such limited partnerships are LLLPs or convertible to LLLPs (in which both
controlling and passive participants enjoy limited liability). See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT
Prefatory Note (2001).
460. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §§ 6, 9, 15 (1914) (sections six and nine provide that partners are
co-owners and have the ability to bind the partnership, and section fifteen provides for joint and
several liability for each partner for acts chargeable to the partnership). Again, virtually all
general partnerships-except those formed unintentionally-are now organized as LLPs or
LLCs.
461. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 3, at 31 ("In partnership law, investors are liable for the
acts of others, but such extended liability occurs in a context in which the partners will be able to
monitor closely the conduct of those for whom they would be liable.").
462. Indeed, control is an essential element of piercing, but, as discussed supra Part 11.B,
control alone is almost never sufficient.
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Yet, importantly, the limited liability shield for other
controlling participants has fared less well. For example, although
LLPs are among the new "hybrid" entities, some LLP statutes retain
partner liability for torts committed by persons acting under the
partner's direct supervision.463 In addition, since the mid-twentieth
century, Congress, state legislatures, and courts have extended
various forms of civil and criminal liability to corporate controlling
persons. 464 Some of these forms of liability extend to controlling
shareholders as well as to other participants, but, as evidenced by
Bestfoods, courts resist imposition of liability on controlling
shareholders absent direct participation or the presence of other
factors. 465 There is less resistance to imposing liability on other
controlling participants.
I am not trying to overstate the breadth of the various forms of
controlling person liability. In most circumstances, absent negligence
or intentional misconduct, corporate officers and other participants
are not personally liable for firm torts or tort-like statutory violations,
and many forms of controlling person liability do not impose pure
vicarious liability. 466 But recent legislative and judicial extensions of
liability to controlling participants in some circumstances, contrasted
with the reluctance to unlimit shareholder liability, suggest that the
linkage of direct control and accountability has not been lost to the
ages. On the contrary, consistent with long-existing legal norms, legal
decision makers remain willing to link direct control and
accountability for wrongs committed within that sphere of control.
In the smaller business organizations, such as the ancient
forms and small partnerships, types of control-more direct versus
more indirect-are not dispersed among firm participants; thus,
historically, the link between direct control and accountability was
achieved by holding any controlling person liable. In modern, complex
organizations, however, some participants, including controlling
shareholders, directors, and principal lenders, typically exercise
significant and perhaps ultimate control, but not direct control. While
some believe that these corporate participants ought to be liable for
463. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
464. See supra Part II.C (discussing various forms of controlling person liability).
465. See supra notes 127-132 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Bestfoods, 524
U.S. 51, 64-71 (1998) (drawing the distinction between shareholder control and direct
participation); Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1268-69 (concluding, after discussing Bestfoods, that
"statutory law imposing direct liability is unlikely to substantially broaden responsibility for
corporate shareholders").
466. See supra Part II.C; see also Thompson, supra note 3, at 27-29 (concluding that many of
these regulatory reforms impose an enhanced duty to monitor, rather than pure vicarious
liability).
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corporate wrongs, more widespread sentiment holds responsible only
those who exercise direct, executive control over firm activities. 467 For
example, both the public at large and the markets give high-ranking
officers the credit for firm successes and the blame for firm failures,
acknowledging that these officers are best situated to influence and
alter participant behavior throughout the firm. 468 Legal norms often
reflect this view, most recently illustrated by the new certification
requirements for CEOs and CFOs. 469 CEOs and CFOs must answer to
controlling shareholders and boards of directors, but they may not be
in the best position to verify the accuracy of financial statements-
accountants, division heads, and experts may have even more direct
access to some information and more expertise. Nevertheless, because
CEOs and CFOs are a clearly identifiable set of firm participants who
combine both significant firm-wide control and direct access to its
activities, Congress and the markets view them as the participants
most capable of ensuring immediate compliance and instilling
confidence. Thus, for many of the same reasons why these officers are
the firm's most efficient risk bearers, they are widely viewed as the
participants who ought to be accountable for firm activities. 470
Of course, history and popular sentiment do not necessarily
translate into legislation. Indeed, public choice analysis would suggest
that legislation imposing vicarious liability on highest-ranking officers
is unlikely, given that corporate officers are a discrete and powerful
interest group. 471 Yet, as evidenced by recent expansions of controlling
person liability, this kind of reform, as opposed to unlimiting
467. Again, this parallels the distinction between parent-level control and direct facility
control in Bestfoods. See supra note 451 and accompanying text. In drawing this distinction, the
Court drew upon "corporate norms." See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 41, 71-72 (1998).
468. Joseph Nocera, Of Fame and Fortune, FORTUNE, Nov. 18, 2002, at 28, 29 ("It is true,
certainly, that just as Presidents get more credit than they deserve for the state of the economy,
so too do CEOs get more credit--or blame-for the state of their particular company. There are
a lot of things, after all, that are outside a CEO's control. But there are a lot of things CEOs do
control-and a company's success or failure is almost always at least some reflection of the skill
of the man or woman at top."); Thomson, supra note 418, at 32 (discussing a Booz Allen
Hamilton study finding an increasing executive turnover due to firings during the market
downturn); Margarethe Wiersema, Holes at the Top: Why CEO Firings Backfire, HARV. Bus.
REV., Dec. 2002, at 70, 70, 72 (discussing the increasing rate of CEO firings); see Deborah Ball et
al., Supermarket Giant Ahold Ousts CEO in Big Accounting Scandal, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2003,
at Al.
469. See supra notes 137-140 and accompanying text.
470. See, e.g., Humbled, ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 2003, at 91, 92 (discussing the tarnished public
reputation of corporate executives in general as a result of the Enron and Tyco scandals).
471. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 159, at 451-52 (applying a public choice analysis to the
emergence of LLCs and stating that the comparative political power of business people and
entrepreneurs assured the extension of limited liability despite the debates over its benefits and
costs in the tort context).
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shareholder liability, is not a complete political nonstarter.
Legislative enactment of highest-ranking officer liability is a
possibility, although it is most likely to be achieved piecemeal, if at all,
through continued legislative attempts to reduce certain kinds of tort
losses or social harms associated with certain industries.
2. Tort and Agency Law Through a Contractarian Lens
The probability of comprehensive legislative reform is,
however, largely beside the point, because highest-ranking officer
liability can and should be implemented without legislation. Unlike
unlimiting shareholder liability, courts can implement my proposal
through a natural extension of common-law tort and agency
principles. Once one abandons the antiquated notion that the
corporate entity controls firm activities, highest-ranking officer
liability is simply the appropriate application of respondeat superior
(and related forms of enterprise liability) within the corporate
structure.
This analysis begins with the predominant contractarian or
nexus-of-contracts conception of the firm. Again, this conception
rejects adherence to the fiction that the corporate entity has its own
preferences and acts separately from its various constituencies. 47 2
Rather, under the contractarian view, the firm is simply a nexus of
consensual relationships-governed by explicit and implicit
contracts-between various participants, including, inter alia,
shareholders, directors, officers, and voluntary creditors. 473 Each of
these participants either bargains for various rights and protections,
or agrees to accept a standard set of terms.474 Thus, for example,
shareholders agree to invest capital in exchange for voting rights (e.g.,
to elect directors) and residual claims on firm cash flows; officers agree
to manage the operations of the firm and, in exchange, bargain with
directors or controlling shareholders for compensation and protection.
Importantly then, legal rules or doctrines as applied to corporations
should be consistent with this conception of the firm, rather than with
the antiquated, entity-centered view.475
472. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 12 ("The 'personhood' of a
corporation is a matter of convenience rather than reality ... .
473. See, e.g., id. at 12; Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 525.
474. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 14.
475. See, e.g., Gulati et al., supra note 309, at 891.
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The doctrine of respondeat superior is a fundamental risk and
loss-allocating vehicle in tort and agency law. 476 It provides that,
when an agent/servant commits a tort within the scope of the
agency/servancy, the principal/master is vicariously liable for the tort
(along with the agent/servant).477 In allocating the burden of vicarious
liability in tort, the doctrine draws a critical distinction between
master and non-master principals: the former group is subject to
vicarious liability while the latter is not.478 The test for determining
whether a principal is also a master is based on the level of control. A
master is a principal who exercises (or has the capacity to exercise)
control over the physical conduct of her agents; a principal who is not
a master by definition exercises control, but not direct control, over
the conduct of her agents.479
Historically, the respondeat superior doctrine has been based
primarily on the notion-very much reflecting sentiments described
above-that a party capable of directly controlling the conduct of those
acting on her behalf is best able to reduce or avoid tortious conduct
within the sphere of her control, and, thus, ought to be accountable for
such torts.480 In so doing, respondeat superior serves the tort system's
476. Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability,
69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1767 n.1 (1996) (noting respondeat superior is "by far the most
important" form of vicarious liability). Nearly all recognize the doctrine as essential in our tort
system. See id. at 1745.
477. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 2.04 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2000) (stating an employer is liable for the torts of
employees committed in the scope of their employment).
478. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 2, 219(1).
479. By definition, a principal exercises or has the capacity to exercise some degree of control
over a person acting on his or her behalf. Id. § 1. But not all principals are masters subject to
vicarious tort liability. "A master is a principal who employs an agent to perform service in his
affairs and who controls or has the right to control the physical conduct of the other in the
performance of the service." Id. § 2(1). A principal who does not have the right to exercise this
kind of control is not a master. See id. § 2(3). In determining whether one wields sufficient
control to be a master, courts look at a variety of factors. All of these factors, however, focus on
the actual exercise or right to exercise control over the details of employees' work and the
workplace. See Ky. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers of Ky., Inc., 91
S.W.3d 575, 580 (Ky. 2002) (emphasizing control over "the details of the work"); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(a) & cmts. a-d; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04
cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001) (stating a master's right to control "is more detailed than the
right of control possessed by all principals, whether or not employers"). Unfortunately, although
greater guidance on drawing distinctions between master and non-master principals would be
helpful, the drafters of the Third Restatement of Agency have chosen not to explore this
distinction. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001)
(containing no definition of an employer or standards for determining which principals are
masters or employers).
480. See, e.g., Fleming James, Jr., Vicarious Liability, 28 TUL. L. REV. 161, 168 (1954);
Schwartz, supra note 476, at 1754 (discussing historical justifications); Gerald M. Stevens, The
Test of the Employment Relation, 38 MICH. L. REV. 188, 199 (1939).
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traditional goal of deterrence. 481 In addition, extending liability to the
principal/master may have the additional effect of facilitating
adequate compensation. 48 2 More recently, economic theorists have
defended respondeat superior liability on efficiency grounds: the
doctrine allocates losses efficiently by placing the initial loss burden
on the party (the principal/master) who can most efficiently bear the
risk. That is, it places the initial risk-bearing burden on the party
who not only is in the best position to prevent the loss, 48 3 but who also
can most efficiently bear or spread the loss. 48 4 Of course, this risk-
bearing analysis is familiar, since it parallels the analysis of risk
bearing within the firm addressed earlier in this Part.
So, if we seek to synthesize the contractarian view of the firm
with respondeat superior, who ought to be vicariously liable for torts
committed within the scope of the corporate enterprise? The
traditional answer has been that the entity itself is the only
principal/master, and courts continue to cling to this fiction. 485 But
481. Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 469 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that
respondeat superior serves as a deterrent by encouraging employers to closely supervise
employees and is limited in situations where no deterrent function is served); Schwartz, supra
note 476, at 1754; Bryant Smith, Cumulative Reasons and Legal Method, 27 TEX. L. REV. 454,
455 (1949).
482. The adequate compensation justification is not inherently linked to control, and it may
not stand on its own as an independent basis for vicarious liability. But it often is listed among
the factors supporting respondeat superior liability. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
§ 204 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002) ("Respondeat superior also reflects the likelihood that
an employer will be more likely to satisfy a judgment."). Some have suggested that respondeat
superior liability is based on the fact that the master benefits from the activities of employees.
But because both master and non-master principals benefit from the actions of agents,
respondeat superior cannot be based solely on such benefits.
483. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 184, at 170-71 (demonstrating that "where the principal
can observe and control the [employee's] level of care the actor will take optimal care whether
the principal is vicariously liable for full losses or only for the balance not paid by the actor and
whether the principal or actor initially bears the cost of care"); see also WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 121 (1987) (stating that
respondeat superior enlists the employer as an enforcer of tort law where tort liability against
the tortfeasor is unworkable or insufficient).
484. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN THE LAW OF TORTS 23 (1967) (arguing
that risk spreading among stockholders, employees, and customers is the most rational
justification for vicarious liability); Calabresi, supra note 368, at 543-44 (arguing that the
employer is "the best primary risk spreader"); Klemme, supra note 368, at 177-78.
485. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text; see also Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280,
282 (2003) (holding, in a unanimous opinion, that a corporate officer of a real estate company is
not vicariously liable for the violations of the Fair Housing Act committed within the scope of the
enterprise). In Meyer, the Supreme Court refused to extend vicarious liability for Fair Housing
Act violations to a corporate officer and sole shareholder, holding instead that only the entity (as
"employer") is vicariously liable under the Fair Housing Act for discriminatory practices of lower-
level employees. See id. at 289. In deciding that Congress did not intend to extend vicarious
liability to corporate officers under the Act, the Court inferred that, absent a contrary expression,
Congress intended ordinary background tort principles to apply. See id. at 289-91. In so doing,
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this conception is clearly inconsistent with the contractarian view,
which recognizes that the corporate entity has neither the capacity to
control nor the ability to allocate risk. Only the firm's participants
have preferences and the ability to act on them. 48 6
The participants within the firm who wield master-like
control-direct control over firm activities and employees-are
corporate officers.48 7 Controlling shareholders, directors, and lenders
may also have the right to exercise control over firm activities, but
they usually exercise indirect control akin to that of non-master
principals. 488 In reality, they do not have the capacity to control
conduct within the firm directly unless they assume officer-like
functions. And, given that these constituencies both must act through
officers and face information costs, they are not the firm's most
efficient initial risk bearers. 48 9 Likewise, managers and employees
down the chain of command may have very direct access to some firm
activities, but they likely do not have the authority to make strategic
decisions about risk and are not otherwise efficient risk bearers.
High-ranking corporate officers are the firm's most efficient initial
risk bearers, and, correspondingly, extending vicarious liability to
these participants furthers the goals of deterrence and compensation.
Thus, if courts apply the doctrine of respondeat superior in
light of the contractarian view of the firm, they should extend
vicarious liability for firm torts and tort-like statutory violations to
highest-ranking officers. 490 Such an extension of respondeat superior
the Court found that, absent special circumstances, ordinary vicarious liability rules extend
liability to the corporate entity only, not to corporate officers or shareholders. See id. Although I
argue courts should extend such liability to corporate officers, the Meyer Court correctly
describes the traditional and prevailing view. And, consistent with other decisions regarding
vicarious officer liability, Meyer simply echoes the standard fiction that employees work for
corporate entities, not the people who actually control these entities. See id.
486. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 184, at 189 ("The attitude toward risk of firms will reflect
the attitudes towards risk of their managers, employees, and shareholders."); Gulati et al., supra
note 309, at 891 ("[I]t is dangerous to ignore the reality that firms can transact only through
individuals, whose motivations may be different from those imputed to the abstraction.").
487. Again, corporate officers exercise control over the daily and ongoing operations of the
firm. See supra note 355 and accompanying text; see also Glanville Williams, Vicarious Liability
and the Master's Indemnity, 20 MOD. L. REV. 220, 230 n.29 (1957) (noting that the control-based
justification for respondeat superior ignores the fact that corporate officers and managers exert
greater control over employees than the corporate employer).
488. See supra notes 372, 446 and accompanying text.
489. See supra notes 368-373 and accompanying text. Indeed, Professor Shavell has argued
that vicarious liability is more effective as the principal's ability to observe and control the actor
increases. SHAVELL, supra note 184, at 171-72. Lower-level officers and employees have direct
involvement in firm activities-indeed, they may be the tortfeasors-but they are not otherwise
efficient risk bearers. See supra Part IV.A.2.
490. This is consistent with the view of Professor Gulati and his co-authors that the
appropriate analysis of which firm participant ought to be liable for corporate debts "would be to
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liability is consistent with both its traditional and efficiency-based
justifications.
This does not mean, however, that the entity should be free
from liability. The firm represents a bargain between its participants,
and each of these participants is aware that his or her particular
investment-capital, labor, opportunity costs-in the firm is at risk,
including the risk of liability for tort claims. 491 It does mean, instead,
that high-ranking corporate officers should be vicariously liable along
with the entity, thereby ensuring that the firm internalizes the risk.
Moreover, my proposed regime not only is consistent with the
traditional and economic justifications for respondeat superior, but
also furthers the goals of enterprise liability theory.492 Enterprise
liability theorists are concerned with the efficient allocation of risk for
injuries resulting from enterprise activities.493 They advocate the
extension of liability to the party best able both to prevent injuries and
to spread losses efficiently.494 Enterprise liability theorists therefore
tend to favor respondeat superior and other, more controversial forms
of "faultless" liability, such as strict products liability. 495  Yet
enterprise liability theory generally does not address the allocation of
examine each of the most proximate participants to determine which one, or which combination
of them, would most likely respond to incentives to take the optimal level of care." Gulati et al.,
supra note 309, at 930-31.
491. Thus, to the extent corporate officers or others bargain for protection and compel the
firm to retain capital and insurance to protect against tort losses, the law will enforce that
bargain.
492. Enterprise liability theory also seeks to allocate risk to various firms engaged in
commerce for a particular good, assigning the ultimate economic burden of defect avoidance and
insurance to the manufacturer. See Klemme, supra note 368, at 188. Without high-ranking
officer liability, however, shareholders and managers of manufacturers may have insufficient
incentives to prevent product defects, particularly latent defects, or to retain sufficient capital
and insurance to indemnify downstream distributors and retailers. And, although risk
avoidance is more difficult for downstream firms, regardless of whether there is highest-ranking
officer liability or not, officers of downstream firms faced with potential liability will have a
greater incentive spread the risk of loss efficiently than under today's regime. Indeed, standard
contracts may emerge whereby officers of upstream firms agree to indemnify officers of
downstream firms.
493. See Calabresi, supra note 368, at 499; Klemme, supra note 368, at 153, 177-78; Alan 0.
Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231 (1984). See generally Lewis A.
Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and Personal Liability for
Accidents, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1345 (1982).
494. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (1997); Calabresi,
supra note 368, at 543-45; Klemme, supra note 368, at 177-78; Joachim Zekoll, Liability for
Defective Products and Services, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 121, 140 (Supp. 2002). Underlying this
notion is that the price of goods or services should accurately reflect the true costs of making
them available. See Klemme, supra note 368, at 160.
495. See generally Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in
Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1056-61 (1972); Kiemme, supra note 368, at 174-78, 222-23.
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vicarious responsibility within the firm.496 Correspondingly, it offers
no mechanism for ensuring that someone within the firm internalizes
the risk of firm activities and compels the firm to take steps to avoid
and spread risk.497 Although high-ranking officer liability does not
address whether or when tort liability ought to arise for firm
activities, it does provide the otherwise absent, risk-internalizing
mechanism for those liabilities that do attach. Of course, many
criticize the existing tort regime and argue that tort law imposes
excessive liability in some contexts. If such normative claims are
accurate, they justify modifying those aspects of the tort regime. They
do not justify retention of so ill adapted a tool as limited liability,
which allows corporate participants to externalize the cost of many
risks that are undisputedly appropriate subjects for tort and tort-like
statutory liability. Limited liability, therefore, is overbroad as a check
against expansive tort liability and, correspondingly, is a rough and
inefficient substitute for appropriate tort reform. Thus, my proposal,
which focuses on correcting limited liability's inefficiencies, neither
embodies nor should be rejected based on normative assumptions
about whether or when tort liability ought to attach for firm activities.
Finally, because my proposal simply extends the doctrine of
respondeat superior, a creature of common-law tort and agency
principles, it offers a further implementation advantage over
unlimiting shareholder liability. By merely modifying an existing
common-law doctrine, my regime avoids the inter-jurisdictional
constraints of corporate law reform. 498 Unlimiting shareholder liability
most likely would have to be achieved through amendments to state
business corporation statutes.499 Yet, faced with such statutory reform
in one jurisdiction, firms would incorporate elsewhere to prevent
shareholder liability. 500 This potential exodus, in turn, will deter
496. Cf. Thompson, supra note 3, at 15 (stating that earlier enterprise liability scholarship
did not seek to extend these principles beyond the firm). These theorists tend to discuss only the
tortfeasor (if there is one), and the firm or employer.
497. See id. ('The recent flurry of proposals to extend liability beyond the enterprise builds
on the now-mature legal doctrine making the enterprise liable for acts of those within the firm
without applying strict causation or agency principles found in earlier law. The extension of
liability beyond the enterprise rests on similar efforts to make the enterprise internalize costs
and to spread costs to better risk-bearers.").
498. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1887-88, 1918 (making this argument in
support of their proposal to extend pro rata liability to shareholders).
499. Hansmann and Kraakman argue that their proposal should be viewed as one of tort law
and subject to traditional choice-of-law analysis in tort. Id. at 1921-22. I find this argument
unconvincing since the limitations on shareholder liability are contained in state business
corporation statutes.
500. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 5-6 ("The managers who pick the
state of incorporation that is most desirable from the perspective of investors will attract the
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reform. 50 1 Highest-ranking officer liability, on the contrary, would not
produce this deterrent effect. Because highest-ranking officer liability
would be an extension of vicarious liability in tort, courts would apply
their normal choice-of-law principles for tort actions, which usually
point to the law of the jurisdiction in which the tort occurred. 50 2 The
state of incorporation therefore would not be dispositive. In fact, even
if only a few jurisdictions adopt this approach, its efficiency-enhancing
effects may be widespread, since officers in firms engaged in
nationwide commerce would have to consider the risk of vicarious tort
liability in these jurisdictions.
V. CONCLUSION
Limited shareholder liability continues to generate
controversy. It should, since, as Professor Mendelson and others
persuasively demonstrate, it inflicts social costs. Proposals for reform
have largely focused on unlimiting shareholder liability, but,
realistically, the existing protections for shareholders are not going to
be dismantled through statutory reform or veil piercing. In addition,
some proposed alternatives-such as pro rata liability-threaten the
benefits of shareholder liability and would be administratively costly.
And all forms of shareholder liability are vulnerable to evasion
techniques and may have negative downstream consequences for
corporate governance. The challenge, then, is to find a realistic and
effective alternative approach to reducing the social costs of limited
shareholder liability.
The best solution is vicarious tort liability for highest-ranking
corporate officers. Contrary to prevailing thought, given their role
within the firm and risk characteristics, high-ranking officers are the
most efficient risk bearers in the corporate enterprise. By placing the
burden of liability on them, my proposed regime retains the beneficial
most money."). And, this choice of state of incorporation also may be dispositive if a tort plaintiff
seeks to hold a shareholder liable through veil piercing. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 1, at
532, n.58 (discussing New York's choice-of-law analysis in piercing cases and noting that several
courts applying this analysis have found that the piercing doctrine of the state of incorporation
governs the dispute).
501. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 6 ("So states compete to offer-and
managers to use-beneficial sets of legal rules."). Historically, we have seen this phenomenon,
which critics call the "race to the bottom," in the limited liability context and in other areas of
corporate law.
502. See Mary Elliott Roll6, Unraveling Accountability: Contesting Legal and Procedural
Barriers in International Toxic Tort Cases, 15 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 135, 184 (2003) (stating
that most common-law jurisdictions have adopted the lex loci delicti standard, whereby a court
will apply the law of the jurisdiction in which the tort occurred); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 175 (1971) (describing the lex loci delicti rule).
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effects of limited shareholder liability and counteracts its moral
hazard, and does so with minimal administrative costs. And officer
liability, unlike shareholder liability, is not easily evaded through
restructuring the enterprise. Finally, an officer-centered liability
regime can be implemented through judicial application of ordinary
tort doctrines consistent with the contractarian view of the firm. This
will synthesize tort and corporate law theory like no other previous
proposal, and will resolve the lingering conflict between limited
liability and the tort system's deterrence and compensation goals.

